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Demise of empire: Radical domestic reform and foreign policy under Stalin, Khrushchev, and Gorbachev

Stanger, Allison Katherine, Ph.D.

Harvard University, 1991

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DEMISE OF EMPIRE: RADICAL DOMESTIC REFORM AND FOREIGN POLICY UNDER STALIN, KHRUSHCHEV, AND GORBACHEV

A thesis presented

by

Allison Katherine Stanger

to

The Department of Government

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in the subject of

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Harvard University

Cambridge, Massachusetts

April, 1991

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To Katerina Kraus,
whose indomitable spirit endures

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DEMISE OF EMPIRE: RADICAL DOMESTIC REFORM AND FOREIGN POLICY UNDER STALIN, KHRUSHCHEV AND GORBACHEV

Allison Katherine Stanger

This study examines the impact of radical domestic reform on Soviet external behavior. It compares the foreign policies of three different campaigns for internal change: (1) Stalin's revolution from above [1929-33] (2) Khrushchev's de-Stalinization drive [1957-61]; and (3) Gorbachev's program of radical reform [1986-90]. In each historical episode, it shows how the attempt to transform the domestic landscape remade the process of foreign policy formulation and implementation in distinctive ways, and in so doing, shaped foreign policy outcomes.

Stalin's revolution from above recast the foreign policy of socialism's vanguard as the foreign policy of one man. The Khrushchev reforms restored oligarchical deliberation to the foreign policy process, but as a consequence of this transformation, Khrushchev's foreign policy was never entirely his own. Foreign policy positions during the Khrushchev years instead became bargaining chips in the internal power struggle over the scope and pace of domestic change. Moreover, de-Stalinization made the appearance of socialism's unfaltering advance beyond the Soviet Union's borders a more critical component of regime legitimacy.

In contrast, new political thinking and the Gorbachev revolutions from above and below combined to shift the locus

of foreign policy reform to the democratization of the foreign policy process, facilitating unprecedented global change. However, the de-ideologization of Soviet rhetoric and external behavior inadvertently exposed as cruel fiction the myth of the inexorable march of socialist accomplishment abroad. Consequently, the unintended result of the Gorbachev reforms was the irreparable draining of legitimacy from surviving communist institutions.

Thus, this thesis argues that the sea change in Soviet international behavior under Gorbachev was rooted in the transformation of Soviet domestic political processes, rather than in external developments. Further, the patterns in foreign policy outcomes prior to the rise of Gorbachev cannot be adequately explained without reference to domestic political factors that both systemic theory and the totalitarian model abstract away.

Thesis Advisor: Prof. Stanley Hoffmann

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INTRODUCTION

This thesis argues that the sea change in Soviet international behavior under Gorbachev was rooted in the transformation of Soviet domestic political processes, rather than in changes in the international system wrought by global interdependence, or the challenge posed by American foreign policy. Moreover, since the reform movement in the Soviet Union was not entirely the creation of Gorbachev and like-minded allies, but instead has its origins in earlier periods in Soviet history, foreign policy outcomes prior to the rise of Gorbachev also cannot be adequately explained without reference to domestic developments that the totalitarian model and its variants abstracted away. The quest to explain changes in Soviet external behavior under Gorbachev, therefore, inevitably leads the student of Soviet foreign policy back to domestic politics.

Maintaining that the battle for change in the Soviet system predates the rise to power of Gorbachev, this project explores the implications for foreign policy of recurrent leadership efforts to remake the domestic political

landscape. It postulates that if domestic factors are important for understanding Soviet international behavior, this should be particularly so for periods of radical transition. Thus, our focus will be on critical conjunctures in Soviet political development, and on the foreign policies of new leaders, rather than on the broad sweep of Soviet history. It will be argued that a framework that makes change central - i.e., one that focuses on episodes of systemic stress and their impact on perceptions of state interest - can also provide insight into the dynamics of state interest formation in more stable times.

Specifically, this study seeks to answer the following question: "Does radical domestic reform affect elite conceptions of national interest, and if so, then how?"[1] To accomplish this task, the chapters that follow will explore the connection between attempts to revitalize Soviet political culture and evolving conceptions of Soviet national interest by examining three cases where conscious efforts to mold political culture have occurred in Soviet history, in each assessing the impact of domestic change on foreign policy: (1) Stalin's revolution from above (2) Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign; and (3) Gorbachev's program of radical reform. Obviously, very different agendas for domestic change were pursued in each of these cases, allowing us to determine whether it matters for

[1]The implicit assumption is that state choices reflect elite conceptions of interest.

foreign policy what type of internal transformation is pursued, or whether domestic upheaval of any sort produces similar patterns of "turning inward."

To make the project less unwieldy, the scope of inquiry is restricted along two lines. First, I am primarily interested in changes in Soviet conceptions of national interest vis-a-vis the Soviet Union's relationship with the West. An analysis of how Soviet images of the enemy and perceptions of "otherness" have changed over time is, I believe, particularly revealing. Thus, my principal, though by no means exclusive, interest is in Soviet-US relations and Soviet-West European relations.

Second, each case study emphasizes approximately the first five years of each leader's tenure in power. Because the effects of newly promulgated reform or revolutionary policies stand out most clearly in the immediate post-succession years, when a new leader's vision of the future has yet to collide fully with stubborn social and systemic realities, this restriction narrows my investigation without sacrificing too much of significance. The use of the first five years as the frame of reference also allows for a parallel study, despite the unfinished nature of the Gorbachev era.

For each episode of Soviet international behavior, the broader phenomenon of Soviet interest is examined from three different perspectives. That is to say, in each case, Soviet foreign policy is broken down into three sub-fields:

diplomatic policy, international economic policy, and what I call transnational policy, this rubric encompassing the Soviet Union's relations with international organizations, from the Comintern to the United Nations.

Analyzing Soviet foreign policy from the perspective of these basic constituent parts facilitates a richer comparative exercise.[2] First, organizing the inquiry in this way expands the number of cases examined from three to nine, thereby increasing the degree of confidence with which we can present our larger comparative findings. Second, it allows for fruitful comparison within each case itself, enabling us to determine whether programs for radical domestic change affect different issue areas in similar fashion, or whether some aspects of external policy are influenced by leadership for change, while others are not or are less so. Finally, evaluating Soviet foreign policy through the lens of these three categories over time, can also reveal whether change, when it does occur, takes place at an equivalent rate in each sub-field, or whether the march of change is accelerated in some cases, and slower in others.

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[2]Obviously, there is often substantial overlap between the three categories deployed in each historical episode. Structuring the investigation in this way is not meant to imply otherwise. Rather, the argument is that analyzing Soviet foreign policy from these three perspectives will ultimately reveal much more than the somewhat artificial division of policy outcomes could obscure.

The investigations that follow are guided by the method of structured and focused comparison elaborated by Alexander George.[3] Within each case, "process-tracing" will be used to evaluate policy strategies for radical domestic change, changes in important intermediary variables - particularly, the quantity and quality of participation and contestation in the foreign policy process - and the evolution of conceptions of state interest. Put another way, our inquiry will pay special attention to the ways in which the domestic agenda affects the institutions, personnel and process of foreign policy formulation. In Harry Eckstein's terms, the cases may also be thought of as sequential plausibility probes of the theoretical assertion that attempts to change political culture affect how states view their interests.[4]

By now, it should be clear to the reader that the aim of this study is not to "test" a particular theory nor to disprove existing ones. That new approaches are needed follows from the inability of old frameworks to elucidate the transformation of Soviet priorities under Gorbachev. Rather, the principal aim of this project is to assemble

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[3]See Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured and Focused Comparison," in Paul Lauren, ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy (New York: Free Press, 1979), pp. 43-68.

[4]Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., The Handbook of Political Science (Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1975), vol. 7, especially pp. 96-123.

what Larry Summers has called a "persuasive collage" of empirical and mid-range theoretical insights.[5] In dispensing with the assumptions that prevented us from anticipating the collapse of the Soviet empire, this study seeks to lay the foundation for an alternative framework for thinking about Soviet foreign policy, one which can shed additional light on where Soviet external policy has been, as well as where it may be going.

* * * * * * *

The study is divided into six chapters. The aim here has been to introduce the central questions and assumptions that guide the project. The argument in Chapter One has two components. The first briefly explains why international relations theory cannot be our point of departure. The second, the lion's share of the chapter, explores the relevant political science literature on domestic and foreign policy change and on foreign policy in an effort to define important terms and construct a tentative working analytical framework for thinking about change.

Armed with the theoretical tools presented in Chapter One, Chapters Two through Four are the substantive case chapters. Chapter Two examines the foreign policy of Stalin's revolution from above, focusing on the years of the

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[5]Lawrence H. Summers, "The Scientific Illusion in Macroeconomics," paper prepared for the Second NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 1987.

first five year plan, 1929-33. Chapter Three turns to an assessment of Khrushchev's de-Stalinization efforts and their impact on the formulation of Soviet foreign policy from 1957-61. The subject for Chapter Four is the complex relationship between the dual domestic agendas of perestroika and glasnost and Soviet foreign policy processes and outcomes under Gorbachev from 1986-90.

Chapter Five is a short epilogue that addresses the question of the probable impact of the rise of opposition to Gorbachev on the future of Soviet foreign policy. Finally, Chapter Six presents the comparative findings from Chapters Two through Four and the project's conclusions.

CHAPTER ONE

BRINGING POLITICS BACK IN: THE DOMESTIC ORIGINS OF STATE BEHAVIOR

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first seeks to establish the necessity of confronting the complexities of domestic politics when posing questions of foreign policy change; while systemic theories can explain important aspects of state behavior, in assuming that states have fixed preferences, they are inevitably mute on the subject of changing interests. Having demonstrated that domestic politics must be our starting point, the second section reviews the political development and social mobilization literature of the 1960s. It argues that we need not start completely anew in thinking about change, but may glean valuable insights from prior work in political science.

The third section clarifies what is meant by domestic reform; i.e., it specifies the project's independent variable. Finally, section four attempts to sketch the general outline of a working analytical framework for thinking about the relationship between domestic reform and foreign policy, defining conceptions of state interest, the dependent variable, and identifying important intermediary variables that serve as transmission belts between ongoing games at the domestic and international levels.

Contending with Change: The Limits of Systemic Theory

A common feature in each of the three cases that this thesis examines is a heightened Soviet interest in cooperation, both diplomatic and economic, with the capitalist West. Given this, it might seem that some elaboration or extension of international regime theory could potentially hold valuable insights for elucidating Soviet international behavior in times of domestic disarray. Prima facie appearances to the contrary, however, regime theory does not provide us with a viable point of departure for explaining Soviet foreign policy outcomes, either past or present. This is, as we shall see, largely due to limitations imposed by two of its central assumptions.

Though their predictive visions differ significantly, both neorealism and its rival perspective, regime theory - I refer here to the variant that Robert Keohane calls "neoliberal institutionalism"[1] - start with the same assumption: that state preferences are fixed and sturdy

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[1]For a full elaboration of this particular research perspective, see the first chapter, "Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World Politics," in Robert Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989). For a collection of essays that elucidate the range of approaches that the international regime theory literature encompasses, see Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).

enough to build a model upon.[2] This is a powerful, simplifying assumption, one that is standard in most economic theories, and one that has surely produced results in the international relations theory literature. However, what is a powerful assumption under circumstances of international stability becomes a limiting assumption when a disruption in existing patterns of state behavior is the phenomenon to be explained. Placing the assumption of fixed preferences at the core of a theoretical perspective simultaneously places the possibilities of change, both domestic and systemic, beyond the scope of the model. Hence, when state preferences are in flux, the power of systemic theory can only decline commensurately.

Under certain conditions, then, both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism can be equally unreliable guides to interpreting state behavior. That is, there are times when change or attempted change must be the focus of attention, if theory is to stand any chance of guiding our assessment of evolving realities. To make the point more

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[2] I do not rehearse the shortcomings of realism and neorealism here, as they have been more than effectively documented elsewhere. See, for example, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds., Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), particularly the introductory and concluding chapters; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977); Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

succinctly, Keohane's telling critique of neorealism may, to a certain extent, be turned on neoliberal institutionalism itself; particularly during periods of rapid change in a cooperating state's political development, neoliberal institutionalism, like the neorealist theory it criticizes, is underspecified, producing misleading conclusions about the origins of international cooperation.

Moreover, even in times of relative stability, when the assumption of fixed preferences is appropriate, neoliberal institutionalism can shed little light on the international behavior of communist states. One of regime theory's principal accomplishments was that it successfully incorporated the significant fact of increasing political and economic interdependence in a systemic theory of international relations. In so doing, it highlighted the existence and importance of multiple channels of interstate and transnational interaction. Yet in communist states, where both the economy and political system are centrally planned, all pathways to the external world are supervised and monitored by the Party. By layering carefully selected constraints on neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism yields valuable insights into the international actions of liberal states "after hegemony", but those same constraints limit its relevance for explaining the external behavior of illiberal regimes.

The preceding discussion, however, in no way means to suggest that this project aspires to found a replacement for

either realism or neorealism. It is, instead, an attempt to point to circumstances, in addition to those elaborated in the regime literature, where both variants falter. The argument for an approach that emphasizes the domestic origins of state behavior, like the argument for neoliberal institutionalism, need not represent a rejection of the realist paradigm, but instead should be viewed as a way of layering constraints on the realist model, of enriching realism, rather than pronouncing it obsolete.[3]

To summarize, there are two principal shortcomings in both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism for our purposes here. First, both perspectives assume fixed preferences, precluding from the outset the possibility of evaluating changing preferences and the consequences that follow from such a shift. Second, the set of research questions each perspective generates are not the most important questions for the study of the external behavior of communist states; that is, where neorealism is underspecified, neoliberal institutionalism inadvertently

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[3]The case for a return to domestic politics, to the study of "how a combination of domestic and international processes shape preferences," has been persuasively made by two of regime theory's principal architects. See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "Power and Interdependence Revisited," International Organization, vol. 41, no. 4, Autumn 1987, especially pp. 752-3. See also Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," International Organization, vol. 41, no. 3, summer 1987. After critically reviewing the international regimes literature, Haggard and Simmons conclude that its major shortcoming has been its failure to incorporate domestic politics adequately.

left the communist world out. If our interest is in understanding change in the international actions of communist states, we must launch our investigation from another vantage point.

One potential bridge between second and third image theory, a curious hybrid of a domestic politics approach to understanding international behavior, is the state itself. This has been a concern of one component of the recent "bringing the state back in" debate in the comparative politics literature.[4] The statists start with the premise that "state" action and "societal" action are best treated as analytically distinct entities. The central issue in foreign policy research, according to Stephen Krasner, then becomes, "how do institutional structures change in response to alterations in domestic and international environments and then in subsequent time periods influence those environments?"[5]

What does this imply for the way in which foreign policy is to be evaluated and analyzed? Krasner puts it thus:

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[4]See Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); Stephen D. Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics, Comparative Politics, January, 1984, pp. 223-246; Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

[5]Stephen Krasner, ibid., p. 224.

> [The statist paradigm] is premised upon an intellectual vision that sees the state autonomously formulating goals that it then attempts to implement against resistance from international and domestic actors. The ability of the state to overcome domestic resistance depends upon the instruments of control that it can exercise over groups within its own society.[6]

Though the preceding may serve to raise an eyebrow or two for the student of the foreign policies of the western democracies, it is not at all eyebrow-raising for the Sovietologist. No Sovietologist needed to argue for bringing the state back in when the state was alive and well, with a death grip on civil society. Students of Soviet politics were left with few alternatives to what has been described above as the statist paradigm.

This is not the same as to say that all Sovietologists openly embraced the totalitarian model. My point is that upon closer inspection, even the bureaucratic or interest group models were in the end clandestinely state-centric. Though bold in their initial proclamations, the sum total of the subsequent qualifiers usually came to something less than the totalitarian model, but little more than most models of authoritarian regimes. And unfortunately, little more was necessary, though most wished it were not so, for understanding the central dynamics of the Brezhnev era.

Happily, and for many, incredibly, with the emergence of glasnost and perestroika in the Soviet Union, these older models have seen better days. More to the point, they are

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[6]Stephen Krasner, ibid., pp. 10-11.

near useless for understanding recent events, since none of them, save, perhaps, some variant of the interest group model, allowed for the possibility of domestic political change. But does the reemergence of civil society in the Soviet Union mean that state-centric models for interpreting Soviet foreign policy now also miss the mark? Since resistance to foreign policy decisions is characteristically the last sort of opposition to be openly tolerated by non-democratic states, the statist framework remains a good starting point, so long as one bears in mind that the very nature of the state itself may ultimately be affected by efforts to transform domestic political arrangements. Put another way, while one may safely retain the statist _framework_ for assessing foreign policy, how one _defines_ the state within that framework may require modification over time. For example, as glasnost spreads to new realms, the state may have to be defined more inclusively than it would have been under less liberal domestic conditions.

I have dealt briefly with some of the statist writings here, not because I believe the aims of this project are best understood when situated within this literature, but because they provide a useful point of comparison with the perspective on world politics that will be employed in this project. Both are interested in how institutional structures respond to domestic change and subsequently affect foreign policy. As will be seen, I am most interested, however, in how states (or elites), through

efforts to change political culture, can influence what Krasner calls the domestic environment as well as institutions themselves. Thus, compared with the statists, my framework is somewhat less ambiguous about the sources of changes in institutional structure. It points a finger at the party leadership and places the aims and aspirations of that elite at the center of its analysis.

Neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and the statists, in the end, share a common blind spot, domestic politics. The scholar interested in the origins of changing state preferences is forced to look elsewhere for theoretical support.

Social Mobilization and Political Development Revisited

I have argued thus far that the more parsimonious theories of interstate behavior can shed little light on the external policies of communist states. In the field of Soviet foreign policy studies, most Sovietologists found some variant of the totalitarian model to be the most serviceable second image theory, until the rise of Gorbachev rendered that metaphor largely impotent. The student of Soviet foreign policy is left with little choice, then, but to focus his attention on the domestic context of Soviet international behavior. The search for a viable alternative to the totalitarian framework, one than might shed light on the Soviet Union's past as well as its present and future,

is a principal task of this thesis. But where should we begin when attempting to build anew?

In their race to construct new models to come to terms with unprecedented developments, political scientists are often too quick to discount the value of first returning to the results of earlier work in the discipline. In understanding recent change in the Soviet Union and Central Europe, there is much to be gained from a reexamination of the political culture and political development literature of the 1960s. Hence, so that we might avoid reinventing the wheel, a brief tour of the pertinent aspects of the discipline's earlier attempts to understand change is in order.

Generally speaking, the political development literature typically employed political culture as an instrument for assessing the prospects for lasting socioeconomic and political change in the direction of greater democracy. Its domain of analysis varied according to the precise manner in which development itself was defined. The third world was the most common focus of research energies, though the revival/imposition of democracy in post-war Germany, Italy, and Japan were also explored at length. Political change was usually construed as a unidirectional force; without external intervention, a state's political culture was a principal determinant of whether a developing country became more democratic or, alternatively, stagnated in the backwater of

authoritarianism and dependency.[7] Political development is defined herein as the "political consequences of modernization,"[8] where modernization is to be viewed as a process relevant to problems the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe presently face. This point will be developed further below.

Those studies of political culture and development that were interested in the dynamics of cultural change were most likely to focus on cultural change imposed from without, either as a product of colonialism or a conscious post-war policy aim of the victors for the vanquished.[9] Hence, they distinguished between "donor" and "recipient" cultures. What has been overlooked, however, is that the culture-bearing entities, both the donor and the recipient, can emanate from the same nation-state; that is, cultural change can be imposed from _within_ by a calculating political leadership as well as from without. While the cultural

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[7]I speak here in enormous generalities; the literature on political development is vast and far more complicated than this paragraph would seem to imply. Nevertheless, I paint this oversimplified picture in order to make the contours of my research strategy stand out most clearly.

[8] This is the definition utilized by Samuel Huntington and Jorge Dominguez in their chapter on political development for the Handbook of Political Science. See Samuel Huntington and Jorge Dominguez, "Political Development," in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., _Handbook of Political Science_ (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1975), vol. 3, p. 5.

[9]For an insightful investigation of the impact of foreign domination on the prospects for democracy, see the final chapter of Robert A. Dahl, _Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition_ (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).

change that follows from social mobilization and an increasingly well-educated polity has been thoroughly examined, the coercive forms of social mobilization, relevant for the Soviet case in particular and communist countries in general, can also produce cultural change and need further examination. Strategies for planned cultural change may have much in common with the processes at work when the victors "aid" the vanquished in the construction of post-war political orders.

Of course, here I do not mean to imply that planned cultural change has been ignored by political scientists, for this is far from the case.[10] The point I wish to make is that the study of cultural change in communist states has been all too often geared toward pronouncements of the failure of efforts to forge an improved socialist man and too little concerned with assessing the degree of failure (that is, the elements of success in a policy that has failed overall) and with the unintended consequences of recurrent attempts to transform existing political culture. Most important, the implications of policies of planned cultural change for the foreign policy of the state on the

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[10]See, for example, Archie Brown and Jack Gray, eds., Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1977); Richard Fagen, The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969); Frederick C. Barghoorn, "Soviet Russia: Orthodoxy and Adaptiveness," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).

cultural operating table have yet to be systematically investigated. Just as political development was studied as a consequence of modernization, so too the implications of modernization and modernity, resulting from either conscious planning or free-form evolutionary processes, for foreign policy should be analyzed.

The political development and social mobilization/participation literatures, although addressed primarily to the problems of a non-communist developing world, can aid us in better understanding communism's contemporary development crisis. We can utilize some of the concepts and ideas first developed in the 1960s to shed light on ongoing liberalization processes taking place in the Soviet Union today.

The preceding is, at first glance, a somewhat counter-intuitive proposition. If political scientists have long ago relegated communist systems to the ranks of the thoroughly modern, what is the meaning of the old vocabulary of political development studies within this context? Here one should remember that while the transition from traditional modes and orders to the state of modernity may be a one-shot proposition, in the sense that modernity implies the attainment of a self-consciousness from which there is no real retreat, the phenomenon of social mobilization is not. A given community may be socially mobilized, with all that this transformation entails, permanently modernized, and then once authority patterns

have been firmly established, demobilized and remobilized according to the whims of a decaying totalitarianism's leadership, who are involved in an ongoing and capricious process of deciding how the masses should and should not be behaving at any given moment.[11] Put another way, the transition to modernity may be a one-way street, but modernization, democratization and social mobilization are two-way thoroughfares, and this is particularly the case for communist regimes.

Events of the twentieth century have demonstrated that, even in the absence of significant foreign intervention, democratization is not an irreversible process, that both nascent and full-fledged democracy can be undermined from within.[12] An awareness of the possibility of multi-directional change in political arrangements is particularly important in the study of communist regimes. A new leader of a communist polity who seeks change can either attempt to single-mindedly further Marxist ideals, or he can simply try to undo the excesses of past single-minded efforts to speed

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[11]One question that is important now, with respect to the case of the Soviet Union, is, can a people be demobilized and remobilized indefinitely by the same political system? The answer would seem to be in the negative, that people can only be manipulated so many times by a given political system before a legitimation crisis threatens to overwhelm existing political arrangements.

[12]Examples are numerous and include the collapse of Weimar Germany, Brezhnevian stagnation, the demise of democracy in Nigeria, the failure, subsequent restoration and presently unstable status of democracy in Argentina, ongoing processes in Central America etc.

up the arrival of the long awaited communist utopia on earth by combatting the weighty legacy of the past with liberalization policies. Of course, leadership for non-change,[13] aptly illustrated in the Soviet case by the Brezhnev era, always exists as an alternative. But the bias in communist regimes will generally be on the side of change or "progress," since the value system of communism is typically one of "ideological activism."[14]

Karl Deutsch defined social mobilization in 1961 as, "the process in which major clusters of old social, economic, and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior."[15] For the Sovietologist, this definition reads like a description of a general recurrent pattern in Soviet history. Social mobilization was a major

[13]This is Robert C. Tucker's phrase. See, in particular, Robert C. Tucker, Politics as Leadership (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1981).

[14]For further elaboration of this point, see Daniel Bell, "Ideology and Soviet Politics," in Richard Cornell, ed., The Soviet Political System: A Book of Readings (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970). See also Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, Political Power: USA/USSR (New York: Penguin Books, 1977), pp. 45-52.

[15]Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," in Jason Finkle and Richard Gable, eds., Political Development and Social Change (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1971), second edition. Excerpted from Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review, September 1961, pp. 493-514. Samuel Huntington and Jorge Dominguez also employ this definition in their chapter on political development in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby eds., Handbook of Political Science (Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co, 1975), vol. 3, pp. 1-98.

component - indeed, to an extreme degree - of Stalin's revolution from above and of Khrushchev's de-Stalinization policies, each leader demanding from both the masses and the elite very different forms of political involvement.

Further, Deutsch's definition could also double as a description of Gorbachev's efforts to revitalize both mass and elite Soviet political culture. In the past, Gorbachev himself has characterized his goals deploying very similar terms, cautioning against panic in the face of rising domestic unrest:

> "If perestroika is a revolution - and we agreed that it is - and if it means profound changes in attitudes toward property, the status of the individual, the basics of the political system and the spiritual realm, and if it transforms the people into a real force of change in society, then how can all of this take place quietly and smoothly?"[16]

Deutsch's article, written in 1961, also speaks volumes about the forces of disorder perestroika has unleashed in the non-Russian republics. In prescient fashion, Deutsch then warned that social mobilization processes will inevitably threaten the unity of ethnicly heterogeneous nation-states:

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[16]Quoted in Bill Keller, "Amid Rising Alarm, Gorbachev Urges a Purge of Party," (a misleading headline, for Gorbachev never uses the word chistka [purge], a word imbued with great historical significance, once in the entire transcript of the meeting in question, though the headline would seem to suggest otherwise) New York Times, July 22, 1989, p. A1. The party meeting at which Gorbachev spoke these words took place July 18, 1989, and the transcript of the meeting was published in Pravda July 21, 1989.

> "Other things assumed equal, the stage of rapid social mobilization may be expected...to promote the consolidation of states whose people already share the same language, culture, and major social institutions; while the same process may tend to strain or destroy the unity of states whose population is already divided into several groups with different languages or cultures or basic ways of life."[17]

Thus, past work on social mobilization and related processes sheds light on both the Soviet Union's past and present. Mobilization of a weary Soviet population is at the heart of Gorbachev's attempt to transform the Soviet Union and of past programs for radical change as well.

Another important feature of the political development literature was its sensitivity to the crucial factors distinguishing traditional man from modern man, traditional politics from modern politics. Traditional man "is passive and acquiescent; he expects continuity in nature and society and does not believe in the capacity of man to change or control either. Modern man, in contrast, believes in both the possibility and the desirability of change, and has confidence in the ability of man to control change so as to accomplish his purposes."[18]

These definitions highlight yet another paradox of contemporary Soviet society. After more than seventy years of broken promises and deferred delivery of the fruits of

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[17]Karl Deutsch in Jason Finkle and Richard Gable, eds., op. cit. (1971), p. 395.

[18]Samuel P. Huntington, "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development and Politics," Comparative Politics, April 1971, p. 287.

constructed socialism, the characterization of traditional man depicted above, rather than that of modern man, best described the typical Soviet citizen of the 1980s. Until only very recently, the Soviet Union might have been construed as a society comprised of traditional subjects in the midst of one of the most thoroughly modern political experiments ever conducted. Hence, it is possible to have a "modern" polity comprised of what are, for all practical purposes, entirely unmodern citizens. Glasnost's task, however, was to remobilize this long-dormant Soviet civil society, in a sense, to remodernize a population that had been beaten over the head with an eclectic barrage of modernization policies so repeatedly, that in self-defense it had seemingly retreated into a safely fatalistic collective stupor. After six years of perestroika in power, the irony is that glasnost's success has spelled glasnost's demise.

The Dynamics of Leadership for Domestic Reform

The comparative enterprise of the proceeding chapters is based on the working hypothesis that if the origins of Soviet foreign policy are rooted in domestic political factors, then internal change has implications for external behavior. In the case studies that follow, our aim is to tease out the mechanism that links internal and external policy. In order to do that successfully, we need to be clear about the meaning of the terms that we will deploy.

Communist movements are typically leader-centered; consequently, in addressing the question of the relationship between domestic and foreign policy change in the Soviet Union, special attention must be paid to the leadership factor. The framework this thesis will utilize to evaluate the relationship between programs for domestic renewal and Soviet perceptions of national interest borrows generously from the work of Robert C. Tucker on political culture and leadership.

As Professor Tucker has emphasized, leadership for change can either be revolutionary or reform-oriented in nature. While both the reform leader and the revolutionary leader reject the existing political culture (usually at both the elite and mass levels), we can distinguish the reformer from the revolutionary by reference to: (1) the tempo at which cultural change is pursued, and (2) the leader's attitude to what Tucker calls the "sustaining myth" of the society in question.[19] The reform leader pursues change that is evolutionary in nature, while embracing the

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[19]A full discussion of these distinctions may be found in Robert C. Tucker, Political Culture and Leadership in Soviet Russia (New York: W.W. Norton, 1987), pp. 12-32. Professor Tucker's analysis also builds on a distinction he makes between ideal and actual cultural patterns. My framework, though indebted in many ways to Tucker's ideas, does not rely on this distinction, since I have excluded behavior from my definition of political culture. In a sense, my theoretical structure attempts a synthesis of two opposing approaches; I employ Sidney Verba's behavior-exclusive definition of political culture, but find Robert Tucker's vocabulary and insights essential for understanding cultural change in communist systems, especially in the Soviet case.

society's sustaining myth. In contrast, the revolutionary leader seeks radical and immediate change, rejecting the society's sustaining myth in his endeavor to rebuild society from the foundation up.[20] What both revolutionary and reformer have in common, however, is a desire to remake the existing political culture.

But what is the meaning of the term "sustaining myth"? A polity's sustaining myth refers to "a notion or concept of that society as a common enterprise. It represents what is distinctly valuable about the society from the standpoint of its members."[21] The sustaining myth for a given polity should be viewed as a fundamental component of the society's operative ideals. The sustaining myth of the United States, for example, might be depicted as the view that ours is a nation of free and equal citizens, founded on the ideals of constitutional democracy, separation of powers, and tolerance for religious and racial diversity. The sustaining myth of the Soviet Union, on the other hand, might be crudely characterized as the pursuit of full communism, through strict adherence to the precepts of Marxism-Leninism, as a transcendent goal worthy of the entire world's efforts.

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[20]Timothy Colton's distinction between radical and moderate reform parallels the distinction made here between revolutionary and reform leadership. See Timothy Colton, The Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet Union (New York: The Council on Foreign Relations, 1986), pp. 4-5.

[21]Robert C. Tucker, op. cit. (1987), p. 22.

Depicted thus, the Soviet sustaining myth is seen to have both internal (domestic) and external (international) dimensions. The internal dimension emphasizes the world historical significance of building socialism well and rapidly in the Soviet Union, following the basic roadmap provided by Marx and Lenin. The external element insists that other nations should - and will, eventually - do the same.

As we shall see in the chapters that follow, while Stalin's revolution from above recast developing patterns of communist legitimation in the dictator's image, both Khrushchev and Gorbachev, through the vehicle of ideological revisionism, attempted to de-Stalinize and revitalize the Bolshevik sustaining myth. Embracing both its original internal and external dimensions, those described above, Khrushchev prescribed new means for pursuing old ends in his doctrine of peaceful coexistence. Gorbachev, however, attempted to reject the external component of the Soviet sustaining myth - the longstanding faith in the inevitability and desirability of the ultimate communist world triumph - in order to focus on building new forms of socialism within the Soviet Union. In so doing, Gorbachev underestimated the extent to which the legitimacy of communism in power in the Soviet Union, in the absence of mass terror, relied on the maintenance of both dimensions of the Bolshevik sustaining myth.

This dissertation, then, examines the foreign policies of both revolutionary and reform leadership. Moreover, it maintains that it is useful to think of both types of domestic agendas as attempts to change existing political culture. For communist political systems, the effort to remake political culture is rarely a once and for all proposition, occurring solely at the time of the revolution. On the contrary, conscious attempts by the leadership to reshape political culture recur in Marxist-Leninist systems, and this is particularly so in the Soviet case. This project seeks to demonstrate that defining the independent variable in the way delineated above can illuminate the relationship between domestic and foreign policy change.

My study utilizes Sidney Verba's classic definition of political culture as "the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place. [Political culture] provides the subjective orientation to politics."[22] Political culture, conceptually, "encompasses both the political ideals and the operating norms of a polity."[23] Thus, this project defines political culture in a behavior-exclusive manner. Such a definition parts ways both with

[22]Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., Political Culture and Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 513.

[23]Lucian W. Pye, "Introduction: Political Culture and Political Development," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., op. cit. (1965), p. 8.

the work of anthropologists and with several past investigations of political culture in the Soviet studies literature, which distinguish between "ideal" cultural patterns (what people believe) and "actual" cultural patterns (how people behave), thereby including behavior in their definition of political culture.[24]

The distinction between definitions of political culture that include behavior and those that do not is certainly theoretically useful, but when it comes to deploying the "subjectivist"[25] (behavior-exclusive) definition in actual research, the line between the two definitions quickly blurs. As subjectivist data typically consists of what people write and say, both being phenomena requiring positive action, behavior inevitably creeps back in through the back window of any purported behavior-exclusive operationalization of political culture, no matter how carefully analytical distinctions are drawn at the outset.

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[24]For studies utilizing the behavior-inclusive definition of culture, see Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Robert C. Tucker, "Culture, Political Culture and Communist Society," Political Science Quarterly, vol. 88, no. 2, June 1973, pp. 173-90; Stephen P. White, Political Culture and Soviet Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), especially p. 1 and pp. 16-18.

[25]The label is Mary McAuley's. See Mary McAuley, "Political Culture and Communist Politics: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back," in Archie Brown, ed., Political Culture and Communist Studies (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1985), pp. 14-15.

Fully aware of the potential pitfalls, this project, nevertheless, employs a subjectivist definition of political culture, since it aims, in the end, to comprehend better how leadership attempts to manipulate political culture can alter elite conceptions of state interest - those interests that are reflected in foreign policy outcomes. Although political culture itself is not my independent variable, restricting the theoretical definition of political culture and its subsequent operationalization to exclude overt behavior will facilitate the process of tracing out an extremely complex set of intercorrelated variables that, in contrast, a broader conceptualization of political culture would only serve further to entangle.

In defining political culture in a behavior-exclusive manner, this thesis does not mean to suggest either that institutions do not play an important role in shaping political behavior, or that culture can wholly explain

institutional development.[26] Rather, it acknowledges that the web of causal relationships between a polity's culture and institutional structure is by nature tremendously complicated.[27] It focuses on the impact of policies for cultural change on foreign policy, rather than on the limits which the more immutable aspects of political culture place on state behavior. In so doing, the interactive relationship between culture and structure is highlighted, rather than hammered into obedient causal configuration.

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[26]One of the principal criticisms of the political culture literature was that it implicitly asserted that culture produces structure; by treating political culture as the independent variable and political institutions as the dependent variable, these critics argued, structure was implicitly assumed to be culturally predetermined. See, for example, Carole Pateman, "Political Culture, Political Structure and Political Change," British Journal of Political Science, vol. 1, July 1971, pp. 291-305. Pateman, criticizing the approach of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba's The Civic Culture, argues that the effects of structure on culture have been overlooked by scholars more interested in evaluating the effects of culture on structure, which leads to the implicit relegation of some cultures to non-democratic forms of governance in perpetuity. Brian Barry has also maintained that Almond and Verba did not adequately acknowledge the possibility that the civic culture might be a product of democratic institutions, rather than vice versa, that political structure can affect political culture. See Brian Barry, Sociologists, Economists and Democracy (London: Collier-MacMillan, 1970).

[27]This is not to say that this particular criticism of the political culture literature was always deserved. Almond and Verba, the targets of Barry's and Pateman's attacks on the civic culture approach (see preceding footnote), themselves never asserted causal unidirectionality between the variables of culture and structure. For an effective elaboration of this point, see Arend Lijphart, "The Structure of Inference," in Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., The Civic Culture Revisited (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980), pp. 47-9.

On the question of whether political culture is something that actually exists in reality or instead resides solely in the imaginations of frustrated social scientists, then, this project argues that not only is political culture something that exists in practice, but moreover, it can be fruitfully assessed and analyzed. "Political culture does exist if people believe it exists and act accordingly; this certainly pertains to the Communist World."[28] The preceding proposition is particularly relevant for the case of the Soviet Union, where the term political culture was first utilized by Lenin himself[29] and today stands as a frequently deployed term in current Soviet political commentary.[30]

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[28]Leslie Holmes, Politics in the Communist World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 77.

[29]Stephen White, op. cit. (1979), p. 2.

[30]Fyodor Burlatsky, presently a political commentator for the pro-perestroika Literaturnaia Gazeta and previously one of Khrushchev's chief speechwriters, seems to have been one of the first to use the term systematically. See, for example his Lenin, Gosudarstvo, Revolutsiia (Moscow, 1970), p. 327. In a book published several years later, Burlatsky remarks that the term "is winning an increasing degree of recognition" in Soviet writings. See Sotsiologiia, Politika, Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia (Moscow, 1974), p. 40. Even Brezhnvev spoke of political culture in an article in Kommunist, no. 9, 1974, p. 10.

More recently, Burlatsky frequently appealed to the concept of political culture in a talk at the Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 27 September 1988, speaking of the "patriarchal-authoritarian political culture" of Khrushchev's day. Interestingly, books by two of the leading proponents of political culture approaches for studying the Soviet Union, Robert C. Tucker's Stalin as Revolutionary and his former student Steve Cohen's Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution, were published in the Soviet Union in 1989.

Having defined political culture in a general sense above, a refinement is now in order. Thus far, I have used the term generically; but obviously, political culture, regardless of whether or not it is defined to exclude political behavior, is far from a monolithic concept. At the most basic level, elite culture must be distinguished from mass culture.[31] The beliefs and attitudes of the average citizen about politics are generally quite different in structure from those of political elites; mass belief systems are not as highly integrated as elite belief systems - i.e., they are more fragmented, less coherent.[32] As Sidney Verba has noted, much of what "we have assumed to be the political culture of a society may in fact be the political ideology of political elites or the political theory of political scientists."[33] Though it is certainly possible to combine an investigation of both mass and elite belief systems in one research project, the student of political culture must always take care to specify when the

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[31]Of course, within both categories, a variety of subcultures can be identified. For this project, however, the distinction between mass and elite political culture and how the line between the two can vary over time is of primary importance, so attention will be focused on this divide.

[32]On the "continental shelf" between mass and elite belief systems, see Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David E. Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent (New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 206-61.

[33]Sidney Verba, "Comparative Political Culture," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, eds., op. cit. (1965), footnote on p. 523.

primary scholarly focus is on mass attitudes and when it is on the attitudes of political elites.

Since I am interested in the Soviet foreign policy process, which has traditionally excluded the participation of the masses, for the purposes of my study, political culture generally refers to elite political culture. But how are we to define what constitutes a political elite, particularly in the context of communist political systems? For non-democratic systems, the task of identifying the political elite is somewhat simplified; nevertheless, for the purposes of clarity, a proper definition is required. Robert Putnam has defined the political elite in a give polity as "those who...rank toward the top of the (presumably closely intercorrelated) dimensions of interest, involvement and influence in politics." His definition will be employed in this project.

In the pages that follow, I will be particularly interested in how the composition of the Soviet elite has changed over time and the relevance of these fluctuations for Soviet foreign policy. Here I am not so much interested in the rise and fall of particular personalities as in the relative number of personalities and institutions (the "quantity" of participation) involved in the making of foreign policy, and in the ways in which institutional and individual actors are able to participate in the policy-making process (the "quality" of participation).
This thesis postulates that changes in participation

patterns, along either dimension, affect foreign policy outcomes. More will be said on this point in the next section.

Having emphasized the importance of elite belief systems for this project, the question then becomes one of better specifying the main contours of the elite political culture these beliefs comprise. Drawing further on the work of Robert Putnam, there are three broad categories that comprise elite political culture: (1) political style (how politicians believe); (2) cognitive predispositions (what politicians believe); and (3) operative ideals (what politicians believe in).[34] Political style does not analytically encompass political behavior (though actions, of course, indirectly inform any evaluation of political style); it refers to general approaches to policy problem-solving. Cognitive predispositions might be thought of as a politician's empirical data bank from which political conclusions are drawn. Finally, operative ideals can be either procedural or outcome-oriented, but in either case refer to an individual's notions of what politics should be. Therefore, though at first glance it might appear otherwise,

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[34]For further elaboration and discussion of these categories, see Robert D. Putnam, op. cit. (1973), pp. 4-7. It should be noted that Putnam's categories are also useful for better understanding mass political culture. Mass political culture is also comprised of operative ideals and cognitive predispositions, which are often quite different from those of the political elite. Political style, however, is relevant to the study of elite political culture only.

Putnam's categories constitute a behavior-exclusive definition of elite political culture, and are a valuable extension of Sidney Verba's general definition, which was our starting point.

Building on the clarifications above, the independent variable in this study - domestic reform viewed as an "attempt to change political culture" - refers to any deliberate leadership strategy for manipulating "the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols and values that define the situation in which political action takes place." Policies for mass and elite cultural change can aim to influence cognitive predispositions and operative ideals, and for elite political culture, political style as well, either separately, sequentially, or simultaneously.

A program for domestic reform can work for cultural change in indirect, as well as direct ways. That is, strategies for domestic change usually encompass institutional as well as cultural reforms. Gorbachev's campaign for glasnost and perestroika illustrates this point. For Gorbachev, glasnost and perestroika were interrelated attempts to transform Soviet political culture,[35] both at the elite and grass roots level. Glasnost, broadly speaking, aimed to manipulate Soviet political culture directly, by transforming existing norms

[35]To be sure, they are also, particularly for the case of perestroika, attempts to actualize radical institutional, as well as cultural, change. This point will be developed further later in this chapter.

of political interaction. In contrast, perestroika was an effort to influence political culture indirectly through the mechanism of institutional change.

For reform leadership, the timing of the implementation of these two agendas (cultural and institutional change) is of utmost importance, for when cultural change takes place without concurrent institutional change, a regime inevitably finds itself in a potentially explosive situation. Political instability and violence usually follow when "rapid social change and the rapid mobilization of new groups into politics [is] coupled with the slow development of political institutions."[36] Thus, it is always a precarious tightrope that the radical reformer walks.

Political culture, therefore, can change as a result of planned elite policies for change, as well as through evolutionary changes in consciousness produced by social and

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[36]Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 4. This is the central thesis of Huntington's path-breaking work. As for the origins of reform programs in communist regimes, strong arguments, worth returning to, have been made that the logic of modernization itself necessitates liberalization of communist regimes. See, for example, Talcott Parsons, "Evolutionary Universals in Society," American Sociological Review, June 1964; and Talcott Parsons, "Communism and the West: the Sociology of Conflict," in Amitai and Eva Etzioni, eds., Social Change: Sources, Patterns and Consequences (New York: Basic Books, 1964). See also Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 64-5, 76-9, 218.

individual thought and reflection over time.[37] While this project explores the former source of change, at the same time, its focus is on leadership attempts to remake the domestic political arena, irrespective of whether or not that attempt might ultimately be labelled "successful." Accordingly, when we turn to the case studies, we will be interested in both the intended and the unintended consequences of domestic reform, maintaining that both have the potential to remake foreign policy processes.

The Foreign Policy of Domestic Reform

This study postulates that the domestic reform dynamic, elucidated above, in shaping elite conceptions of state interest, has important implications for foreign policy. In its study of the complex relationship between domestic and foreign policy change in the chapters that follow, this thesis focuses on the effect of domestic reform on the foreign policy process, hypothesizing that just as domestic reform can alter the process by which policy is formulated and implemented, the process itself, in turn, plays a critical role in shaping foreign policy outcomes. Because different agendas for radical reform alter the existing foreign policy process in distinctive ways, considerable energy was invested above in building a

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[37]Hayward Alker refers to the latter source of cultural change as "historicity," while Ernst Haas and others have called it "learning." The connection is Robert Keohane's. See Robert O. Keohane, op. cit. (1989), p. 171.

framework for thinking about domestic change. I use the term "foreign policy process" to refer to patterns of both institutional and individual interaction in foreign policy formulation, the way in which the institutions and personnel of foreign policy relate one to the other.

Accordingly, participation is a critical intermediary variable in this project, the character and extent of elite and institutional participation in foreign policymaking being a determining feature of the foreign policy process. Samuel Huntington and Jorge Dominguez's definition of political participation provides a valuable foundation for subsequent discussions:

> [Political participation] "is here used to refer to the activity of private citizens designed to influence government decision-making," [which] "limits attention to activity rather than attitudes and to the behavior of private citizens rather than of those who are professionally and continuously involved in public affairs."[38]

While this definition is a useful starting point, it must be modified slightly when extended to non-democratic regimes. Who are the "private citizens" in communist systems? When all spheres of life have been politicized, is anyone a non-participant in politics?

The key here would seem to lie in the notion of purposive political activity, of "activity designed to influence," to which Huntington and Dominguez elude. That

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[38]Samuel Huntington and Jorge Dominguez, "Political Development," in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., op. cit. (1975), p. 33.

is, even though all is politicized, this does not necessarily imply that all "non-private" citizens believe they are capable of influencing government decision-making, that communism means everyone is a participant. To the contrary, one of communism's many ironies was its immense capacity to alienate those whom it was designed to empower. By emphasizing that before activity can be designed to influence, people must believe that influence of their government is possible, it is possible to define political participation in such a way as to admit for the possibility of fluctuations in political participation in a given communist polity over time. Another way of making the same point is to bear in mind that in communist systems, historically, planned participation has been the rule, but unplanned participation has always existed - save for in the years of the most heinous terror - as at least a potential alternative.

Relatedly, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, in their classic comparative study of political culture, The Civic Culture, specify three types of political cultures: parochial, subject, and participant.[39] Though Almond and Verba's work was primarily concerned with democracies, it can be extended to shed light on the political cultures of

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[39]See Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

"failed totalitarian" polities.[40] One of the consequences of failed totalitarianism is an ever-widening gap between what the party desires mass political culture to be (highly participatory) and what mass political culture actually is in non-utopian reality (primarily subject in orientation).

Gorbachev's aim, similar to that of past leaders of the Soviet Union, was a highly participatory political culture. Where he broke with the past was in his expansion of the definition of state-tolerated participation to include what was, in practice, extra-party political activity - non-planned political participation - rather than the traditional ritual performance. Paradoxically, from the vantage point of the end of the Brezhnev years, it was possible for Gorbachev, in a bizarre sense, to plan unplanned participation. However, as recent events in the Soviet Union demonstrate, it is never possible to control unplanned participation for long, even that which is at the outset planned. Unintended consequences inevitably predominate.

When I speak of participation in these pages, I will be referring at all times, unless specified otherwise, to unplanned participation. That way, my definition of political participation is capable of capturing and analyzing change in participation patterns along two

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[40]The phrase is Michael Walzer's. See Michael Walzer, "On 'Failed Totalitarianism'," in Irving Howe, ed., 1984 Revisited: Totalitarianism in Our Century (New York: Harper and Row, 1983).

dimensions, that of quality and of quantity. The former dimension refers primarily to how people and institutions participate, the latter to who and how many participate. The case studies that follow will be particularly concerned with tracing the effects of changes in the quality and quantity of participation on perceived foreign policy interests, that is, in the impact of the participation of new elites and institutions on the contours and dynamics of the foreign policy-making process.

We can describe the foreign policy process of a given regime by specifying the degree of participation along these two dimensions of quality and quantity. To say that the foreign policy process has been democratized - as Soviet analysts insist that it had been under Gorbachev - refers to an increase in both the quantity and quality of participation, at both the elite and mass levels.

In similar fashion, Robert Dahl has characterized democratization as being made up of primarily two dimensions: liberalization (public contestation) and inclusiveness (the right to participate).[41] Liberalization and inclusiveness are used in Dahl's work in a way that closely parallels the sense in which I deploy the categories of quality and quantity. We can capture the quality of participation by assessing the degree of public contestation

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[41]See Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), especially pp. 120-122.

that is tolerated in the discussion of foreign policy issues. Likewise, an increase in the quantity of participation, in the number of institutional and elite voices that take part in the formulation of foreign policy, may be thought of as an increase in the degree of inclusiveness in the foreign policy process.

The example of the Gorbachev reforms can further illustrate these distinctions. Policies for cultural change that aim primarily to manipulate political culture, one example of such being glasnost, will have the greatest impact on liberalization (quality of participation), while those policies whose primary target is institutional change, such as Gorbachev's perestroika, will have the greatest affect on inclusiveness (quantity of participation - i.e., who and how many participate). And of course, reform need not always be a democratizing force; the reform dynamic can also work in the opposite direction, as was the case during Stalin's revolution from above.

Finally, my dependent variable, as stated above, is elite conceptions of state interests. Broadly speaking, interests can be classified according to two major categories, material interests and general interests.[42] Material interests are those interests that relate to the physical security and well-being of a state; they often

[42]For the distinction between material and general interests, I am indebted to Fareed Zakaria. See Fareed Zakaria, "The Reagan Strategy of Containment," Political Science Quarterly, vol. 105, no. 3, Fall 1990, pp. 375-8.

involve access to markets, goods, and investments, as well as basing rights on foreign territory. General interests are preferences that flow from a nation's beliefs, or using the vocabulary of this chapter, a polity's sustaining myth. General interests, then, encompass notions of a nation's role in the world, its long term goals and priorities.

Of course, interests are different things to different people. Hence, it is important when one speaks of interests to specify whose perceptions matter most. For the purposes of this study, it is elite conceptions of interest which will occupy center stage.[43]

Though this study is primarily interested in elite attitudes, this is not the same as to say that domestic pressure is irrelevant in the making of Soviet foreign policy. Indeed, as the degree of liberalization in a given regime rises, the power of the state to steam-roll or ignore domestic opposition to its policies is diminished. For non-democratic states such as the Soviet Union, however, domestic opposition to foreign policy decisions has typically been the last sort of resistance that the powers that be will tolerate.[44] Consequently, though domestic

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[43]This characterization of interests is similar to Stephen Krasner's depiction of the national interest, which he defines inductively as "the preferences of American central decision-makers." See Stephen Krasner, op. cit. (1978), pp. 12-13.

[44]Witness the development of glasnost in the Soviet Union, where criticism of past Soviet foreign policy has been the last taboo to fall away.

pressure is of paramount importance in Soviet politics today, in the historical episodes that the cases examine, it still remains less important for understanding foreign policy than the preferences of elites, and attention in this thesis is allocated accordingly.

Since the empirical subject of this study is Soviet foreign policy, a final word of clarification on the role of Marxist-Leninism in both foreign policy processes and outcomes is in order. Obviously, the question of the changing role of ideology in the formulation and implementation of Soviet foreign policy - to be more precise, the effect of ideological elite beliefs on Soviet foreign policy - is of great importance for the central concerns of this project.[45]

But what does it mean to label a belief ideological? David Joravsky provides a potential working definition:

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[45]Countless pages have been filled with analyses of the role of ideology in Soviet foreign policy. Articles which classify the vast literature on ideology and Soviet foreign policy include: William Glaser, "Theories of Soviet Foreign Policy: A Classification of the Literature," World Affairs Quarterly, vol. 27, no. 2, July 1956, and Daniel Bell, "Ten Theories in Search of Reality," World Politics, vol. 10, no. 3, April 1958.

"When we call a belief ideological, we are saying... [that] although it is unverified or unverifiable, it is accepted as verified by a particular group because it performs social functions for that group. 'Group' is used loosely to indicate such aggregations as parties, professions, classes or nations. 'Because' is also used loosely, to indicated a functional correlation rather than a strictly causal connection between acceptance of a belief and social processes.[46]

Ideological beliefs are "overt, systematic, dogmatic, and embodied in a set of institutions"; they "consciously [stress] purpose in all social-political activity and [relate] it to a scheme of history."[47]

Robert Putnam has argued that it is "not the what, but the how of political thought that makes it ideological," that ideological politics are more a question of political style than of substance.[48] My characterization is, of necessity, more comprehensive, since a politician operating in an established communist system is virtually by definition ideological; to refer to a Soviet party member as a devout Marxist-Leninist - i.e., as ideological - typically is to say something about the content of his political views and his relative political power, in addition to his mode of operation. Under such circumstances, if it is to be useful,

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[46]David Joravsky, "Soviet Ideology," Soviet Studies, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 2-19.

[47]Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, Political Power: USA/USSR (New York: Penguin Books, 1977), p. 19.

[48]See Robert Putnam, The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), especially pp. 31-48.

the notion of ideological politics must encompass both the substance and the style of a politician's approach to policy-making.[49]

The function and importance of ideology in the making of Soviet foreign policy has certainly changed over the course of the Soviet Union's history. Adam Ulam has pointed out that ideology can potentially serve three functions in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy: it can constitute a world-view, serve as an action plan, and operate as a legitimating mechanism. In 1959, Ulam argued that while Marxist-Leninist ideology continued to serve as a legitimation device and as the prism through which the Soviet leadership analyzed international reality, it no longer was utilized as a specific action plan for policy; that function, over time, had atrophied.[50] Thirty some years later, with the benefit of hindsight, one might take this argument a step further, arguing that ideology's role in Soviet foreign policy has undergone still further

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[49]Interestingly, as the process of change in the Soviet Union progresses, one might maintain that Putnam's definition of ideological politics becomes increasingly sufficient, that thinking ideologically concurrently evolves into something which has more to do with style than with content.

[50]Adam Ulam, "Ideology and Soviet Foreign Policy," World Politics, vol. 11, no. 2, January 1959, pp. 153-72. Robert C. Tucker makes a similar argument in his 1967 analysis of the process of what he calls the deradicalization of Marxist-Leninist movements. See Robert C. Tucker, "The Deradicalization of Marxist-Leninist Movements," American Political Science Review, vol. 41, no. 2, June 1967, pp. 343-58.

evolution, becoming less and less significant, no longer constituting a world view for the Soviet leadership and operating less overtly as a legitimating mechanism. If ideology circumscribes the realm of policy choice, its power as a constraint on political action would seem to have diminished over time.

There is a huge literature that evaluates the interplay between interest and ideology in Soviet international behavior, the standard interpretation being that either interest or ideology must predominate in the Soviet Union's dealings with its allies and enemies, that interest and ideology are mutually exclusive roadmaps for formulating the Soviet Union's foreign policy.[51] It is far more productive, I argue, to conceptualize the two as being complexly interrelated.[52] Interest dictates policy, but interest is also a function of ideology, just as ideological justifications of policy often flow from interest. National

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[51]For a classic debate on this topic, see the "Symposium on Ideology and Power Politics" [participants being R.N. Carew Hunt, Samuel Sharp, and Richard Lowenthal] in Erik P. Hoffmann and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., eds., The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy (New York: Aldine Publishing Company, 1980); reprinted from Problems of Communism, March-April 1958, pp. 10-30, and May-June 1958, pp. 50-52.

[52]Archie Brown has also recently made this point, arguing that the bulk of writing on the relative importance of Marxism-Leninism and national interest has overlooked "the fact that Soviet ideology has been so refined through the years as to largely eliminate the clash of principles between one and the other." Archie Brown, "Ideology and Political Culture," in Seweryn Bialer, ed., Politics, Society and Nationality: Inside Gorbachev's Russia (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), p. 28.

interest and ideology are intertwined in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy; neither can be ignored.

What, then, is the conceptual relationship between ideology and elite political culture? It is clear that the two have much to do one with the other; ideology is a principal component of elite political culture, affecting cognitive predispositions, political style and operative ideals. Consequently, understanding the ebbs and flows of ideological development is necessary if one seeks to tackle the problem of cultural change. Just as the role of ideology in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy has changed over time, so, too, has the relationship between ideology and elite political culture undergone related transformations. Both sets of relationships will be subjected to scrutiny in the case studies that follow.

To summarize, then, in our framework for thinking about change, inclusiveness and liberalization are intermediary variables that operate as important constraints on the determination of foreign policy. In altering these constraints, leadership policies for cultural change restructure the foreign policy process. In turn, changes in the foreign policy process can alter elite conceptions of state interest, often with important implications for foreign policy outcomes.

Armed with these concepts and causal connections, we are ready to see how well they can explicate empirical trends, and in so doing, what further theoretical insights

they might yield. And so it is back in time to the opening shots of Stalin's revolution from above that we now turn.

CHAPTER TWO

FOUNDATIONS OF EMPIRE: STALIN AND THE FOREIGN POLICY OF REVOLUTION FROM ABOVE

"No generalization on the Soviet Union can have more than momentary validity. The Russian Revolution is still moving with such rapidity that any picture is certain to be false after the lapse of a few months."

--William C. Bullitt, first American ambassador to the Soviet Union, 1934.[1]

"To maintain and transmit a value system, human beings are punched, bullied, sent to jail, thrown into concentration camps, cajoled, bribed, made into heroes, encouraged to read newspapers, stood up against a wall and shot, and sometimes even taught sociology."

--Barrington Moore, Jr., 1966.[2]

By 1929, Stalin had emerged victorious from the protracted struggle for supreme power in the Soviet Union after Lenin's death. Over the next five years, the period of the first five year plan, Stalin unleashed a revolution from above that would forge a new economic and political system, one whose basic contours would remain in place long after the end of Stalin's dictatorship.

This chapter will argue that we cannot begin to understand Soviet external behavior under Stalin without reference to the internal demands of Stalinism in power. It also seeks to demonstrate how the building of Stalinism in one country had immense and enduring consequences for Soviet foreign policy. Both tasks require that the reader be

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[1]Quoted in Beatrice Farnsworth, William C. Bullitt and the Soviet Union (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967), p. 142.

[2]Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), p.486.

acquainted with the changes in the foreign policy apparatus first wrought by the February and October revolutions, as well as the crucial role of German-Soviet relations in early Bolshevik foreign policy. Thus, we step back for a moment from our exploration of the immediate ramifications of the third revolution, and briefly
survey the demands and dynamics of Lenin's foreign policy.

The Leninist Legacy

The first revolution of 1917 brought few structural or personnel changes to either the tsarist Ministry of Foreign Affairs or to Russian embassy staffs abroad. Consequently, when the Bolsheviks seized power in October, they inherited a distinctly un-revolutionary diplomatic apparatus, both at home and overseas, which was to prove quite resistant to change.[3]

At first, this was of little concern to the fledgling Soviet state; with world revolution imminent, inter-state diplomacy seemed hopelessly atavistic and unworthy of protracted attention. When questioned by a comrade about his diplomatic agenda, Trotsky, the Bolsheviks' newly appointed Commissar for Foreign Affairs, replied, "What diplomatic work are we apt to have? I will issue a few revolutionary proclamations to the peoples of the world, and

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[3]Teddy J. Uldricks, Diplomacy and Ideology: The Origins of Soviet Foreign Relations, 1917-30 (London: Sage Publications, 1979), pp. 10-11.

then shut up shop."[4] In addition to Trotsky's outspoken disinterest, there is no evidence to suggest that the Bolsheviks took their new Foreign Ministry, Narkomindel[5], at all seriously. They attached much greater significance to another institution founded at the same time to manage relations with foreign revolutionary movements.[6]

The Bolsheviks' initial disinterest in diplomatic relations was arguably quite fortunate, since their alleged embassies abroad were now staffed with some of their fiercest opponents; the embassies were veritable bastions of anti-communism. Bolshevik Russia's alleged ambassadors had even organized themselves to wage war against Bolshevism. The eventual battle that would ensue to purge Russian embassies abroad and transform them into Soviet outposts was a protracted one, complicated by the capitalist powers' continued recognition of the tsarist or provisional government envoys as legal representatives of the Soviet state. Consequently, without diplomatic outposts,

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[4]Leon Trotsky, My Life (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1960), p. 341.

[5]Narkomindel is the acronym for Narodnyi Kommissariat Innostrannykh Del (People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs). It is also referred to in still more abbreviated form as NKID.

[6]Teddy Uldricks, op. cit. (1979), p. 16. The International Department of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Congress of Soviets (VTsIK) was the body established to monitor relations with revolutionary movements abroad.

Narkomindel's powers - had the Bolsheviks even deemed them important - were quite limited in the early years.[7]

Trotsky's stint at Narkomindel was cut short by the demand for his talents on other fronts - namely, in the fight to contain the raging civil war. The task of directing foreign diplomacy would then fall to Georgii Chicherin, a man with little political clout in the Party (Chicherin was not even made a member of the Central Committee until 1925, seven years into his tenure as Commissar of Foreign Affairs).[8] Chicherin would be forced to confront the question which his comrades had been able temporarily to side-step: what was the appropriate diplomatic posture for the first socialist state?

The strategy chosen was born of realpolitik rather than ideological purity. Its centerpiece was German-Soviet

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[7]Ibid., pp. 20-5. The end of the First World War and the eventual recognition of Soviet power on the part of most foreign governments enabled the Bolsheviks to slowly gain control of their embassies abroad. Though ultimately beyond the scope of our immediate concerns here, the story of these early years is fascinating and often entirely bizarre. The Bolsheviks continually overstepped, often deliberately, the bounds of the permissible. For example, in early 1918, Lenin came up with the brilliant idea of appointing the American communist John Reed, presently serving the Soviet state as a leading figure in the NKID Bureau of International Revolutionary Propaganda (!), to replace the current Russian consul in New York! Needless to say, the Americans protested vehemently, and Lenin cancelled the appointment. See George Kennan, Russia Leaves the War: Soviet-American Relations 1917-20, vol. I (New York: W.W. Norton, 1958), pp. 405-10.

[8]Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-73 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 141.

relations. The 1922 Treaty of Rapallo between Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia enabled both sides to emerge from conditions of relative diplomatic isolation with a partner to confront potential enemies, primarily England and France. The treaty of Rapallo wiped clean the slate of German-Russian relations and paved the way for a new era of cooperation. Both sides renounced all past financial claims on the other. For the economically struggling Soviet Union, this meant a renunciation of all rights to reparation from Germany, a significant concession, since Russia had been a major contributor to the victory of the Allied Powers.[9] In return, the Weimar government promised to encourage German commercial activity in the Soviet Union - no small pledge, either, since German capitalism was highly state-centric, and hence could more readily deliver on its promises. Finally, both sides agreed to resume full diplomatic and consular relations.[10] Though the treaty itself did not speak of military matters, it eventually was to spawn mutually beneficial military cooperation between the two countries, with Germany circumventing the harsh terms of the Versailles settlement by building munitions factories on Soviet soil, and the USSR grateful for the

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[9]Max Beloff, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia: 1929-41 (London: Oxford University Press, 1947), vol. I (1929-36), p. 150.

[10]Gerald Freund, Unholy Alliance: Russian-German Relations from the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to the Treaty of Berlin (London: Chatto and Windus, 1957), p. 118.

German contribution to its industrialization efforts, of which more will be said later.[11]

In the ensuing years, the intensity of the Russian-German relationship would depend on the extent to which France, Britain and the United States would tolerate German desires to maintain a delicate balance between East and West; when the West grew irritable, German-Soviet ties flourished. It would also depend on the revolutionary tactics of the Soviet state at a given time; calls for world revolution, usually with an eye to Germany as the most promising potential spark, would lead to a worsening of relations. Conversely, the more the Soviet Union restrained itself and behaved like a bourgeois great power, the healthier were German-Soviet relations.[12]

With a better sense of the external circumstances and internal constraints that Soviet foreign policy faced on the eve of the third revolution, we are ready to turn our attention to the tragic fury of Stalinism in power.

The Revolution from Above

I use the term revolution from above to describe the rapid industrialization, coerced collectivization and concurrent transformation of the Soviet political system

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[11]The Soviet Union acknowledged the establishment of German armaments firms on Soviet soil, but never admitted to the illegal export of war materials back to Germany. E.H. Carr, German-Soviet Relations Between the Two World Wars, 1919-39 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1951), p. 94.

[12]Gerald Freund, op. cit. (1957), pp. 249-50.

during the first five year plan. The coinage emphasizes the leading role of the Communist Party in general and of Stalin in particular in transforming Soviet state and society. Some Sovietologists have argued that stressing the state-society dichotomy inevitably undervalues important social and economic forces, including the involvement of ordinary citizens in the collectivization and industrialization campaigns.[13] The point is an important one; millions of profoundly unenthusiastic inhabitants of the countryside aside, Stalinism certainly was not the exclusive product of the Bolsheviks, let alone of one man's psychosis.[14] However, to speak of a revolution from above need not deny the importance of societal and economic factors. Revolution from above can be both the initiating and predominant, while

[13]Sheila Fitzpatrick has led the attack on this front. See Sheila Fitzpatrick, "Cultural Revolution as Class War," in Sheila Fitzpatrick, ed., Cultural Revolution in Russia: 1928-31 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), pp. 8-40.

[14]Lynne Viola's superb study of the 25,000ers, the "vanguard of the Soviet proletariat" sent into the countryside in 1930 to implement collectivization, provides one well-documented example of mass involvement in the construction of Stalinist institutions. See Lynne Viola, The Best Sons of the Fatherland: Workers in the Vanguard of Soviet Collectivization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). A younger Party member later wrote of those heady years: "Our general mood was one of healthy optimism. We were sure of ourselves and of the future. We believed that, provided no war came to interrupt the reconstruction of Russian industry, our Socialist country would be able, within a few years, to offer the world an example of a society based on principles of liberty and equality." Alexander Barmine, One Who Survived: The Life Story of a Russian Under the Soviets (New York, 1945), p. 161. Quoted in Robert C. Tucker, Stalin as Revolutionary: 1879-1929 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1973), p. 389.

by no means exclusive, phenomenon. That is to say, a range of forces can be unleashed, so to speak, by restructuring from on high that subsequently proceed to assume a life of their own, yet without initiation from above might have remained dormant. The term will be deployed here in this latter, richer sense; in so doing, I believe I follow the lead of most who have used the concept previously.

Stalin's revolution from above obliterated the old order, establishing new patterns of social and political relations. His social revolution was, however, in some ways atypical, for the old order swept away was NEP society, which was itself the result of a monumental revolution.[15] In contrast to the October revolution, which was primarily a destructive process, Stalin's revolution from above employed destructive, violent means in what might be characterized as a generally constructive (though simultaneously reprehensible) process, for which Lenin, arguably with intentions to the contrary, laid the groundwork.[16] Stalin himself seems to have viewed his program in these terms. The infamous "short course" history of the Bolshevik Party, which Stalin himself personally edited, describes collectivization as "a profound revolution, a leap from an

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[15]Stephen F. Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography, 1888-1938 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 270.

[16]Robert C. Tucker, "Stalinism as Revolution from Above," in Robert C. Tucker, ed., Stalinism: Essays in Historical Interpretation (New York: W.W. Norton, 1977), p. 95.

old qualitative state of society to a new qualitative state of society, equivalent in its consequences to the revolution of October 1917."[17]

Stalin's revolutionary agenda, more specifically, might be thought of as a three-pronged attack on existing socioeconomic and political structures involving (1) industrialization, (2) mass collectivization, and (3) state-building processes.[18] As my project is interested in the domestic origins of Stalin's foreign policy, I shall touch only briefly on each of these internal aspects in turn. My aim is to lay the necessary foundation for a subsequent assessment of their effect on the evolving external interests of the nascent Soviet state.

From the perspective of industry rather than human needs, the first five year plan was a period of rapid change

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[17]Joseph Stalin, History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) Short Course (Moscow, 1945), p.305. Robert C. Tucker, "Stalinism as Revolution From Above," in Robert C. Tucker, ed., op. cit. (1977), p. 83, and Robert C. Tucker, Stalin in Power: The Revolution from Above, 1928-41 (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1990), pp.. 530-2. Stalin's language here sounds eerily familiar; Gorbachev has often described perestroika in similar terms. Thus, talk of "post-October" revolutions is not unprecedented in Soviet history.

[18]Robert C. Tucker, op. cit. (1977), p. 84.

and prodigious achievement.[19] Existing industry in Moscow and Leningrad was modernized and expanded, while commands from Moscow and the stirrings of industrialization invaded the more remote Soviet republics. No ten year period in any Western country has ever exhibited as high a rate of industrial growth as the time spanned by the first two five year plans in Soviet Russia.[20] By the era's end, the Soviet Union was the number one producer of oil, machine tools, and tractors in Europe, and the second largest producer of these items in the world. In the production of electric power, steel, cast iron, and aluminum, the Soviet Union ranked second in Europe and third in the world; it also ranked among the world's leaders in coal and cement production

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[19]Available Soviet statistics for the period are wildly inflated, but a compilation of the (still impressive) growth estimates of various Western economists can be found in Eugene Zaleski, Stalinist Planning for Economic Growth, 1933-52 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1980), p. 503. While it is indisputable that the Soviet economy grew rapidly during these years, as one of the world's leading authorities on Soviet economic history, Alec Nove points out, it is important to keep in mind that many other countries' economies grew rapidly in the same period, and that despite all its weaknesses, imperial Russia in 1913 was still the world's fifth largest industrial power (in gross figures, of course, not per capita). See Alec Nove, An Economic History of the USSR (New York: Penguin Books, 1984; c. 1969), p. 399.

[20]R.R. Palmer and Joel Colton, A History of the Modern World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), third edition, p. 742.

(third in Europe, fourth in the world).[21] These proud accomplishments, however, were built at the expense of the agricultural and consumer goods sector, and of countless human lives.

A flow of laborers from the countryside - one-time peasants for whom collectivization had mandated a change of career and residence - ensured that both existing plants and enterprises under current construction would have no shortage of employable souls. Disappointment in peasant productivity soon led to draconian labor laws:

> "The first legislation involving prison sentences for those who violated labour discipline was passed in 1931. Work books were introduced for all industrial and transport workers in February 1931, and the death sentence could be applied for theft of state or collective farm property as from August 1932. Missing a day's work could mean instant dismissal after November 1932, and the internal passport...was introduced on 27 December 1932 to restrict movement and increase control."[22]

Stalin's program for economic modernization is difficult to convey in the language of the economist, for it was less a prescription than a call to arms; his advocacy of industrialization was overwhelmingly martial in spirit. In his calls for accelerating accomplishment, he regularly

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[21]These output figures are cited in Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr Nekrich, Utopia in Power: The History of the Soviet Union from 1917 to the Present (New York: Summit Books, 1986), p. 317. They are gathered from Narodnoe khoziastvo SSSR v. 1962 g. Statisticheskii sbornik (Moscow: 1963), p. 52, and G.S. Kravchenko, Voennaia ekonomika SSSR, 1941-1945 (Moscow, 1963), pp. 21-2.

[22]Martin McCauley, Stalin and Stalinism (Burnt Mill: Longman House, 1983), p. 28.

invoked the potential external threat to the gains of the Bolshevik revolution. His oft-cited speech to Soviet businessmen in 1931 is representative:

> "It is sometimes asked whether it is not possible to slow down the tempo somewhat, to put a check on the movement. No, Comrades, it is not possible! The tempo must not be reduced...to slacken the tempo would mean falling behind. And those who fall behind get beaten...One feature of the history of old Russia was the continual beatings she suffered because of her backwardness. She was beaten by the Turkish beys. She was beaten by the Swedish feudal lords. She was beaten by the Polish and Lithuanian gentry. She was beaten by the British and French capitalists. She was beaten by the Japanese barons. All beat her because of her backwardness...Such is the law of the exploiters - to beat the backward and the weak...That is why we must no longer lag behind."[23]

When economic achievement fell short of Stalin's wildly optimistic aims, responsibility for industry's shortcomings was ascribed to "bourgeois" (non-Party) specialists and foreign saboteurs. As a result, at a time when expertise was in greatest demand, most of the Soviet Union's experts found themselves under siege. The years of the first five year plan brought the first show trials, and all the show trials of this period inevitably linked the accused to some form of economic sabotage.

From the perspective of the countryside, the years under study were a complete catastrophe. Pravda sounded the alarm in November of 1927 when it announced that "the demand to raise the cultural level of the worker-peasant masses,

[23]Speech delivered on 2/4/31 in J.V. Stalin, Works, vol. 13 (Moscow, 1955), pp. 40-1.

the demand to carry out a broad and profound 'cultural revolution' in the country is evident; it is now really in the air."[24] The collectivization movement was launched in 1929 and by January 1930, with the Politburo's call for the "liquidation of the kulaks as a class," was in full swing. The so-called kulaks, a term whose definition grew ever all-encompassing, were stripped of their possessions and land and deported, often to remote regions. Their holdings became property of the local kolkhoz (collective farm). In 1929 and 1930, 380,800 peasant households (and these households were quite large, averaging six or seven persons per family) were forced to leave their homes.[25] Stalin's March 1930 "dizzy with success" pronouncement,[26] where he temporarily admonished overly enthusiastic local officials, the vanguard of the collectivization offensive, provided only a brief respite; by the fall of 1930, the onslaught had begun anew.[27]

The tragic results of all this revolutionary fervor are well known. Collectivization was "an unmitigated

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[24] Pravda, November 30, 1927.

[25] The figures are from Voprosy istorii KPSS, no. 5 (1975), p. 140. Cited in Roy Medvedev, On Stalin and Stalinism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 74.

[26] See Stalin's article in Pravda, March 2, 1930.

[27] Robert C. Tucker, op. cit. (1990), pp. 184-9.

economic policy disaster."[28] Peasants slaughtered their livestock rather than surrender them to local authorities. In 1932, livestock numbers were less than half of what they had been in 1928, and the shortage reverberated throughout the entire economy.[29] The revolutionary process culminated in the man-made famine of 1932-33, which produced great suffering throughout the southern farming regions, but had its most devastating consequences in the Ukraine. Even the producers of through-the-looking-glass Stalinist statistics shrunk from the task of hiding the devastation of Stalin's five year war against the peasants, which was to be followed by Stalin's terrorist war against all; each year from 1933-38, the Central Statistical Board's handbook was to cite the same figure for the total population of the Soviet Union (165.7 million).[30]

The net product of collectivization was immense human suffering, profound social dislocation and economic havoc. From the standpoint of Stalin, however, one benefit emerged from the wreckage he and his henchmen had wrought: the strengthening of centralized political, economic, and social control.

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[28]James R. Millar, "Mass Collectivization and the Contribution of Soviet Agriculture to the First Five Year Plan: A Review Article," Slavic Review, December 1974, p. 764. Millar supports his persuasive argument with Soviet archival data first published in 1968 and 1969.

[29]Martin McCauley, op. cit. (1983), p. 25.

[30]Roy Medvedev, op. cit. (1979), p. 76.

The years 1929-33 also mark the establishment of Stalin's leading role as first Bolshevik among equals in the Soviet leadership. Stalin's personality cult was effectively born in December 1929 with the public celebration of Stalin's fiftieth birthday as a national event.[31] By the time the first five year plan had been completed, the foundations of Stalinism and Stalin's dictatorial powers were firmly in place, the result of brilliant political maneuvering on the part of Djugashvili. As we shall see, Stalin's tactics and strategy in his quest for supreme power had implications for foreign policy as well as for domestic affairs.

Stalin's political program in the late 20s and early 30s was constantly "evolving," but was always a child of political expediency. It moved in tandem with the rise and fall of challengers to his personal power. When the so-called "left opposition" (Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev) seemed threatening, Stalin became - as much as a Bolshevik could ever be - an advocate of moderation and pragmatism in matters economic. The expulsion of Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev from the Politburo in late 1926 brought a concurrent change in Stalin's tone and platform. As Stephen Cohen writes, "before 1928, Stalin was largely a Bukharinist in economic philosophy; in 1928-9, as he groped toward policies

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[31]Robert C. Tucker, Stalin as Revolutionary: 1879-1929 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1973), p. 462.

that were in effect counter-Bukharinist, he began to become a Stalinist."[32]

Conveniently for Stalin's needs, a profound shortage of grain procurements loomed large in late 1927/early 1928. The peasantry, behaving in an economically rational manner, simply refused to sell their grain at official state prices, which were set below market level.[33] Having eliminated the left opposition in the previous year, Stalin now focused all his energies on ensuring that the newly identified "right opposition" or "right deviation" (Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky), those so obviously responsible for the economic downturn, would not escape the same fate.

In 1928, the "right's" position on the Politburo was quite strong, with its ranks represented by Bukharin, Kalinin, Rykov, and Tomsky. Only Stalin and Molotov stood on the "left;" Voroshilov, Kuibyshev, and Rudzutak can be categorized as swing votes.[34] Yet less than a year after Stalin announced to the Central Committee Plenum the existence of a right deviation in the Party (in late November 1928), Bukharin had been stripped of his commanding posts at Pravda and in the Comintern and expelled from the Politburo. Rykov and Tomsky, while retaining their Politburo seats, had also been effectively neutralized,

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[32]Stephen F. Cohen, op. cit. (1973), p. 313.

[33]Alec Nove, Stalinism and After (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1975), p. 35.

[34]Stephen F. Cohen, op. cit. (1973), p. 287.

reduced to signing a demoralizing string of official recantations. That Stalin by the end of 1929 had so readily relegated the right opposition to the dustbin of political history testifies to his extraordinary political gifts.

Bukharin's fall, as we shall see below, reverberated through the Comintern, as had Trotsky's and Zinoviev's demise three years prior (Bukharin had replaced Zinoviev as head of the Comintern, in the wake of the defeat of the left opposition).[35] But in more general terms, the fall of Bukharin sounded the death knell of political moderation in Soviet Russia and marked the consolidation of Stalin's dictatorship, which would be further institutionalized as an "ism" in the revolutionary years that followed.

The end of opposition at the top very quickly spelled the death of all serious criticism in general. The entire texture of intellectual life soon underwent dramatic change; scholarly articles on socioeconomic issues in 1928 bear absolutely no resemblance to the propagandistic screeds mandatorily published in 1933. The censor's shadow had touched all aspects of cultural life by the time Stalin triumphantly proclaimed the overfulfillment of the first five year plan.

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[35]For a superb analysis of Stalin's role in the defeat of the Right Opposition, see Robert C. Tucker, op. cit. (1973), pp. 407-420. Stephen F. Cohen provides a scrupulously documented and elegantly written account of Bukharin's fall. See Stephen F. Cohen, op. cit. (1973), pp. 270-336.

Official spokesmen for the Bolshevik/Stalinist regime were the first to stress the implications of the third revolution for Soviet foreign policy objectives at the time. An Izvestiia editorial complained in May of 1929 that "people often forget that the five year plan also defines the plan for our foreign policy."[36] Upon his official appointment as Commissar of Foreign Affairs in July 1930, Maxim Litvinov trumpeted the same song, proclaiming the basic principles of Soviet foreign policy to be the defense of the revolution's achievements from external interference and the securing of freedom from external distractions, so as better to concentrate on the tasks of socialist construction. "The more significant our plans for construction, the faster the rates of growth, the greater is our concern to preserve the peace," insisted Litvinov.[37] Having set the domestic stage, it is to an assessment of these claims that we now turn.

Diplomatic Policy, 1929-33

Stalin's political report to the XVth Party Congress in December 1927 endeavored to set the tone for Soviet diplomatic relations in the years to follow. Bolshevik

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[36] Izvestiia, May 23, 1929.

[37] Interview with Maxim Litvinov, Izvestiia, July 26, 1930. One wonders whether the world was meant to understand that disappointing growth rates should be expected to produce the opposite effect.

rhetoric aside, the precedence of the domestic agenda figured prominently in his remarks:

> [We must] "take into account the contradictions in the imperialist camp, postpone war, buying off the capitalists, and take all measures to preserve peaceful relations. We must not forget Lenin's words that in our construction, much depends on whether we succeed in delaying war with the capitalist world...The preservation of peaceful relations with the capitalist countries is, therefore, a necessary task for us."[38]

In this view, though a future war with the imperialist powers was inevitable, skillful diplomacy could delay its onset, and in so doing, buy time for the vanguard of the socialist movement to gain strength. These assumptions were the guiding parameters of Stalin's diplomatic policy.

In the fall of 1929, the Bolshevik regime had still not been recognized by a wide assortment of states to its West, including Spain, Portugal, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Luxembourg, the countries of the Little Entente (Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia), Bulgaria and Hungary, and the United States.[39] With blitzkrieg industrialization on the Stalinist agenda, the Soviet Union needed every potential economic partner it could persuade to cooperate. Since diplomatic recognition was often - though not always, as we shall see in the case of the United States

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[38]Stalin on 12/3/27 in the Political Report on the Central Committee to the XVth Party Congress. Quoted in Xenia Joukoff Eudin and Robert M. Slusser, Soviet Foreign Policy, 1928-34, Documents and Materials (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1966), vol. I, p. 3.

[39]Max Beloff, op. cit. (1947), vol. 1, p. 6.

- a prerequisite for economic cooperation, the quest for acceptance as a legitimate power became a priority item on the list of Soviet diplomatic objectives.

The restoration of normal relations with Great Britain was an immediate concern for Bolshevik diplomacy in early 1929. Britain's first Labour government was quick to extend de jure recognition in 1924; rapid expansion of trade relations soon followed. This happy state of affairs was to be short lived. Squabbles over the Soviet Union's involvement in the propaganda activities of the British Communist Party and the subsequent raid by British bobbies of the Soviet trade mission in London led to the severing of relations in May 1927, much to the USSR's dismay. However, immediately following the installation of the second Labour government in June 1929, negotiations on the resumption of relations were initiated. A protocol was signed by both parties in October of the same year, officially re-establishing diplomatic relations.[40]

Harmonious Anglo-Soviet relations, however, soon proved, once again, to be elusive. The antics of the British Communist Party continued to infuriate the new Labour government, and the British Foreign Secretary, Arthur Henderson, soon charged the Soviet Union with violations of the freshly signed protocol. Izvestiia responded to

[40]Xenia Joukoff Eudin and Robert M. Slusser, Soviet Foreign Policy, 1928-34: Documents and Materials (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 1966), vol. I, pp. 14-15; pp. 50-51.

Henderson's allegations with feigned shock and indignation, lecturing that "the British Minister of Foreign Affairs is actually complaining that the Soviet government did not interfere in British internal affairs and did not restrain the Communist Party of Great Britain from expressing the viewpoint that this party wished to express. Actually, it would have been simply monstrous to have done such a thing."[41] In the end, the restoration of official relations with Britain amounted to something of an uncertain victory.

The events following the signing of the 1928 Kellogg-Briand pact, in which over sixty nations collectively renounced war as an instrument of national policy, proved more promising for Moscow's interests. The Soviet Union had first been excluded from the group of potential signatories, but at France's insistence was eventually included.[42] Recovering quickly from the initial insult, the Soviet Union soon gained the upper hand in the ongoing most-peaceful-nation competition by devising a supplementary protocol to the Kellogg-Briand pact, one that would both broaden the original initiative and be operational before the parent pact could be ratified. The idea was that a subset of

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[41]Izvestiia, November 3, 1930. Quoted in ibid., p. 51.

[42]Xenia Joukoff Eudin and Robert M. Slusser, op. cit. (1966), vol. I, p. 7.

contiguous signatory nations would set an example for other less progressive nations to follow.[43]

The so-called Litvinov Protocol was signed on February 9, 1929 by the USSR, Latvia, Poland, Estonia, and Romania.[44] Litvinov, at this time de facto foreign minister with Chicherin ailing, used the occasion as a platform for proclaiming the virtues of complete disarmament.[45] In contrast to Chicherin, who had viewed disarmament as a capitalist plot, passionate public cries for world disarmament were a central component of Litvinov's diplomatic arsenal.[46]

At the most immediate level, Moscow's participation in the Kellogg-Briand pact provided, at least temporarily and in part, the breathing space needed for the successful implementation of Stalin's massive industrialization/collectivization efforts. Less apparent but no less important, at least from the Soviet perspective,

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[43]On its face, in an abstract sense, the stated purpose of the Litvinov protocol parallels the declared aims of the Schengen countries with respect to European integration today, though Moscow's ulterior motives in the early 30s were perhaps more immediately obvious.

[44]Max Beloff, op. cit. (1947), p. 9. Lithuania, Turkey, Persia and the Free City of Danzig would come on board later in the year.

[45]See "Statement by Litvinov at the Signing of the Litvinov Protocol, February 9, 1929," Document 20, in Xenia Joukoff Eudin and Robert M. Slusser, op. cit. (1966), vol. I, pp. 166-8.

[46]Louis Fischer, Men and Politics: An Autobiography (New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1941), p. 127-8.

was Litvinov's successful act of "peace aggression" in the signing of the supplementary pact, to use a Leninist expression.

In the wake of his triumph, Litvinov was finally officially appointed Commissar of Foreign Affairs in July 1930.[47] As mentioned above, he had been de facto head of Narkomindel for several years,[48] as Chicherin's health and probably inclinations required that he spend increasing amounts of time in the spas of Central Europe. While at the time poor health was the official reason for Chicherin's exit, Pravda would reveal, some thirty two years later, that Chicherin had instead been dismissed for repeatedly criticizing Stalin's position on international issues.[49]

There does seems to have been some hesitance on the part of the Party regarding Litvinov's appointment. He was both a returning emigre and a Jew, as well as an Anglophile, having spent a considerable amount of time in England, first as communist mischief maker, then as the first Bolshevik

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[47]For general biographical information on the careers of both Chicherin and Litvinov, see Theodore H. von Laue, "Soviet Diplomacy: G.V. Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 1918-30," pp. 234-281, and Henry L. Roberts, "Maxim Litvinov," pp 344-377 in Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, eds., The Diplomats: 1919-39 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953).

[48]A 1936 Izvestiia article asserted that Litvinov became de facto head of Soviet diplomacy in 1928. See Izvestiia, July 17, 1936.

[49]See Pravda, December 5, 1962.

ambassador.[50] While Narkomindel was still filled with individuals of similar background and origins, distrust of the NKID was on the rise with the expansion of Stalin's authority. Speaking no foreign languages (save Russian) and having spent no time engaged in revolutionary activities abroad[51], Stalin was the product of an entirely different set of experiences, and the alien, for Stalin, was never to be fully trusted. Perhaps this explains why Litvinov was to hold no prominent place in the Party hierarchy until 1934.[52] There is a consensus in the literature that the Politburo, and increasingly Stalin alone, exercised strict control over Litvinov and his Commissariat.[53]

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[50]Jonathan Haslam, Soviet Foreign Policy, 1930-33: The Impact of the Depression (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 14-15. For a recent Soviet account of Litvinov's London years, see E. Sheinis, Maksim Maksimovich Litvinov: revolutsionar, diplomat, chelovek (Moscow, 1989), pp. 77-135. The book also reprints some of Lenin's and Litvinov's pre-revolutionary correspondence. See, especially, pp. 85-104.

[51]See George Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1961), pp. 241-259, especially p. 249.

[52]The XVI Party Congress, which met in June 1930, just one month prior to Litvinov's official appointment and two years into Litvinov's tenure as de facto Commissar of Foreign Affairs, could have conferred high Party status upon Litvinov, but it did not; this would seem to support the interpretation that Stalin was not anxious for his foreign minister to acquire power in the Party.

[53]See, for example, Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 282, and Henry L. Roberts, "Maxim Litvinov," in Gordon Craig and Felix Gilbert, eds., op. cit (1953), pp. 370-2.

Litvinov's appointment came in the midst of profound domestic disarray. The stop-go collectivization campaign was wreaking havoc in the countryside, and a general sense of apprehension pervaded Narkomindel's interactions.[54] The Italian, British, and French envoys were convinced that the collectivization onslaught had sown large-scale unrest in the Red Army.[55] Consequently, the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and the subsequent absence of any sort of collective Western response provoked considerable alarm in Moscow. As Japan marched through Manchuria, the Soviet Union had frantically proposed a non-aggression pact to the Japanese, who did not even respond to the proposal until a good year later. This did little to assuage Moscow's anxiety.[56]

Moscow's response was to step up the peace offensive. In 1931 alone, friendship and non-aggression treaties were signed with Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan and Lithuania[57], but Litvinov's eyes were predominantly set on fortifying old relationships and collecting new ones in the West, thereby diminishing the threat from the East. In the summer of

[54]Jonathan Haslam, op. cit. (1983), Appendix 1, pp. 121-22.

[55]Ibid., p. 24.

[56]See Xenia Joukoff Eudin and Robert M. Slusser, Soviet Foreign Policy, 1928-34, Documents and Materials (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1967), vol. II, pp. 362-5.

[57]Xenia Joukoff Eudin and Robert M. Slusser, op. cit. (1966), vol. I, pp. 48-49.

1931, the Soviet Union and Germany had signed a protocol extending the 1926 Treaty of Berlin, which was itself an extension of the Treaty of Rapallo, but in 1932, the pact had yet to be ratified.[58] This did not testify to the unshakeable strength of German-Soviet friendship. Litvinov turned to France for support.

With their dominions in the south of Asia, the French had a vested interest in avoiding any provocation of Japan while it was searching in Manchuria for lebensraum. The French were also, as always, carefully watching events in Germany. Litvinov had almost reached a breakthrough agreement with Paris in the summer of 1931 - indeed the French had actually initialled a non-aggression pact with the USSR - but the French press caught wind of the initiative and collectively went berserk; the initialled agreement was hastily put aside.[59] Litvinov, consequently, probably felt more than a bit apprehensive when one of Franz von Papen's first public acts after being installed as German chancellor was to meet in Lausanne with the French prime minister Edouard Herriot; the prospect of German

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[58]It would not be ratified until after Hitler's rise to power, on May 5, 1933. Max Beloff, op. cit. (1947), vol. I, p. 68.

[59]Dovgalevsky (Paris) to Moscow, September 23, 1931, Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR (Moscow, 1968), vol. XIV, Document 273, pp. 535-7.

encirclement once again appeared to be rearing its ugly head.[60]

The Soviet Union's worst fears soon dissipated. In November 1932, just two days after Moscow and Poland had at long last ratified their treaty of non-aggression, the French finally agreed to ratify the Franco-Soviet pact.[61] Earlier in the year, the Soviet Union had also concluded agreements with Finland, Estonia, and Latvia.[62] The French turn around was followed by the fall of chancellor Papen (in December), who was replaced by General Kurt von Schleicher. These events combined to ease the Soviet Union's anxiety somewhat; Moscow's long standing relationship with the Reichswehr made Schleicher an appealing choice for the chancellorship, conjuring up images of happier Rapallo days.

Shortly after Schleicher's installation, Litvinov met with the new chancellor in Berlin. Schleicher expressed concern over Moscow's latest non-aggression pact spree and supreme irritation with the latest antics of the German Communist Party (KPD). Litvinov assured him that any measures taken against the KPD would not adversely affect

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[60]E.H. Carr, Twilight of the Comintern 1930-35 (New York: Pantheon, 1982), pp. 58-9.

[61]The French change of heart was no doubt facilitated by the fall of Tardieu, who had been anti-Soviet. The new prime minister, Herriot, was more flexible on this issue. Ibid., p. 80.

[62]For the texts of these agreements, see Maxim Litvinov, Against Aggression (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1939), pp. 148-51, 152-5, and 160-3.

the German-Soviet relationship.[63] Britain's ambassador to Moscow had received a similar report from Litvinov regarding Soviet attitudes toward the KPD a year earlier, and had cabled back to London that "the Soviet Union wanted no revolution in Germany or elsewhere today; world revolution was undoubtedly 'on their books', but for the moment they were entirely concentrated on the five year plan and wished to show concrete results in their own country as the best form of propaganda."[64] Litvinov, no doubt reflecting Stalin's personal position, seems to have viewed the fortunes of the KPD in strictly instrumental terms.

By the end of 1932, the network of alliances that Litvinov had so carefully constructed seemed to establish Soviet security on solid ground. One short year later, with the Nazi party firmly in control in Germany, the foundation of this infrastructure had collapsed. Though on the tenth anniversary of Rapallo, Izvestiia had proudly proclaimed that the German-Soviet relationship "served as a model for how relations should be established between two countries having opposing socio-political systems, but common economic

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[63]E.H. Carr, op. cit (1982), pp. 80-1. Carr reports that the fullest account of the conversation between Schleicher and Litvinov can be found in Auswartiges Amt, 9496/668964-7.

[64]Ovey (Moscow) to Henderson (London), July 27, 1931 in Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-39 (London: 1958), second series, vol. VII, Document 140, p. 216.

and foreign policy interests,"[65] Hitler's rise to power rapidly exposed long-standing Soviet hopes as illusions.

Hitler's assumption of the chancellorship did not initially provoke much of a response in Moscow. Stalin did not utter a single public remark about the turn of events in Germany for the full first year of Hitler's tenure in power.[66] For his part, Hitler, at first, said little about foreign affairs. His retention of Neurath as foreign minister, for a Moscow eager to be optimistic, seemed promising. Litvinov met with Neurath in Berlin on March 1, 1933, where he was assured that Hitler was a "practical" man, quite capable of distinguishing between ideology and interest.[67] The very day after Litvinov's meeting, however, Hitler launched his first public diatribe against Bolshevik Russia, placing the blame for the Reichstag fire squarely on its agents, and proceeded to step up violence against German

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[65]Izvestiia, April 16, 1932.

[66]Stalin would break this silence at the 17th Party Congress in January 1934. Isaac Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 2nd edition, p. 415.

[67]"Zapis' besedy Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannykh Del SSSR c Ministrom Inostrannykh Del Germanii Neiratom" in Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR (Moscow, 1970), vol. XVI, document 54, pp. 134-8.

communists, a week later banning the KPD and all its institutions.[68]

Thereafter, German-Soviet relations swiftly degenerated. In late 1933, German military advisors finally departed Soviet soil, with sadness on both sides. Voroshilov, then Commissar for War, expressed great satisfaction with what had been accomplished through cooperation between the Red Army and the Reichswehr, and the hope that this fruitful partnership might be resumed in the future.[69]

While German soldiers were packing, Litvinov was engineering a diplomatic breakthrough in Washington. The United States at long last officially recognized the Soviet government in November 1933, sixteen years after the Bolshevik revolution.[70] William C. Bullitt, who in 1919 had been dispatched to Petrograd on a special investigatory

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[68]E.H. Carr, op. cit. (1982), pp. 86-8. One possible explanation for Hitler's initial restraint in his first dealings with Moscow is that until he had firmly established control, he dared not alienate the Reichswehr, early beneficiaries of the Rapallo relationship. See John W. Wheeler-Bennett's introduction to Gerald Freund, Unholy Alliance: Russian-German Relations from the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to the Treaty of Berlin (London: Chatto and Windus, 1957), pp. xv-xvi.

[69]Xenia Joukoff Eudin and Robert M. Slusser, op. cit. (1967), vol. II, p. 362. The original source is US Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: 1949-), Series C, II, pp. 338-39.

[70]For a full account of the negotiations leading up to recognition, see Beatrice Farnsworth, William C. Bullitt and the Soviet Union (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967), pp. 89-115.

mission by President Wilson, was appointed America's first ambassador to the Soviet Union.[71]

Bullitt set out for Moscow shortly thereafter, and the Soviet leadership, much to Bullitt's delight, rolled out the red carpet. Voroshilov hosted a dinner at his home for Bullitt, with Kalinin, Molotov, Litvinov, and Stalin himself present. There the new ambassador found his Soviet hosts preoccupied with Japan, rather than with the establishment of Nazi power in Germany. Stalin sought Bullitt's assistance in securing old railway ties from the United States, telling him that, "'without those rails we shall beat the Japanese, but if we have the rails, it will be easier.'" Stalin also introduced his chief of staff Egorov as "'the man who will lead our army victoriously against Japan when Japan attacks.'"[72] The day after Voroshilov's dinner, Litvinov expressed similar concerns, informing Bullitt that "'anything that could be done to make the Japanese believe that the United States was ready to

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[71]Bullitt's wife also had a long-standing relationship with the Soviet Union and the communist movement. America's first ambassador to the Soviet Union was married to Louise Bryant, the widow of John Reed, the American communist who had served in Narkomindel until his death! Reed is buried in the Kremlin wall, the only foreigner so honored.

[72]William C. Bullitt to William Phillips, Acting Secretary of State, January 4, 1934 in Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. The Soviet Union 1933-39 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 59.

cooperate with Russia, even though there might be no basis for the belief would be valuable.'"[73]

Why were Stalin and Narkomindel so slow to discern the imminent threat from Hitler's Germany? To be sure, Japan was already actively involved in aggressive activities at the time, while Hitler's offensive existed only in Nazi imaginations, so the lack of explicit concern could be attributed to Soviet sensory overload; simultaneously coping with Japanese military action against China and the array of domestic problems had already pushed Soviet strategic planning to the limits of the possible. Still, in the end, it remains somewhat surprising that a group of men so preoccupied with matters ideological would so seriously underestimate the threat from a complete ideological nemesis. At times, the Soviet leadership seems to have been persuaded by its own propaganda that fascism would be capitalism's last gasp, the stepping stone to socialist triumph. Max Beloff has nicely summarized this view: "communist theory made no allowance for a movement that was at once revolutionary and non-proletarian."[74]

Litvinov's speech to the Central Executive Committee of December 29, 1933, however, points to other potential explanations. The Commissar began with the dramatic statement that "if it is possible to speak of diplomatic

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[73]Ibid., p. 61.

[74]Max Beloff, op. cit. (1947), vol. I, p. 61.

eras, then we are now without doubt standing at the junction of two eras."[75] He pointed to the establishment of relations with the United States, the last bastion of officially sanctioned anti-Bolshevism as the year's greatest triumph.[76] He also chronicled, country by country, the success of Soviet diplomacy in improving relations with the capitalist - and even fascist, in the case of Italy - powers, insisting that "the entire world knows that we can and do maintain good relations with capitalist States, whatever their regime, even if it is fascist."[77] That is, in Litvinov's eyes, the new diplomatic era was not the result of a change in Soviet diplomacy, but stemmed instead from changing attitudes among the bourgeois powers, the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States symbolizing this change from without.[78]

As for the deterioration of German-Soviet relations, Litvinov expressed the hope that the Nazi government will

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[75]Litvinov's speech on foreign affairs to the Central Executive Committee, December 29, 1933. Edited version reprinted in Jane Degras ed., Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), vol. III (1933-1941), p. 48.

[76]Ibid., p. 51. Molotov (at this point, head of Sovnarkom, the Council of People's Commissars) also cited the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States as the year's greatest success for Soviet foreign policy. See Molotov's speech on foreign affairs to the Central Executive Committee, December 28, 1933. Edited version reprinted in ibid., p. 46.

[77]Ibid., pp. 52-4; p. 56.

[78]And, as I argue below, there is more truth than propaganda in this claim.

realize, "as we understand very well, the difference between doctrine and policy."[79] This would seem to suggest that Stalin's fatal error in assessing the Nazi threat may have been to project his own Machiavellian perspective on matters ideological.

Finally, Litvinov's speech signalled an interest in League of Nations' membership, not surprising given both Germany's and Japan's recent withdrawals from the League. Litvinov emphasized that "we have never rejected and do not reject organized international cooperation designed to consolidate peace. Not being doctrinaires, we do not refuse to use international association or organization, whether those already in existence or those which may be founded in the future, if we have or shall have reason to believe that they serve the cause of peace."[80]

Although Stalin's diplomatic gymnastics, from the joining of the League of Nations to the Stalin-Hitler pact, were eventually to astonish the world, the ground we have travelled in this section suggests that little of this should have been so surprising.[81] While its apprehensive tone is probably attributable to a rapidly changing external world, Litvinov's speech to the Central Executive Committee

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[79]Ibid., p. 56.

[80]Ibid., p. 51.

[81]Adam Ulam has argued that had Litvinov's speech been carefully studied, no one would have been surprised by the Stalin-Hitler pact. See Adam B. Ulam, op. cit. (1974), p. 206.

of the Comintern, as we have seen, only makes explicit diplomatic trends that had been set in motion much earlier. Put another way, though often depicted as such, Soviet foreign policy did not suddenly deradicalize on January 30, 1933. Rather, the origins of the new Soviet diplomacy predate Hitler's assumption of the chancellorship. Though the rise of Nazi Germany surely accelerated an ongoing process, it did not initiate the evolution in Soviet external posture. For a more complete explanation of Soviet diplomacy in the late 20s and early 30s, one must look not to Hitler, but to the external manifestations of Stalin's internal strategies for building socialism in one country.

International Economic Policy, 1929-33

The patterns of Soviet international economic policy in 1929-33, for the most part, moved in tandem with the rhythms of diplomatic relations, explored above. Paradoxically, while the first five year plan's long range aspirations tended toward autarky, fulfillment of its more immediate aims mandated an increase in ties with the capitalist world. Imports of capital goods, machinery, and Western expertise were vital components of Stalin's blitzkrieg strategy for industrialization of Bolshevik Russia.

For the Soviet Union, trade agreements with the West served a dual purpose. In the most direct sense, they provided the fuel for Stalin's breakneck industrialization drive. Indirectly, however, a successfully negotiated

economic agreement with a capitalist power had even broader significance; the implications of its signing were that pre-Bolshevik Russian debts, which were quite extensive, had been forgiven, thereby enabling the new Soviet government to start afresh with the country in question.

The years of the first five year plan are often characterized as a period in which the Soviet Union "turned inward" to focus on its predominant concern, economic development and the building of socialism, however defined. While it is a central contention of this chapter that Stalin's revolution from above in many ways shaped Soviet external policies at the time, this is not the same as to say that the Soviet Union "turned inward," at least not in the sense in which the phrase is often employed, that is, to denote a certain degree of isolationism.[82] To the contrary, the previous section has revealed a Soviet Union eager to involve itself in a network of diplomatic relationships. In the realm of Soviet international economic policy, this desire to reap the benefits of interaction with the outside world is perhaps even more pronounced. Soviet foreign trade figures recently compiled by a Soviet economist, Vladimir

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[82]For example, George Kennan has characterized the era of the first five year plan as mandating a certain isolationism in Soviet foreign policy, arguing that "the five years following 1927 might be called, in fact, a period of isolationism in Soviet foreign policy - a period of withdrawal from external affairs during which great internal changes were undertaken." See George F. Kennan, op. cit. (1961), p. 148.

Popov[83], suggest that the Soviet Union was more involved with the outside world during the first five year plan than in any period in its entire history. Foreign trade turnover (exports plus imports) from 1928-32 represented 30% of national income, the highest percentage figure ever, at least 7.9 percentage points higher than the same figure for the detente era, and 7.1 percentage points higher than Gorbachev's first five full years in power. The complete set of figures are reproduced in the table below:

Foreign Trade Turnover in 1983 Prices[84]

Years	Rubles (in billions)	% of National Income
1918-23	2	20.0
1924-28	7	20.0
1929-32	12	30.0
1933-37	6	6.0
1938-6/30/41	3	2.6
7/1/41-45	4	3.3
1946-50	20	9.5
1951-55	45	10.8
1956-60	85	12.1
1961-65	140	14.8
1966-70	200	14.7
1971-75	365	20.0
1976-80	500	22.1
1981-85	625	23.6
1986-90	725	22.9

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[83]Popov is the author, with Nikolai Shmelov, of Na perelome: ekonomicheskaia perestroika v SSSR (Moscow, 1989).

[84]Vladimir Popov, "Perestroika and Foreign Economic Ties," in Michael Kraus and Ronald D. Liebowitz eds., Perestroika and East-West Economic Relations: Prospects for the 1990s (New York: New York University Press, 1990), p. 77. Popov's figures are compiled from Narodnoye khoziastvo SSSR (various years) and Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodniye otnosheniia, 1987, no. 2, p. 147.

Who, then, funded Soviet industrialization? Statistics on the source of Russian imports during the first five year plan reveal some interesting trends, some quite predictable, others less so. First, unsurprisingly, Germany provided the Soviet Union with an ever increasing share of its imports. In 1929, Germany accounted for 22.1% of all Russian imports; by 1932, it supplied 46.0%, nearly half of total imports. Also, not surprisingly, the trends for Soviet economic relations with France stand in inverse relationship to those for Germany, mirroring the general rhythms of Soviet diplomatic relations with France and Germany in the same period. France contributed a paltry 4.3% of the Soviet Union's imports in 1929, and by 1932, this figure had dwindled to 0.5%. In contrast, somewhat surprisingly, despite the absence of diplomatic recognition, the United States consistently supplied 20-25% of Soviet imports from 1929-31 (in 1932, the figure plummets, as the result of a Soviet effort to pressure the Americans into diplomatic recognition, about which more will be said below).

Source of Russian Imports During First Five Year Plan (%)[85]

Year	USA	UK	Germany	France
1913	5.8	12.6	47.5	4.1
....				
1929	20.1	6.2	22.1	4.3
1930	25.0	8.0	24.0	2.8
1931	21.0	6.0	37.0	1.3
1932	5.0	5.0	46.0	0.5

The West, particularly with the onset of the depression, was more than willing to exploit Soviet demand for its goods and services, but was understandably apprehensive about the Bolsheviks' ability to afford its products.[86] Consequently, the Bolsheviks were granted primarily short term, rather than long term, commercial credits. Short on cash and credit, if the Soviet Union wished to import items to assist in the modernization of its economy, the foreign goods would have to be paid for with immediate exports.

The Soviet Union's precarious international economic status had implications for both domestic and foreign economic policy. To secure what they needed for industrialization, the Bolsheviks would have to step up their exports to the West. But what could a preindustrial

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[85]Figures were compiled by Max Beloff, op. cit. (1947), vol. I, Appendix 3, p. 40.

[86]In the midst of the jubilant celebration of the end of the cold war and the pacific powers of economic interdependence, it is sobering to read documents from the early 30s, which reveal the complete predominance of economic concerns for both Russia and the West, when but a few years later, the world would again be engulfed in war.

state produce that the already industrialized capitalist countries might actually want and need? The obvious answer, or so it seemed, was to extrapolate from what commodities they had wanted and needed before the October Revolution, and so the fledgling communist regime followed in the footsteps of its tsarist predecessors and set out to restore Russia's status as a world leader in grain exports.

In terms of both internal and external repercussions, the timing of the USSR's attempt to recapture its share of the international grain market could not have been worse. The chaotic campaign for rapid collectivization turned the daily life of the average Soviet peasant upside down, threatening his entire way of life, as well as his very survival. His future uncertain, he did the natural thing; despite the harshly enforced state grain procurement system, he hoarded grain[87] - while simultaneously, the state attempted to step up exports. Facing a mounting grain shortage, rather than sacrifice exports or renounce Stalinist agricultural mythology, the regime introduced bread rationing.[88]

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[87]By the end of the first five year plan period, with Stalin's coercive apparatus firmly entrenched in the countryside, the peasantry would not be able to hoard grain; thus, the great famine of 1932-33 caused the greatest suffering in the most agriculturally productive regions of the country.

[88]Adam B. Ulam, Stalin: The Man and His Era (New York: Viking Press, 1973), p. 312. Bread rationing by the end of 1929 had been extended to cover almost all foodstuffs. Alec Nove, op. cit. (1984), p. 202.

Externally, the Stalinist rush to export grain coincided with the Great Depression. The Wall Street crash sent the price of wheat plummeting, and onto this situation then dropped a mountain of Soviet grain, accelerating the crash-induced downward price spiral. Needless to say, those countries who relied heavily on the export of raw materials (the United States, Canada, and the Scandinavian and Baltic countries) were outraged at the Soviet Union's inopportune incursion. France, though less affected by the Soviet action due to quite different export patterns, joined in the outcry, being miffed over Comintern mischief in Indochina. Accusing the Soviet Union of "dumping," a number of European countries, led by France, imposed a partial economic boycott of Soviet products in the fall of 1930.[89]

In classifying Soviet export policy as "dumping," the West was fundamentally in error. By definition, "dumping" is a way of unloading surplus goods at prices below home market levels; a prerequisite for a strategy of "dumping" is a surplus of the good in question. In the case of the Soviet Union in 1930, the good allegedly being dumped, grain, was simultaneously rationed at home. The Soviet strategy was to sell commodities abroad, regardless of whether or not a demand for these goods existed at home. Grain was priced attractively for the foreign buyer, without that price bearing any particular relationship to the costs

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[89]Jonathan Haslam, op. cit. (1983), pp. 4-6, 38-45.

of production, not to mention the most immediate needs of the Soviet people. Hence, Soviet trade practices were profoundly disruptive of rationally operative international markets, which helps to explain the intensity of the West's protest.[90]

The Soviet Union's response to the French-led sanctions was something of an escalation. The French partial boycott consisted of requiring permission to import certain categories of Soviet goods into France, with permission often being denied. Moscow retaliated by prohibiting all imports from France. Shortly thereafter, French sabotage of the Soviet industrialization drive, rather than German, began to star in the ongoing procession of show trials. The November 1930 trial of the "Industrial Party" or Promparty, to use its mixed Russian-English acronym, featured prominent condemnation of French mischief. The accused were charged with acting on sabotage or "wrecking" orders from the French General Staff.[91] The trade war continued until July 1931, when both parties lifted restrictions on the eve of the short-lived breakthrough in Franco-Soviet diplomatic relations in August.[92]

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[90]Max Beloff, op. cit. (1947), vol. I, pp. 31-2.

[91]For an account of the trial, see Alexander Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago, 1918-56: An Experiment in Literary Investigation (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), vol. I, pp. 376-399.

[92]Jonathan Haslam, op. cit. (1983), p. 44; Xenia Joukoff Eudin and Robert M. Slusser, op. cit. (1966), vol. I, p. 47.

The conflict with France made the USSR's surviving economic ties with the West all the more important. When the German and Austrian governments concluded a customs union agreement in March 1931, Izvestiia rejoiced at what it saw as a challenge to French domination in Europe.[93] A new trade agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union was signed in April 1931, and the subsequent protocol extending the Treaty of Berlin explicitly banned economic sanctions or boycotts between the two powers.[94] Similarly, a fascist regime in Italy did not phase Moscow's economic warriors. The August 1930 Soviet-Italian trade agreement provided for the expansion of economic relations between Mussolini's Italy and Stalin's Russia. Indeed, fascist Italy was to shock the world's diplomats by calling for the inclusion of the world's first communist state in the League of Nations commission of enquiry on European Union, set up to deal with the Briand plan.[95]

Italy's request, though, was only partially satisfied. The Soviet Union was included in discussions on economic matters, but excluded from all others. Litvinov seized the opportunity, however, and in his opening speech to the

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[93]Izvestiia, March 24, 1931.

[94]Xenia Joukoff Eudin and Robert M. Slusser, op. cit. (1966), vol. I, p. 52.

[95]Italy found in Russia a valuable weapon in its struggle against France. See Jonathan Haslam, op. cit. (1983), pp. 50-1. Haslam's account on this point is based on his analysis of Italian diplomatic documents, which I believe have never been translated into English.

commission in Geneva on May 18, 1931 unveiled the Soviet Union's contribution to the advancement of European unity: a draft protocol of a pact on economic non-aggression, a reflection, perhaps of Moscow's most immediate concerns.[96] The Soviet foreign minister's passionate plea met with a distinctly unenthusiastic response, but Litvinov left Geneva confident that the Soviet Union's participation in the European Union Commission had won the Soviet Union the "breathing space" needed to complete successfully the first five year plan.[97]

With the small victory in Geneva and the restoration of economic relations with France behind it, the Soviet Union turned its sights to winning diplomatic recognition from the last capitalist holdout, the United States. Interestingly, as mentioned above, the absence of official diplomatic relations did not seem to inhibit intensive economic interaction between the two countries. In 1929, despite official non-recognition of the Soviet regime, the United States was the Soviet Union's third largest trading partner, accounting for 12.2% of Soviet trade, ranking only behind

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[96]"Draft Protocol of a Pact of Economic Non-Aggression Submitted by the Soviet Delegation to the Commission of Enquiry on European Union," May 18, 1931, and "Statement by Litvinov on the Soviet Draft for a Pact of Economic Non-Aggression," May 21, 1931 in Jane Degras, ed., <u>Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy</u> (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), vol. II (1925-32), pp. 499-500; 500-503.

[97]Maxim Litvinov (Geneva) to Moscow, May 23, 1931, in <u>Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR</u> (Moscow, 1968), vol. XIV, document 167, pp. 346-48.

Britain at 14.3% and Germany at 22.7%.[98] American firms and Americans were of vital importance to the first five year plan's implementation. Albert Kahn and Company, an American architectural company, worked with Soviet engineers to design over two billion dollars worth of industrial buildings for heavy industry.[99] After 1928, American designers, engineers, laborers, and technicians were the largest contingent in the shock troops of foreign talent assisting in the construction of socialism.[100] And, of course, individual renegade American entrepreneurs, such as the legendary Armand Hammer, son of one of the founders of the American Communist Party, also played a leading role in the modernization of the Soviet economy.[101] However, in late 1931, the Soviet Union curtailed these involvements to step up the pressure for recognition; US exports to the Soviet Union, consequently, fell from 180 million rubles in 1931 to 24.8 million rubles in 1932. The Soviet move seems

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[98]The source of these figures is Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR v. godu doovoennykh piatiletok (1929-40): Statisticheskii sbornik (Moscow, 1968).

[99]Antony C. Sutton, Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), vol. 2, pp. 249-52.

[100]Mikhail Heller and Alexander Nekrich, op. cit. (1986), p. 231.

[101]For the role of American businessmen in the Soviet Union's early economic development, see Joseph Finder, Red Carpet (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1983). On the activities of Armand Hammer specifically, see Robert Considine, The Remarkable Life of Doctor Armand Hammer (New York: Cass Canfield, 1975).

to have been effective, for the opposition Democrats seized the issue and hounded President Hoover on the matter.[102]

Economic relations with Britain, which had always been rather rocky, also took a downturn in 1932. The Soviet Union still posed a major threat to Canada's export revenues, and Canada had been lobbying England for several years to do something about this unacceptable competition, Canada herself having already placed an embargo on Soviet imports (in February 1931 - the Soviet Union promptly responded in kind). Canadian protests paid off in October 1932, when Britain severed its trade relations with the Soviet Union.[103] As a result, the Franco-Soviet non-aggression pact the following month was hailed in Moscow with heightened enthusiasm, particularly since it specifically prohibited acts of economic aggression.[104]

Throughout, the Soviet Union persisted in pursuing foreign markets for its grain, while its own citizenry starved. The winter of 1932-3 brought a famine of unspeakable proportions to the Soviet Union's agricultural belt. Record high grain export levels in 1930 and 1931 had fueled industrialization but depleted all reserves. To feed urban workers and keep the hard currency export revenues flowing into state coffers, Stalin literally bled the Soviet

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[102]"Appendix Two: The Search for US Recognition," in Jonathan Haslam, op. cit. (1983), p. 123.

[103]Ibid., pp. 107-112.

[104]See Izvestiia, November 30, 1932.

countryside.[105] In the midst of mass famine, Moscow continued to export grain and to insist on fulfillment of the plan for state procurements. The figures reprinted below tell the story:

State Grain Procurements[106]
(millions of tons)

1928	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
10.8	16.1	22.1	22.8	18.5	22.6

Grain Exports[107]
(millions of tons)

1927-28	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933
.029	0.18	4.76	5.06	1.73	1.69

While ideology devoured human beings in the Soviet countryside, the first socialist state's external relations were a model of dry-eyed pragmatism. With Hitler's Germany now openly hostile, Moscow signed a trade and credit agreement with fascist Italy in May 1933. Izvestiia hailed the agreement as "new proof that the Soviet Union sincerely

[105]For the most recent account of the great famine of 1932-33, see Robert Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). Conquest's treatment is controversial for suggesting that the famine in the Ukraine was not only man-made, but a deliberate attempt on the part of Stalin to annihilate Ukrainian nationalism.

[106]Alec Nove, An Economic History of the USSR (New York: Penguin Books, 1984; c. 1969), p. 180. Original source of the figures is Malafeyev, Istoriia tsenoobrazovaniia v SSSR (Moscow: 1964), p. 175; 177.

[107]Ibid., p. 180. The figures are compiled by Nove from Soviet trade returns.

desires to establish peaceful relations with the capitalist countries, and will gladly meet any of them halfway if they seriously wish to establish normal and close relations."[108]

The net results of Soviet international economic policy from 1929-33 were appalling. During that time, the Soviet Union's already low standard of living fell by as much as a third.[109] Whereas in 1928 the average Soviet city dweller consumed 51.7 kilos of meat and lard, in 1932 he ate only 16.9 kilos. The urban worker was able to make up for this deficit through increased consumption of bread and potatoes; the rural dweller simply consumed less of everything. This suffering was the direct result of deliberate state policy.[110] What forced collectivization did not destroy, the Soviet Union did not hesitate to export. With his literal sacrifice of human beings for capital, Stalin gave new meaning to the Marxist concepts of alienation and exploitation.

When Stalin's industrialization goals came into conflict with the cause of advancing Stalin's personal power, however, the latter agenda always took precedence. As George Kennan has in characteristic fashion so aptly summarized, "Stalin did not hesitate during those years to

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[108] Izvestiia, May 9, 1933.

[109] Adam B. Ulam, op. cit. (1973), p. 342.

[110] Alec Nove, op. cit. (1984), p. 177. Nove's figures are from Y. Moshkov, Zernovaia problema v gody sploshnoi kollektivizatsii (Moscow: 1966), p. 136.

abuse Russia's relations with the Western countries for his own domestic purposes."[111] If show trials of foreign specialists were needed to deflect the blame for the country's woes from Stalin and the inherent shortcomings of the Stalinist system to an amorphous enemy without, Stalin would readily accept the subsequent international and economic fallout. And so the internal propaganda crusade against foreigners and capitalism feverishly raged, while Stalin's deputies laboured to expand and strengthen the Soviet Union's ties to the capitalist world.

Transnational Policy, 1929-33

Stalin's revolution from above shook the world communist movement as profoundly as it did Soviet Russia. By the epoch's close, the Comintern was but a shadow of its former self, transformed beyond recognition, while concurrently Soviet attitudes regarding non-communist international organization in general and the League of Nations in particular had undergone a complete metamorphosis. In this section, we shall first turn our attention to an assessment of the revolution in Comintern policy, before moving on to an investigation of the latter array of changes.

Initially, Comintern policy more or less constituted Soviet foreign policy. As we saw above, the Bolsheviks first viewed the more traditional forms of diplomacy to be

[111] George Kennan, op. cit. (1961), p. 282.

an unnecessary nuisance; with world revolution thought to be imminent, the nascent diplomatic energies of the Bolsheviks were instead devoted to organizing and instructing the international communist movement for rising to the challenge of its world historical moment.

With the close of the civil war years, the demands of successfully winning the right to exist as the world's first socialist state in a suspicious and hostile world quickly took precedence, and Soviet foreign policy soon took on a dualistic character, constituting a veritable revolution in international norms of behavior. While maintaining and indeed actively pursuing diplomatic and trade relations with the capitalist powers, the Soviet Union, through the vehicle of the Comintern, simultaneously directed operations aimed at overthrowing the existing governments of these same countries. Needless to say, the two arms of the Soviet state often found themselves working at cross purposes, with Western governments perpetually protesting Soviet-sanctioned communist subversion in their respective countries, and the Soviet leadership repeating, ad nauseam, that the Comintern was an independent international organization, beyond the direct control of the Soviet government.

Orchestrating world revolution and simultaneously striving to win the favor of established governments was an increasingly difficult task. As a result, the internal struggle for power following Lenin's death found further expression in heated debates over Comintern policy, and the

complicated situation in China in the mid-20s was a focal point for this conflict. The story is quite involved, but to summarize very quickly: until 1927, the Chinese Communists had been instructed to exercise restraint, to work within and exert their primary influence through the Kuomintang - the Chinese nationalist organization (which grew ever more anti-communist as events progressed) - until the situation had sufficiently "ripened" to ensure the ultimate communist triumph.[112] Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the Chinese nationalists, however, had a very different notion of China's future, and upon capturing Shanghai in March 1927, proceeded to massacre all the local Communists and their supporters, making a shambles of the Comintern's policy of collaboration. At this point, the Comintern "unleashed" the Chinese Communists, but it was now far too late. By the end of the year, with China's communists exiled to isolated areas of the countryside, China's future seemed indisputably to belong to the Kuomintang.

Though Trotsky subsequently claimed that the initial policy of collaboration and restraint was solely Stalin's, and that Stalin was responsible for "losing" China, documents in the Trotsky Archive demonstrate that by 1926, even Trotsky was sensitive to increasing Western and Japanese concern over Comintern policy in Asia. Just before

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[112]For a more detailed account of the extraordinarily involved story of Comintern policy in China, see Adam B. Ulam, op. cit. (1974), pp. 167-181.

his fall, Trotsky had been appointed to head a special committee of the Politburo to study the situation in China. His report of March 26, 1926 calls for a subordinate role for China and the Chinese communists in Soviet foreign policy priorities. The Treaty of Locarno, Trotsky argued, raises the prospect of a united front allied against the USSR; thus, the Soviet Union, at this stage in its historical development, needed a breathing spell.[113] This asserted coincidence of interests between the Soviet state and the Communists in China would soon be extended to define the Soviet Union's doctrinal position on Comintern policy in general.

In ducking the charge of losing China, Stalin redefined the meaning of proletarian internationalism. For those who had previously misunderstood, Stalin explained in August 1927 that "an internationalist is one who unreservedly, unhesitatingly, and unconditionally is prepared to defend the USSR, because the USSR is the base of the world revolutionary movement, and it is impossible to defend or advance the world revolutionary movement without defending the USSR. Whoever thinks of defending the world revolutionary movement without the USSR and against it, opposes the revolution and must be considered an enemy of the revolution."[114] The implication was that those who

[113]The Trotsky Archive, Document T870.

[114]J.V. Stalin, Sochinenila (Moscow: 1948), vol. X, p. 51.

criticized Stalin or the Soviet Union for the Comintern's failed China policy, in so doing attempted to defend the world revolutionary movement without the USSR, and were consequently exposed as enemies of socialism, to be dealt with accordingly. With this ideological modification, Stalin had journeyed far afield from the Bolsheviks' original position in 1917 that the Soviet Union existed to promote world revolution; the nascent premise was, instead, that the international communist movement existed to promote the interests of the USSR. Whoever so much as questioned that fundamental premise was labelled an enemy of the people and of socialism.

Thus, the gradual process of "Bolshevization" of the foreign communist parties, initiated by the promulgation of the twenty one conditions for membership in the Comintern in 1920, and alluded to and further promoted by Stalin's pronouncement, reached its logical conclusion only with the

consolidation of Stalin's dictatorship.[115] The final stages of Stalin's march to supreme power in the Soviet Union coincided with a string of external Comintern failures - the defeat of the German uprising in 1923, the losses in Estonia and Bulgaria in 1924/25, culminating with the "loss" of China in 1927 - and both sets of events had considerable impact on the outcome of the Comintern's fateful sixth Party Congress in the summer of 1928.

The dynamics of the power struggle in Moscow were projected onto the sixth Congress' proceedings and its aftermath at a number of levels. Bukharin, his position already in jeopardy, presided over the gathering, which triumphantly proclaimed the elimination of the subversive Trotskyist left opposition in the Comintern and the current need to focus collective energies on fighting the mounting

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[115]The twenty one conditions, drafted largely by Lenin at the Second Comintern Congress in August 1920, spelled out the ideological and organizational requirements for Comintern membership. The process of implementing the twenty one conditions in foreign communist parties later became known as "bolshevization." In 1925, Zinoviev defined bolshevization as "utilizing the experience of the Bolshevik party in the three Russian revolutions in its application to the concrete situation in the given country."(Zinoviev's first revolution is the mass uprising of 1905, which Lenin much later referred to as the "dress rehearsal" of the revolution). Quoted in Jane Degras, ed., The Communist International 1919-1943, Documents, vol. II (1923-28), p. 188. For an English translation of the twenty one conditions, see Robert V. Daniels, A Documentary History of Communism (Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 1984), vol. 2, pp. 44-47.

threat from the right.[116] The alleged challenge to Comintern unity from the right translated into a momentous doctrinal radicalization of the Comintern party line, the full effects of which were to unfold in the years that followed. Stalin gave a sneak preview of the new line that was to emerge from the sixth Congress, when he asserted just two days before the Congress' commencement, that "Communist parties must oppose war, struggle against social democracy, and should war come, change the imperialist war into a civil war."[117]

In short, the new policy was one of open hostility to all leftist non-communist parties; instead of building bridges with progressive parties (or with mass organizations committed to revolutionary change, as the Chinese Communists had done with the Kuomintang before their demise), communist parties were instead to form a "united front from below" -

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[116]"Extracts from the Theses of the Sixth Comintern Congress on the International Situation and the Tasks of the Communist International," August 29, 1928 in Jane Degras, ed., The Communist International 1919-1943, Documents, vol. II (1923-28), p. 464.

[117]See Izvestiia, July 15, 1928.

and work openly against these elements.[118] Especially singled out for open Comintern contempt throughout the period of the first five year plan were social democratic parties in general - soon to be referred to generically in this dark period of Comintern history as "social fascists" - and the German Social Democrats in particular. The ultra-radicalism of the Comintern from 1929-33, though of general application, was launched primarily against the German Social Democratic Party (SPD); this was, in some ways, not difficult to understand, for the German Social Democrats from the start had done little to earn the affections of the Bolsheviks. They were the first to draw public attention to the extent of military collaboration between Germany and Russia in the Rapallo years and were also unfailing supporters of a Western orientation in German foreign policy.[119]

Shortly after the close of the sixth Congress, Molotov reported to the Leningrad Party organization that unanimity

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[118]As usual, the American Communist Party was granted to be something of an exception. The sixth Congress blamed its impotence in the preceding years on its failure to recruit Negroes (sic). The national content of the Negro question had been overlooked, the Executive Committee of the Comintern (the ECCI) argued; the Negroes are an oppressed nation, and communists should support and work for national self-determination for Negroes in the "Black Belt." See "Extracts from an ECCI Resolution on the Negro Question," in Jane Degras, ed., op. cit. (1971), vol. II (1923-28), pp. 552-557. (Some sixty odd years later, General Secretary Gorbachev would make a similar appeal, stunning the world.)

[119]See E.H. Carr, op. cit. (1982), p. 7; Max Beloff, op. cit. (1947), vol. I, p. 59.

of decisions had been one of the Congress' outstanding characteristics; "the Comintern has achieved unity on the basis of overcoming Trotskyism," Molotov proudly declared.[120] With the overcoming of Bukharinism in the Comintern, Stalin took matters one step further. Bukharin's presiding presence at the sixth Congress was to be his last; after 1928, Bukharin was banned from participation in Comintern affairs. On December 19, 1928, Stalin made a rare appearance at a meeting of the Comintern Executive Committee, signalling his full seizure of the international organization.[121]

Upon having ousted Bukharin from the Comintern presidency, Stalin did not appoint an official successor; instead Molotov, who had never been abroad, was entrusted unofficially with presidential responsibilities, and he was assisted in his Comintern endeavors only by minor personalities, such as Maniulsky and Kuusinen. "The choice of personnel was a clear implication that international communism was no longer regarded as important in itself."[122] To preside over the Comintern would be forever to wield the potential for building an alternative to Stalin's power, and this, above all, Stalin could not tolerate. Though the

[120]Jane Degras, ed., op. cit. (1971), vol. II (1923-28), p. 451.

[121]Stephen F. Cohen, op. cit. (1973), pp. 300-301.

[122]Franz Borkenau, World Communism: A History of the Communist International (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962; c. 1939), p. 339.

sixth Congress had mandated that a world Congress should be convened once every two years, significantly, the international communist movement would not have its seventh Congress until 1935; that is, the Comintern would not meet at all during Stalin's revolution from above.[123]

Thus, the extremist left turn of the Comintern in 1928-34 (which the participants in the sixth Congress referred to anticipatorily as the "third period")[124] has been characterized here as a product of both Stalin's revolutionary agenda within the Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent, the series of setbacks the international movement suffered beyond the Soviet Union's borders in the 1920s. It must be stressed that this is not the same as to say that the Comintern's lurch to the left was entirely masterminded by Stalin, though this is, generally speaking,

[123]Jane Degras, ed., op. cit. (1971), vol. II (1923-28), p. 467.

[124]Theodore Draper's delineation of the interwar period through Comintern eyes is most incisive, and provides some needed background for the discussion that follows: "In the communist analysis of the post-first world war era, the first period began with the Russian Revolution of 1917 and ended with the abortive Hamburg uprising in October 1923. It was summed up by the phrase 'revolutionary wave.' The second period extended from the end of 1923 to some time in 1928. It was marked by the relative recovery, or, as the communists preferred to call it, the 'partial stabilization' of capitalism. Then came the third period, which was supposed to signify the end of capitalist stabilization and the renewal of the revolutionary wave. It should have lasted as long as it took to bring about the final downfall of the capitalist system. Actually, it was quietly abandoned about the middle of 1934 and officially succeeded by the Popular Front in 1935." Theodore Draper, "The Strange Case of the Comintern," Survey: A Journal of East and West Studies, vol. 18, no. 3 (84), summer 1972, p. 94.

the prevailing view in the literature on the origins of the third period.[125] Rather, the complete story is far more involved, for Stalin's ultimately successful machinations were facilitated both by foreign Comintern members and, arguably, by Bukharin himself. Theodore Draper has convincingly demonstrated that the slogans associated with the inception of Stalinism in the world communist movement - "class against class," "united front from below," and "social fascism" - were not born at the sixth Congress, but instead, their conception can be traced to an earlier period. "Class against class" had been launched by French communists in 1927, a full year before the sixth Congress.[126] "Social fascism" was an epitaph that was revived in 1928, not created.[127] Finally, "united front from below" was also a resurrected slogan.[128]

Moreover, in the case of "class against class" and the "united front from below," Bukharin, not Stalin was the first publicly to deploy these maxims, though Stalin was subsequently to hijack them and transform their meaning, taking them to their respective logical extremes. In a sense, then, Bukharin rather than Stalin was the initial

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[125]For a superb (and bitingly critical) summary of existing scholarly views on the origins of the third period, see ibid., especially pp. 95-100.

[126]Ibid., pp. 107-116.

[127]Ibid., pp. 119-124.

[128]Ibid., pp. 116-119.

architect of the third period, and the left/right dichotomy usually emphasized in depicting the struggle between Stalin and Bukharin, when it comes to matters of Comintern policy, is misinformed. In the end, the sixth World Congress was "both the end of the Comintern's Bukharinist phase and the beginning of the Stalinist era."[129] While the proceedings at the sixth Congress certainly were, in many ways, an extension of the power struggle in Moscow, the Comintern's turn to the left in 1928 was not the product of a straight right-left split between Bukharin and Stalin, with Stalin the victor in this arena and Bukharin the loser.

Comintern policy in the third period may not have been Stalin's creation, but he quickly moved to reserve the right to supervise its implementation. After the sixth Congress, the Comintern Executive Committee, once the preserve of the Party's intellectuals, rapidly became the dominion of Stalin's henchmen.[130] As long as the Soviet leadership had been effectively collective, there was room in the world communist movement for a divergence of legitimate views, competing dogmas being nominally associated with the positions or patronage of different members of the Soviet oligarchy. With the consolidation of Stalin's power as

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[129]Ibid., p. 133.

[130]Adam B. Ulam, op. cit. (1973), p. 361. The Tenth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern met July 3-19, 1928, and issued a resolution calling for the expulsion of all "deviationists, " Bukharin included. Xenia Joukoff Eudin and Robert M. Slusser, op. cit. (1966), vol. 1, p. 38.

supreme leader, this was no longer the case; being a communist thereafter would mean being a Stalinist.

Being a good Stalinist often meant suffering setbacks in one's own country if doing so promoted the security interests of the USSR. Thus, the French Communist Party (PCF) in 1929 instituted a system for gathering intelligence on France's military potential and strategic plans, to be passed along to Moscow; much of the PCF's leadership was subsequently prosecuted for treason.[131] Similarly, in the wake of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, the Comintern instructed the Japanese communists to step up subversive activities at home, despite the fact that the resulting wave of arrests would reduce the ranks of the Japanese Communist Party to a few isolated individuals.[132] The pattern of subservience to Moscow was self-reinforcing, for the weaker the foreign party became in its native country, the more dependent the party became on Moscow. And "the further the real chances of revolution recede[d] into the background, the more the adoration of the accomplished revolution in Russia [took] their place."[133]

The discussion above is in no way meant to imply that the Comintern in the early 1930s was a fully monolithic

[131]Jonathan Haslam, op. cit. (1983), p. 56.

[132]See "Theses on the Situation in Japan and the Tasks of the Communist Party," in Xenia Joukoff Eudin and Robert M. Slusser, op. cit. (1967), vol. II, document 20, pp. 439-459.

[133]Franz Borkenau, op. cit. (1962), pp. 416-18.

structure, responding automatically to Stalin's whims. Covert dissension within the Comintern existed and was tolerated, so long as it did not in any way threaten Soviet security interests. And conversely, the Comintern swore allegiance to Moscow, even as the Soviet leadership directly violated its proclamations.[134] One of the many long theses adopted at the sixth Congress had denounced both the Kellogg-Briand pact for the renunciation of war and the disarmament conference in Geneva as contemptible attempts to hoodwink the working class.[135] One year later, the Soviet Union had joined with the Kellogg-Briand pact nations in renouncing war, even seizing the initiative on the issue by presenting the member nations with the Litvinov Protocol.[136]

The difference between Narkomindel and Comintern policies would grow in the years to follow, but their ultimate aim - the promotion, at any cost, of the security

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[134]France's ambassador was sensitive to the potential dichotomy between Comintern initiatives and Soviet intentions; discounting Comintern rhetoric, he cabled back to Paris in December 1932 that "this fait accompli [the normalization of Franco-Soviet relations] has not put an immediate end to dissensions within the Comintern, certain of whose members, with no part in the real responsibilities of power, and with a different appreciation of the international situation from Mr. Litvinov, remain, through a kind of momentum of their own, advocates of an exclusively German orientation." See Dejean (Moscou) to Paul-Boncour (Paris), December 19, 1932, in Documents Diplomatiques Francais, 1932-39 (Paris: 1964), vol. I, document 122. Quoted in Jonathan Haslam, op. cit. (1983), p. 115.

[135]Jane Degras, ed., op. cit. (1971), vol. II (1923-28), p. 449.

[136]On the Litvinov Protocol, see p. 75 above.

of the USSR - would remain the same. Indeed, though the Comintern all the while cried out against collaboration with entities bent on coopting the international communist movement, for Soviet foreign policy, the third period was a time of increasing Soviet involvement in non-communist international organizations. With Comintern pronouncements on the evils of pacifism in general and organized disarmament as background noise, the Soviet Union extolled the virtues of complete disarmament throughout the third period.

Despite the continued Soviet boycott of the League of Nations, beginning in 1930, Litvinov was fully involved in the work of the League preparatory commission on disarmament, and the USSR, despite its non-membership status in the League of Nations, was an official participant when the actual General Commission of the Disarmament Conference convened in February 1932. At the conference's close, Izvestiia bemoaned the lack of tangible accomplishment, no doubt influenced by Germany's behavior at the proceedings, which indicated that rearmament was a top German priority, stipulations of the Versailles treaty to the contrary.[137]

By the time the General Commission met again in early 1933, Germany's intentions with respect to the constraints of Versailles were crystal clear. Correspondingly, Litvinov

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[137]Izvestiia, July 26, 1932. Excerpted version (in English) reprinted in Xenia Joukoff Eudin and Robert M. Slusser, op. cit. (1967), vol. II, document 83, pp. 471-474.

stepped up the Soviet peace offensive at Geneva, proposing a draft definition of "aggression" for member nations to sign. When the proposal, though favorably received, was relegated to a special committee for further study, Litvinov adopted the same strategy he had with the Litvinov Protocol in 1929; he rallied the nations that had been signatories to the earlier pact to sign a similarly motivated convention defining aggression, before the appointed special committee could even begin to act.[138]

Litvinov's extra-League diplomatic gymnastics bore little fruit. Germany continued to rearm, and on October 14, 1933 officially dispensed with the formality of League of Nations membership. Shortly thereafter, Stalin publicly hinted at the possibility of a change in the long-standing Soviet position on League membership; if the League of Nations could facilitate peace, Stalin explained to New York Times correspondent Walter Duranty on Christmas Day

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[138]Afghanistan, Estonia, Latvia, Persia, Poland, Rumania and Turkey and the USSR signed Litvinov's convention for the definition of aggression on July 3, 1933. Separate but related agreements with Lithuania and Finland would be signed on July 5, 1933 and January 31, 1934, respectively. See Xenia Eudin and Robert M. Slusser, op. cit. (1967), vol. II, p. 375. For extracts from a press statement by Litvinov on the signing of the convention, see Jane Degras, ed., Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, 1933-41 (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), vol. III, pp. 28-29.

1933, "then we are not against the League."[139] Three days later, the Soviet ambassador in Paris informed the French of the conditions under which the Soviet Union might join,[140] and in September 1934, the Soviet Union took its seat in Geneva as an official member nation.

By the close of the first five year plan period, therefore, the shape of Soviet policy on international organization had undergone a complete metamorphosis. Instead of the Comintern, the organization of choice was now the League of Nations. With the threat from fascism mounting in 1933 and 1934, the Comintern had begun to question whether social democracy was indeed the real enemy, as the propaganda of the third period had unceasingly proclaimed, but showed few signs of reaching any sort of agreement on the nature of the new epoch. Molotov was conspicuously absent from the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth meetings of the ICCI in 1931, 1932, and 1933.[141] The Comintern would not snap to attention until mid-1935, when the Franco-Soviet pact for mutual assistance would help

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[139] J.V. Stalin, Sochineniia (Moscow, 1953), vol. XIII, p. 280. The Soviet Union had traditionally viewed the League of Nations suspiciously, as an organization whose real purpose was to orchestrate collective action against Soviet interests. See, for example, K.W. Davis, The Soviets at Geneva, 1919-33 (Geneva, 1934), and W.L. Mahaney, Jr., The Soviet Union, the League of Nations and Disarmament, 1917-35 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1940).

[140] Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR, (Moscow: 1970), vol. XVI, footnote 321, pp. 876-7.

[141] E.H. Carr, op. cit. (1982), p. 122.

clarify Comintern objectives: to defend the USSR against the mounting threat from Nazi Germany.

Finally called to assembly after a hiatus of seven years, the seventh world Congress met in the summer of 1935 to unveil the strategy of the "Popular Front;" whereby proper communists were now to ally with former "social fascists" (now once again simply socialists) in the fight against the common enemy, fascism. No speaker at the Congress so much as hinted that there had been a reversal of policy.[142]

It is thus easy to see, particularly with the benefit of hindsight, the counterproductive havoc wreaked by Comintern policy in the third period. Targeting social democrats as the source of all evil served neither the interests of foreign communism nor of the Soviet Union, which at the time was seeking accommodation with the West on all fronts. The Comintern's policies consistently undermined Soviet-Western relations during the period on which this study has focused. Yet Stalin was fully in charge of the general course of Comintern policy throughout this period. Rather than asking why the Comintern pursued

[142]That is, at least so far as we know. As of 1982, the seventh Congress of the Comintern was the only one for which no complete stenographic record was ever published. An abbreviated version was published in 1939 - but not in Russian. In contrast, the resolutions of the seventh Congress and all of Dimitrov's speeches were promptly published. Perhaps there was a spirited debate over the policy reversal, which, to preserve the facade of unity, the censor purged from the record. But this is merely speculation. See ibid., p. 403, footnote 1.

the vituperative and ultimately self-destructive campaign against social democracy, the more important question, for our purposes then, would seem to be: why did Stalin tolerate the Comintern's ultimately self-destructive radical onslaught?

In response to this question, Isaac Deutscher has argued that the Comintern's "ultra-radicalism was so unreal that Stalin, in all probability, countenanced it only because he attributed very little practical significance to what the Comintern did in those years."[143] Once the ultra-radical proclamations of the sixth Congress had been institutionalized, it was easier to let the Comintern take the ball and run with it, so to speak, then to make an effort to calibrate Comintern policy with Soviet interests, particularly with Stalin's revolution from above in full swing. According to Deutscher, then, Stalin's disinterest in internationalist matters explains the contradictions in Stalin's foreign policy.

While it is no doubt true that Stalin's attentions were focused elsewhere in the third period, and that the Soviet Union's role in abetting the Nazi revolution, by any calculation, did not serve the Soviet Union's long term security interests, this is not the same as to say that the

[143]Isaac Deutscher, op. cit. (1967), second edition, p. 405. Deutscher also recounts that Lominadze, who was one of Stalin's close associates in the 1920s, later recalled Stalin saying that "the Comintern represents nothing. It exists only because of our support." Stalin himself denied making the remark. See ibid., p. 392.

Comintern's ultra-radical line ran counter to Stalin's interests. After all, a more moderate Comintern would only mean more pragmatic foreign communist parties. And a more pragmatic foreign communist party always stood the chance of accumulating real, as opposed to marginalized, power. A foreign party that had the potential actually to seize power in its native country was precisely the sort of organization that Stalin had no interest in encouraging, as subsequent events in China and Yugoslavia would one day demonstrate. The existence of another communist state, however friendly initially, could only undermine the operative - and wholly advantageous, from Stalin's perspective - premise that a foreign communist's first duty was to defend the security of the first socialist state.[144] In contrast, a foreign communist party with little indigenous support was all the more dependent on Moscow and available for slavish service of the Soviet state, which by 1933 served only Stalin.

Thus, when foreign communists - to be specific, the prospect of German communists allied with the SPD against the Nazi menace - stood a real chance of actually sharing power, a radicalized Comintern policy that condemned such an alliance served the interests of Stalinism in power. The SPD had been the chief force for a Western orientation in

[144]For an eerily prescient and powerful argument that Moscow, in all likelihood, had little interest in seeing communists rule other countries, see the concluding chapter to Franz Borkenau, op. cit. (1962), pp. 413-429. As the prior notation indicates, Borkenau reached his conclusions in 1939.

German foreign policy. Consequently, an SPD-KPD alliance against the Nazis, while preventing the rise of fascism in Germany, in Stalin's view, could too easily have resulted in an alliance of all of Europe against him. In contrast, the Nazi party was clearly anti-democratic, vehemently anti-Western. For Stalin, a Nazi victory promised to divert Western hostility away from Bolshevik Russia, at least temporarily, while the West regrouped to confront the new fascist challenge. Further, it might also easily serve as the catalyst for the apocalyptic war between the imperialist powers that Marxist-Leninist doctrine promised, and Stalin was ever poised to exploit.[145] This line of reasoning is reflected in a conversation Stalin had with Heinz Neumann at the end of 1931, in which the dictator is said to have remarked, "Don't you believe Neumann, that if the Nationalists seize power in Germany, they will be so preoccupied with the West that we'll be able to build up socialism in peace?"[146]

Viewed in this light, if the international communist movement, after a purge of its leadership, could be led to believe that advancing the cause of world revolution required individual parties to pursue self-destructive policies, there was little reason for Stalin to intervene,

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[145]Robert C. Tucker, op. cit. (1990), pp. 230-1.

[146]Margarete Buber-Neumann, Von Potsdam nach Moskau: Stationen eines Irweges (Stuttgart, 1957), p. 284. Quoted in Robert C. Tucker, ibid., p. 231.

particularly if he was as preoccupied with his transformation of the domestic landscape as he appears to have been - that is, until the threat from Hitler's Germany could no longer prudently be ignored.

Conclusion

Our tripartite exploration of foreign policy in the first years of Stalin's dictatorship revealed a Comintern policy very much at odds with the growing Soviet interest in diplomatic and economic cooperation with the West. Rather than advancing the cause of socialist internationalism, Comintern policy in this period instead helped to pave the road for the march to power of national socialism in Germany. These contradictory patterns of Soviet international behavior in 1929-33 are incomprehensible without reference to the concurrent Stalinization of Soviet institutions and political culture. As Stalin consolidated his power, the policies of the Soviet state and of the world communist movement would increasingly reflect only Stalin's self-serving preferences.

In the most direct sense, Stalin's domestic campaign left a lasting imprint on the foreign policy apparatus. A victory for Stalin in the domestic power struggle was always followed by the systematic elimination of the vanquished rival's alleged followers in the Comintern and Narkomindel. To Stalin, both organizations would always represent a potential power base from which his enemies might mount a

challenge to his dictatorial rule; Stalin "never seems to have lost the fear that if his rivals ever succeeded in enlisting against him the moral force of socialist opinion outside Russia, his rule could be shaken and he could be lost."[147] These periodic purges of personnel over time only served to strengthen Stalin's supreme authority in matters of foreign policy. Moreover, by removing all individuals of remote intellectual stature[148] from the Comintern and NKID and replacing them with faceless apparatchiks eager to do his bidding, Stalin created an enduring tradition of authoritarian foreign policy formulation and implementation that would long outlast his dictatorship.

Robert C. Tucker has persuasively argued that the Stalinization of Soviet foreign policy formulation was a reversion to the ways of Russian tsarism, after a period of oligarchical policymaking under Lenin and in the years immediately following his death. Traditionally, the tsar's foreign minister, like Stalin's, was the executor of the tsar's will and did not himself typically make policy. Both the tsars and Stalin managed to emancipate themselves from the need to persuade others to ensure that their policy would be implemented, distinguishing their rule from

[147]George F. Kennan, op. cit. (1961), pp. 250-51.

[148]Unlike Stalin, Bukharin and Trotsky had actually made genuine theoretical contributions to Marxism-Leninism, and as a result had a considerable following in the international communist movement, as well as inside the Soviet Union. Thus to eliminate their influence, Stalin of necessity had to wage a two-front war.

oligarchical modes of governance.[149] One of the many unfortunate results of Stalin's revolution from above, then, was the transformation of Soviet foreign policy processes into little more than the sum total of Stalin's personal interests.

Our inquiry also demonstrated that the Soviet quest to expand diplomatic and economic ties with the capitalist powers predates Hitler's ascension to power in Germany, undermining significantly the conventional wisdom that the Nazi seizure of power prompted a sudden change in Soviet foreign policy. Rather, changes in Western attitudes toward overt relations with the world's first communist state often bore the lion's share of the responsibility for any improvement in Soviet-Western relations, for Stalin's desire to secure a "breathing space" to ensure the success of his revolutionary agenda is unfailing throughout the first five year plan period.

With the opening shots of Stalin's civil war as his backdrop, Litvinov instructed the Central Executive Committee at the end of 1929 that the first five year plan required peace, but that "further five year plans will follow the first, and for these, too, conditions of peace

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[149] See Robert C. Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind (New York: W.W. Norton, 1971), pp. 205-225.

will be as necessary as they are for the first."[150] Litvinov's personal assessment of the potential for lasting Soviet-Western cooperation, however, is revealed in an exchange between Litvinov and William Bullitt in 1935. Bullitt complained to Litvinov about Comintern subversion, explaining that its activities were "incompatible with US/USSR friendship." Litvinov is said to have replied to the frustrated ambassador that there was no such thing as "really friendly relations between nations."[151]

In the years that followed, cooperation with the powers that world revolution would one day destroy would be a recurrent Soviet imperative, but one that was always, so long as Stalin lived, a tactical means to a higher end, the maintenance of Stalin's totalitarian power, rather than an end in itself. "Stalin, the man who could not allow a single one of his old companions to live, [was] the last man to believe in the possibility of sincere collaboration in the international field."[152]

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[150] "Report by Litvinov, Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to the Central Executive Committee," December 4, 1929, in Jane Degras, ed., op. cit. (1952), vol. II (1925-32), p. 409.

[151] See Bullitt (Moscow) to Hull (Washington), November 9, 1935, in Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. The Soviet Union 1933-39 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 265.

[152] Franz Borkenau, op. cit. (1962), p. 429.

CHAPTER THREE

THE GRAND MARCH REDEFINED: KHRUSHCHEV AND THE FOREIGN POLICY OF DE-STALINIZATION

"Paradise is a place where people want to end up, not a place they run from! Yet in this country, the doors are closed and locked. What kind of socialism is that?...Some curse me for the times I opened the doors. If God had given me the chance to continue, I would have thrown the doors and windows wide open."

-- Citizen Nikita S. Khrushchev, in retirement.[1]

"Most people still measure their freedom or lack of freedom in terms of how much meat, or how many potatoes, or what kind of boots they can get for one rouble."

-- Citizen Nikita S. Khrushchev, in retirement.[2]

March 1953 must have provided bittersweet liberation of a somewhat terrifying sort for Stalin's heirs. Stalin's death presented the Soviet leadership with a great challenge, one which had less to do with the question of who was "worthy" of taking Stalin's place - though considerations of such certainly commanded the immediate attention of the Politburo's aging revolutionaries - and more to do with the overarching question of "What shall take the place of Stalinism as a mode of rule and pattern of policy and ideas?"[3] How might communist power be

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[1]Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990), p. 203. Translated and edited by Jerrold L. Schector and Vyacheslav V. Luchkov.

[2]Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), p. 506. Translated and edited by Strobe Talbott.

[3]Robert C. Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind (W.W. Norton and Company, 1971), p. 173.

reconstructed in the absence of its principal architect's commanding personality?

On the most practical and immediate level, Stalin had compounded his successors' problems by bequeathing them little that remotely resembled a government. In the latter years of Stalin's rule, government that extended beyond Stalin's particular whim of the moment had essentially ground to a halt: the last reported meeting of the Central Committee plenary session took place in February 1947, and regular meetings of the Politburo came to an end sometime early in 1949.[4] The one organization, though completely subservient to Stalin's wishes, that did retain a measure of institutional autonomy under Stalin's dictatorship was the security apparatus, the notorious MGB/MVD, headed by the ruthless Lavrenty Beria, who upon his boss' demise was quick to see himself as the obvious heir apparent.[5] But that is also why Beria was the first casualty of the succession struggle. His downfall and subsequent execution broke the back of the old MGB/MVD, Stalin's personal instrument. In its place arose the Committee for State Security at the Council of Ministers (KGB).

Ironically, in retrospect, the establishment of the KGB stands as one of the first institutional acts of de-

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[4]Ibid., p. 180.

[5]According to Khrushchev, Beria was plotting his bid for supreme power from Stalin's deathbed. See Nikita S. Khrushchev, op cit. (1971), particularly pp. 343-45.

Stalinization. The new security apparatus was no longer an autonomous enterprise, subordinate only to the commands of the supreme leader. Instead, it now would answer to the Party through its Central Committee. Unlike the MGB/MVD, the KGB was not endowed with the power to arrest, try, sentence and execute; its powers were "limited" to investigation and arrest. Trial and sentencing would now be work for the courts, and the elaborate network of camps and prisons would be managed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Needless to say, this new institutional arrangement reserved a powerful role for the Party as final arbiter.[6]

It would take several years before Khrushchev emerged as the final arbiter of the Party itself. Although Khrushchev acquired the title of First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in September 1953, he did not consolidate his power until the resolution of the Anti-Party Group crisis in 1957; that is, Khrushchev stood as first among equals only after narrowly escaping losing all. The Stalinist road Khrushchev had to travel to acquire supreme power in a post-Stalin political world, as we shall see below, is nearly as important for our purposes as the campaigns he launched upon reaching the top. Since this chapter will argue that the patterns of Soviet foreign policy from 1957-61 both followed from and were a part of

[6]Roy A. and Zhores Medvedev, Khrushchev: The Years in Power (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1978), pp. 39-40.

Khrushchev's ongoing effort to address the crisis of legitimacy that Stalin's death engendered, it is to the twists and turns of Khrushchev's ascent that we first turn.

Khrushchev and De-Stalinization

Stalin's death in and of itself, as we have seen above, necessitated a process of what might be referred to as spontaneous de-Stalinization; in other words, change of some variety was inevitable if the Party was to continue to maintain power and legitimacy in the absence of Stalin's dictatorial leadership. The real questions, then, in the immediate years following Stalin's death were what shape that change would take - would it take the form of a radical break with the past, or instead, be presented within an overarching framework of continuity? - and ultimately, who was to preside over the transformation. Thus, the battle for power and particular policies were destined to be inextricably intertwined.

Khrushchev, like Stalin, was able skillfully to adapt his policy preferences to the power imperatives of the moment. Just as Stalin in his quest for power had first denounced "left" and "right" wing deviationists, and then, having disposed of his rivals, claimed "left" and "right" policies as his own, so Khrushchev, in his early battles with Malenkov and Molotov, similarly manipulated policy

issues to his political advantage.[7] In his struggle with Malenkov, Khrushchev presented himself as the defender of orthodoxy against Malenkov's reformist notions. Upon temporarily neutralizing Malenkov, Khrushchev then launched an attack on Molotov for standing in the way of the forces of change. All this need not suggest that Khrushchev's subsequent actions be viewed entirely as acts of political opportunism. Rather, it is to emphasize from the outset that Khrushchev the reformer was himself very much a product of the Stalinist political system.

Though his prior moves against Malenkov and Molotov were necessary preconditions, it was Khrushchev's speech[8] to a closed session of the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956 that enabled Khrushchev both to seize the initiative in defining the Party's agenda for change, and in so doing, to gain a more secure hold on the Party's reins of power. Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin's excesses, revealingly,

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[7]For a detailed account of Khrushchev's use of Stalinist methods in his quest for supreme power, see Roger Pethybridge, A Key to Soviet Politics: The Crisis of the Anti-Party Group (London: Allen and Unwin, 1962).

[8]Though the revelations of the secret speech came as something of a sudden shock to the international communist movement, Khrushchev's opening address at the Twentieth Party Congress did hint at what was to follow. Khrushchev began by asking all present to rise in memory of Stalin - and Klement Gottwald (Czechoslovakia's Party leader) and Tokuda (head of the Japanese Communist Party), establishing from the start that there was no one personality of supreme worth for international socialism, an assertion that broke radically with past communist rituals. See Wolfgang Leonhard, The Kremlin Since Stalin (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975), p. 120.

focused on only those crimes committed against the Party; he was silent when it came to the crimes of Stalin and the Party leadership against the Soviet people, implicitly deeming the atrocities of forced collectivization and mass terror a necessary evil in the building of socialism.[9] However, this limited indictment of Stalinism had profound and immediate consequences for both the Soviet Union's external and internal affairs.

The Soviet First Secretary's condemnation of Stalinism in one country, the Soviet Union, amounted to a strong indictment of all systems that had subsequently been forged in the first socialist country's image. From the perspective of the Soviet Union's relations with the "fraternal countries," then, the disclosures of Khrushchev's secret speech were a bombshell that shook the very foundations of existing Stalinist political arrangements in Eastern Europe.[10] Though these events will be discussed

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[9]For an official English translation of the secret speech, see Appendix 4, "Khrushchev's Secret Speech (as released by the US Department of State on June 4, 1956)," in Nikita S. Khrushchev, op. cit. (1971), pp. 608-77.

further below, here it is enough to emphasize that it is difficult to find a more compelling example of the monumental consequences of a single domestic political event for a country's foreign policy - short of overt revolution itself - than the more or less immediate ramifications of Khrushchev's secret speech.

As for the domestic fallout from the Twentieth Party Congress, Khrushchev's frontal attack on Stalin also functioned as an implicit indictment of the past and present actions of his principal political opponents. Changes in both personnel and institutions, advantageous to Khrushchev's personal position, quickly followed. Five new Khrushchev supporters were elected to the Party Presidium after the Twentieth Congress. One new candidate Presidium member, D. T. Shepilov, assumed Molotov's duties as Minister of Foreign Affairs in June of 1956. In addition, a special bureau of the Central Committee for the Russian republic was established, with Khrushchev as its first chairman, and this

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[10]Though Khrushchev's fateful speech was delivered to a closed session of the Congress, a transcript of the "secret" speech quickly made its way to the West. For information on how the text of the secret speech was leaked to Western journalists and smuggled out of the country, see the interview with John Rettie (recipient and smuggler) of the Manchester Guardian, "Leaking Khrushchev's 1956 Report," in Moscow News, no. 28, 1990, p. 16. The secret speech was not published in the communist world until July 1988 (in the Polish Weekly Politvka). The text was first published in the Soviet Union in April 1989, making its debut in the official information bulletin of the Central Committee, side by side with the first official documented account of the Great Purge of 1937-38. See Michael Dobbs, "Khrushchev's Secret Speech Printed," Washington Post, April 6, 1989, p. A28.

institution would serve as a key power base for Khrushchev's future reform efforts. Thus, from the perspective of the Soviet Union's internal affairs, the Twentieth Party Congress above all was an overwhelming personal victory for Khrushchev.[11]

Although Khrushchev's leadership appeared ascendant in the wake of the Twentieth Party Congress, his opponents regrouped and almost managed to dispose of him entirely scarcely more than a year later. The events that directly followed Khrushchev's secret speech soon undermined the First Secretary's newly found authority. First, the denunciation of Stalinism at home had destabilized Stalinist political systems in Eastern Europe, culminating in the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956. Second, in early 1957, Khrushchev had proposed sweeping and controversial institutional reforms whose aim was to strengthen significantly the power of the Party over the State in the administration of the country's economic life. These radical reforms further alarmed the defenders of the status quo.[12] Consequently, in June 1957, Khrushchev returned from a trip to Finland to discover a majority in the Party Presidium demanding his overthrow.

To counter this gravely serious challenge to his power, Khrushchev's ultimately successful ploy was to

[11]Roger Pethybridge, op. cit. (1962), pp. 68-9.

[12]Robert Conquest, Power and Policy in the USSR (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 292-309.

transfer the struggle from the Party Presidium to the Central Committee, which was then stacked with his supporters. Throughout, the support of Marshal Zhukov, the Soviet minister of defense, was instrumental in enabling Khrushchev to survive this near-fatal challenge to his leadership.[13] Khrushchev himself cites the support of the military as critical in his weathering of the stormy events of June 1957:

> "Thanks largely to him [Zhukov], the military took an active stand against the Anti-Party Group of Molotov, Malenkov, Bulganin, and the others who mounted a campaign to remove me from my post as First Secretary of the Central Committee. This Anti-Party Group had a majority in the Presidium; they thought they had already achieved their goal of removing me. But the Central Committee decided otherwise. It rectified the decision of the Presidium and removed the Anti-Party Group instead."[14]

By the summer's end, the conspirators of the Anti-Party Group, while retaining their Party membership (a radical departure from the standard handling of fallen comrades in Stalin's time), had been stripped of their Party posts and assigned tasks deemed more appropriate. Molotov was dispatched as Ambassador to Mongolia. Malenkov and

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[13]For a more detailed account of the behind-the-scenes struggle, see Carl A. Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 1957-64 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966), pp. 40-57.

[14]Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1974), p. 14. Edited and translated by Strobe Talbott. Zhukov is said to have actually organized an airlift to ferry the necessary Central Committee support to Moscow so that the Presidium's verdict could be successfully overturned. See ibid., footnote 4, p. 14.

Kaganovich were made managers of an electric power station and a factory, respectively. Shepilov became a university lecturer. The summer of 1957 also marked the promotion to important government positions of what were to be some of the leading luminaries of the Brezhnev era. Kosygin and Ustinov replaced Pervukhin and Saburov as Vice-chairmen of the Council of Ministers, Andrei Gromyko was crowned Minister of Foreign Affairs, replacing the fallen Shepilov.[15]

In contrast to the fate of Khrushchev's challengers, Zhukov was rewarded for his support with a seat on the Party Presidium, the first Soviet military commander ever to be so honored. His triumph was short-lived, however, as Khrushchev quickly grew leery of the newly expanded power of the military in what had previously been purely Party affairs, as well as Zhukov's enhanced personal power. With charges of Bonapartism ringing in the air, Zhukov was ousted several months after his promotion, and the powers of the political organs in the Soviet army and Navy were subsequently strengthened.[16] Thus, rather ironically, Khrushchev, usually remembered as a champion of consumerism,

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[15]Roy Medvedev, Khrushchev (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982), pp. 119-120.

[16]Ibid., p. 123. For the reader interested in Ella Zhukova's (Marshal Zhukov's daughter) ongoing campaign to restore the reputation of her father, see the transcript of an interview with Ella G. Zhukova (broadcast on Moscow Radio, 7 May 1990) published in Daily Report: Soviet Union, FBIS, 10 May 1990, pp. 67-8. (hereafter FBIS-SOV)

in reality consolidated his power in alliance with the military and heavy industry.[17]

After the dust from the scuffles of 1957 had settled, Khrushchev was appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers, making him head of both Party and state, as had been Stalin. Thus, in March 1958, the professed leader of the drive for de-Stalinization had officially assumed the basic mantle of titles that Stalin himself had worn.[18]

And what of the de-Stalinization campaign itself? How had it fared through the waves of factional skirmishes delineated above? The materials of the Twenty-Second Party Congress (held in October 1961) reveal that - dramatic pronouncements on the break with the past from the momentous Twentieth Party Congress to the contrary - the Soviet leadership continued to be deeply divided over the issue of de-Stalinization. In Khrushchev's words, "the factionalists did not cease their struggle even after the [twentieth] congress; they did everything they could to hamper an

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[17]Raymond Garthoff, Soviet Military Policy: A Historical Analysis (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1966), p. 49.

[18]In his retirement, Khrushchev acknowledged the paradox of the leader of de-Stalinization garnering the accoutrements of dictatorial power and the enticing allure of the same: "I've often criticized Stalin for allowing a single person to have two posts, one in the government and one in the Party. Therefore my acceptance of [the Premiership] represented a certain weakness on my part - a bug of some sort which was gnawing away at me and undermining my power of resistance. The final judgement on the question I'll have to leave to the court of history." See Nikita S. Khrushchev, op. cit. (1974), pp. 17-18.

investigation of abuses of power, afraid that their role as accomplices in mass repression would be revealed." [19]

For reasons of personal survival, let alone his genuine beliefs, then, Khrushchev really had little choice but to escalate periodically his usage of the issue of de-Stalinization as a weapon against his opponents in the factional struggle. Strategically generating a new wave of de-Stalinization when under fire was one way for Khrushchev to regain the initiative and establish authority anew after a personal setback.

For reasons of this nature, the Twenty-Second Party Congress became a second and more complete congress of de-Stalinization. This time, the crimes of Stalin and his accomplices were rehearsed in public, not in closed session. The resultant Party Program of 1961 was noteworthy for its repudiation of "revolutions from above"[20] and for its bold proclamation that the Soviet Union, liberated from the politics of terror and the personality cult, would prosper and enter the glorious epoch of full communism by 1980,

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[19]Khrushchev's closing address to the Twenty-Second Party Congress, published in Pravda, October 29, 1961.

[20]Richard Lowenthal, "Development vs. Utopia in Communist States" in Chalmers A. Johnson, ed., Change in Communist Systems (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), pp. 95-6.

surpassing a floundering United States along the way.[21] Just to be certain that nobody missed the point, the tribal rituals ultimately culminated in the removal of Stalin's remains from the Lenin mausoleum, and his reentombment at the base of the Kremlin wall, buried under several tons of freshly poured concrete.[22]

Dramatic symbolic gestures aside, considerable resistance to de-Stalinization within the Party leadership would persist throughout Khrushchev's tenure in power. Nevertheless, despite formidable obstacles, the change in the texture of social and political life in the Soviet Union after Stalin's death and particularly in the wake of the Twenty-Second Party Congress, was still substantial.

Khrushchev's stop-start de-Stalinization campaign produced both institutional and cultural forms of sociopolitical change. Khrushchev's institutional reforms sought to construct norms and procedures for communist governance, and the institutions that might then sustain the new rules of the game once established. Unlike Stalin, Khrushchev appears to have been convinced that communism in power did not need to rely on mass repression, that a "populist" communism was not a contradiction in terms. As

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[21]See XXII-y s'ezd KPSS: Stenografichesky otchet (Stenographic Report of the 22nd Party Congress of the CPSU), vol. 3 (Moscow: 1962), p. 276. The draft Party Program was published in all major Soviet newspapers on July 30, 1961.

[22]Roy Medvedev, op. cit. (1982), p. 211.

Merle Fainsod has summarized, "Khrushchev's attempt to square the political circle took the form of combining the appearance of popular control with the reality of Party rule. The thrust of his major institutional reforms was to strengthen Party direction in every walk of Soviet life."[23] From an institutional perspective, therefore, de-Stalinization entailed the restoration of political power to the Party, with Khrushchev, of course, at the Party's helm.

Khrushchev's cultural reforms, in contrast, were more genuinely populist in nature, and, in many ways, were at war with his institutional agenda. His "glasnost" policies endeavored to liberate cultural and intellectual life from the Party's direct control, while at the same time, Khrushchev's institutional perestroika mandated the expansion of the Party's powers. Thus, the resultant "thaw," while significant, was always something of an improvisation, an elaborate but haphazard dance around the contradictions inherent in the Khrushchev reforms.

The perils of this dance on the domestic stage shaped Soviet foreign policy during the Khrushchev era. Having sketched the basic changes in policy and personnel in the early Khrushchev years, it is to an examination of the impact of these changes on the Soviet Union's external policies that we now turn. As with the investigation of

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[23]Merle Fainsod, "Khrushchevism," in M.M. Drachkovitch, ed., Marxism in the Modern World (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), p. 130.

Stalin's foreign policy in the previous chapter, we shall address the categories of Soviet diplomatic policy, international economic policy and transnational policy in turn.

Diplomatic Policy, 1957-61

Though Soviet theoreticians laboriously insisted that peaceful coexistence was a return to Leninism, the ideological foundation of the diplomacy of de-Stalinization was largely a product of the Khrushchev era. It is true that Lenin on several occasions spoke of "peaceful cohabitation" (mirnoe sozhitel'stvo) with the capitalist powers; he never once, however, deployed the term "peaceful coexistence" (mirnoe sosushestvovanie) in his voluminous writings.[24] Moreover, for Lenin, peaceful cohabitation was a short-term tactical maneuver to secure a "breathing space" (peredyshka) in which to await the inevitable triumph of communism over capitalism. The ultimate aim of peaceful coexistence, in contrast, was not to gain time for socialism to catch its breath, but instead "to secure the most favorable conditions for the victory of socialism over

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[24]Paul Marantz, "Peaceful Coexistence: From Heresy to Orthodoxy," in Paul Cocks, Robert V. Daniels, and Nancy Whittier Heer, eds., The Dynamics of Soviet Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), footnote 5, p. 408. Marantz actually counts the number of references to peaceful cohabitation Lenin made (5), and points out that four out of these five instances of usage were addressed to visiting foreign journalists. See Ibid., p. 294.

capitalism through peaceful economic competition."[25] Thus, peaceful coexistence represented a significant ideological departure from previous Marxist-Leninist interpretations of the nature of international interaction.

Lenin's theory of imperialism pointed a finger at the inexorable logic of capitalist greed as the engine of history. From this vantage point, while it might be postponed through skillful Bolshevik diplomacy, the advent of apocalyptic war was ultimately inevitable. Doctrinally, Stalin had not deviated from Lenin's reading of the forces of history; he also argued that "to eliminate the inevitability of war, it is necessary to abolish imperialism."[26]

In contrast, peaceful coexistence painted a quite different picture of the character of the historical moment. The nature of the epoch, so the doctrine goes, has changed since Lenin's time; the epoch is no longer an imperialist one, but instead, one transitional in nature. Since the era is no longer imperialist, war is no longer fatalistically inevitable, as both Lenin and Stalin had maintained.

New theoretical approaches, consequently, were imperative for this new era. As Khrushchev explained it, "One cannot mechanically repeat now what Vladimir Ilyich

[25]Nikita S. Khrushchev, Speech to the Sixth Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, published in Izvestiia, January 17, 1963.

[26]Joseph Stalin, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR (New York: International Publishers, 1952), p. 30.

Lenin said many decades ago regarding imperialism, or continue asserting that imperialist wars are inevitable until socialism triumphs throughout the world."[27] By the close of the Khrushchev era, the vocabulary of the still fledgling field of Soviet international relations theory had been radically transformed. The main actors on the world stage were no longer the world systems of capitalism and socialism, as they had been under Stalin; instead, states were the new unit of analysis.[28]

The full-blown theory of peaceful coexistence, as developed by the Soviet Union's doctrinal specialists, was premised, therefore, on Khrushchev's assertion at the Twentieth Party Congress that war was no longer a "fatalistic inevitability."[29] Peaceful coexistence as a slogan was deployed at the May Day celebrations of 1955[30], but the tortuous theoretical elaboration of the notion was inspired by Khrushchev's new doctrinal pronouncements at the first congress of de-Stalinization. In this sense, the

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[27]Nikita S. Khrushchev, Rech' na III S'ezde Rumynskoi Rabochei Partii (Speech at the Third Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party) (Moscow, 1960), p. 31. Quoted in Robert C. Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind: Stalinism and Post-Stalin Change (New York: W.W. Norton, 1971), p. 243.

[28]See William Zimmerman, Soviet Perspectives on International Relations, 1956-67 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 276-80.

[29]See Khrushchev's address to the Twentieth Party Congress published in Pravda, February 15, 1956.

[30]See Paul Marantz in Paul Cocks, Robert V. Daniels, and Nancy Whittier Heer, eds., op. cit. (1976), p. 299.

theory of peaceful coexistence is an example of leader-led ideological innovation.

Yet peaceful coexistence's origins should not obscure the larger fact that the new agenda for Soviet foreign policy did not assume the status of general party line without a fierce internecine struggle. As Molotov, speaking at the Twentieth Party Congress, in a rare moment of candor confessed, "Probably never before has the Central Committee of our Party and its Presidium dealt so actively with problems of foreign policy as it has in the period just passed."[31]

Peaceful coexistence in its theoretical guise, then, was new in a dual sense. First, it expanded what was once an obscure reference to the status of a general party line. Second, peaceful coexistence in its post-Stalin incarnation was an ongoing dialectical process - dialectical in the sense that it encompassed both conflict and cooperation - rather than a mere interlude before the apocalyptic demise of capitalism.[32] To embrace peaceful coexistence, however, did not in any way involve passive acceptance of the status quo, which was still considered to be forever evolving in communism's favor. Instead, good new age Marxists should aggressively pursue peace with the West while actively supporting wars of national liberation in the South. They

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[31]Izvestiia, February 21, 1956.

[32]Robert C. Tucker, op. cit. (1971), pp. 243-4.

must, as Khrushchev insisted, "fully and unreservedly support such just wars and march in the vanguard of the peoples fighting wars of liberation."[33] Needless to say, this "dialectical" aspect of peaceful coexistence did not sit well with an already skeptical West.

Finally, peaceful coexistence was also a domestic call to arms. Coexistence was seen to be the continuation of the struggle between capitalism and communism by peaceful means, an "economic, political, and ideological struggle, but not a military one."[34] Instead of insisting that the capitalist world would soon collapse under the weight of its own internal contradictions, the new Soviet doctrine boldly proclaimed that Communism would eventually triumph through prosperity, rather than class conflict; capitalism would simply be unable to match the material achievements of socialism, and hence, would be co-opted rather than subverted.[35] Soviet diplomacy could facilitate this process by encouraging moderate elements - a newly discovered entity, conceptually speaking - in capitalist ruling

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[33] Pravda, January 25, 1961.

[34] Nikita S. Khrushchev, speech published in Pravda, October 14, 1959.

[35] Isaac Deutscher, The Great Contest: Russia and the West (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 68-9.

circles, particularly among the American elite.[36] Thus, the international agenda of peaceful coexistence was often presented and justified as an outgrowth of pressing domestic imperatives, foreign policy being the continuation of domestic policy.

Peaceful coexistence, in the end, then, provided an explicit ideological justification for the Soviet leadership to focus principally on domestic rather than international concerns. The diplomacy of Stalin's revolution from above, in its pursuits of temporary rapprochement with the West, in contrast, was never similarly armed.

But what of the diplomats who wielded this doctrine, the envoys and analysts of Khrushchevian detente? What effect did de-Stalinization have on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?[37] To answer these questions, we must first acquaint ourselves with the manner in which Stalin's purges had molded this institution and its personnel.

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[36]For evidence of this new Soviet belief that it was possible for the forces of moderation to triumph, if properly cultivated, in the United States and other capitalist countries, see Khrushchev's speech of January 6, 1961 in Kommunist, no. 1, 1961, pp. 23-4 and his speech in Pravda, January 25, 1961. See also the speech of Otto Kuusinen reprinted in G.F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal, and Roderick MacFarquhar, The Sino-Soviet Dispute (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1961), pp. 119-20. One cannot help but be struck by the familiarity of this argument, often similarly employed in an assortment of American foreign policy prescriptions, all of which are united in their call for the sustained encouragement of the "dove" faction in the Kremlin.

[37]Hereafter, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is sometimes abbreviated as "MFA".

The Great Terror (Ezhovshchina) of 1937-38 had decimated the ranks of Narkomindel, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.[38] Those who managed to escape alive found their influence on Soviet diplomacy to have been eclipsed by the rapid rise of a new generation of cadres in the Commissariat. Unlike the first generation of Soviet diplomats, who had primarily been old Bolsheviks with considerable experience abroad, both as members of the international communist intelligentsia before the revolution and as diplomats thereafter, the majority of the Gromyko generation, like Stalin himself, neither spoke a foreign language nor had spent much time outside of Russia. In a sense, then, Stalin died having succeeded in remaking the diplomatic service of the Soviet state in his own image.[39]

Even though Stalin's death and the manifestations of de-Stalinization in Soviet doctrine together did indeed

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[38]Narkomindel was renamed as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the War. Stalin's motives in his destruction of the diplomatic corps have been the subject of spirited debate. One school of thought holds that the purge of the diplomatic corps was a systematic effort on the part of Stalin to rid the Commissariat of all opposition to a Soviet-Nazi alliance for massive territorial aggrandizement, arguing that Stalin was plotting the Stalin-Hitler pact throughout the collective security period. Another school argues that the purge of Narkomindel makes no sense whatsoever in terms of any foreign policy objectives. For an example of the former, see Robert C. Tucker, "The Origins of Stalin's Foreign Policy," Slavic Review, December 1977, pp. 563-89. For an example of the latter, see Teddy Uldricks, "The Impact of the Great Purges on the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs," Slavic Review, June 1977.

[39]Teddy Uldricks, Diplomacy and Ideology: The Origins of Soviet Foreign Relations, 1917-30 (London: Sage Publications, 1979), pp. 171-84.

amount to, as Robert Tucker has characterized it, a "psychological revolution in Soviet foreign policy," de-Stalinization penetrated the ranks of the Soviet diplomatic service slowly, and, under Khrushchev, only in part. To be sure, Khrushchev's stop-start crusade was reflected in the dismissal of Molotov from the position of Foreign Minister in June 1956, his subsequent replacement by Shepilov, and then in the exit of Shepilov and the appointment of Gromyko in the wake of the 1957 leadership crisis. But these changes in the leadership of the Ministry do not seem to have prompted any sort of substantive purge of the Ministry's bureaucracy, although considerable reshuffling of old Stalinist players certainly took place. According to statistics compiled by Jerry Hough, in 1952 the average age of a deputy foreign minister was 45, while in 1964 it was 56 (by 1980, it had risen to 65).[40] Thus, generational change in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, arguably a necessary though by no means sufficient condition for full de-Stalinization of the MFA, was not a feature of the Khrushchev years, and Soviet diplomacy in this period was largely devised and conducted by Stalin's former cadres, with Khrushchev as executive-in-chief.

By relaxing control and censorship of scholarly activity, however, Khrushchev's reforms did affect the

[40]See Jerry F. Hough, "The Foreign Policy Establishment," in Robin F. Laird and Erik P. Hoffmann, Soviet Foreign Policy in a Changing World (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1986), p. 152.

foreign policy process, albeit indirectly. De-Stalinization revived the previously discarded notion of what might be termed centrally planned independent scholarly research, leading to an enormous expansion of quasi-academic jobs. Shortly after the Twentieth Party Congress, the old Varga Institute was reconstituted as the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) under the Academy of Science, and its ranks continued to grow throughout the Khrushchev years.[41] Though the subsequent revitalization and expansion of the research institutes under Gorbachev would have greater consequences for Soviet diplomacy - a topic for discussion in the proceeding chapter - the nascent notion that "outside" input to the policy process was of some value was present in the Khrushchev reforms, and IMEMO researchers did contribute to the doctrinal elaboration of peaceful coexistence.

Having discussed the substantial theoretical innovations sparked by the attempts to repair the damage wrought by Stalinism, as well as the effects of de-Stalinization on the institutions and personnel of Soviet diplomacy, we are now adequately equipped for an investigation of the general patterns of Soviet diplomacy during the height of the Khrushchev reforms.

Peaceful coexistence in practice was, to say the least, an inconsistent enterprise. The erratic course of

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[41]Ibid., pp. 149-51.

Soviet diplomacy with the West in the Khrushchev years - the alternate peace overtures and belligerent outbursts - have been attributed to Khrushchev's mercurial personal style[42], or to the constraints imposed on Khrushchev's foreign policy decisions by the ever-widening and increasingly acrimonious Sino-Soviet dispute[43]. While both of these factors are crucial for our understanding of the rhythms of Soviet diplomatic policy in this period, this study focuses on the larger phenomenon of interaction between unfolding de-Stalinization, set in motion by Khrushchev, on the one hand, and its architect's ongoing struggle to maintain his personal power and control over the processes he himself had unleashed, on the other. The dynamic of Khrushchev's responses (always shaped, of course, by his personality) to external and internal challenges to his authority can help us to understand better the ebbs and flows of Soviet diplomacy.

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[42]See, for example, Fyodor Burlatsky, "Khrushchev: Sketches for a Political Portrait," Literaturnaia Gazeta, February 24, 1988, p. 14. FBIS-SOV, February 25, 1988, pp. 55-62. For another perspective, see the memoirs of Aleksei Adzhubei (Khrushchev's son-in-law and former editor of Izvestiia) in Znamia, nos. 6 and 7, June and July, 1988.

[43]Adam Ulam was the first to emphasize the importance of the challenge to Soviet authority from communist China in explaining Khrushchev's foreign policy. See his chapter on Khrushchev in Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-73 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), pp. 572-694.

The Soviet leadership's contradictory signals in 1957 and 1958 are worthy of sustained attention, as they are indicative of broader trends in the Khrushchev years.

After the defeat of the Anti-Party group and dismissal of Zhukov, Khrushchev, his grip on power newly strengthened, was able to renew his crusade for peaceful coexistence. The first secretary rang in the new year (1958) with a speech in Minsk, which reiterated his desire for improved relations with the West. A flurry of peace proposals quickly followed, with Khrushchev proposing everything from bans on atomic testing and the militarization of space, to reductions in conventional forces stationed in the two Germanies, to declaring Central Europe a nuclear-free zone.[44] Though the Eisenhower administration remained unimpressed, rejecting each of these initiatives, in March, the Soviet Union unilaterally announced that it was voluntarily suspending nuclear testing. Begrudgingly, in October, the United States and Britain followed suit.

Yet several weeks after the British and the Americans had more or less conceded that the Soviet Union had set an example it was in their interest to follow, the Soviet Union reversed its policy and resumed nuclear testing. By the end of November, Khrushchev had issued the bellicose Berlin ultimatum, demanding the withdrawal of Western forces from Berlin and its establishment as a "free" city under a newly

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[44]Roy Medvedev, op. cit. (1982), p. 141.

negotiated agreement - all within six months.[45] What can explain the shift from conciliation to confrontation in Soviet diplomacy from 1957 to 1958?

The most plausible answer lies both within the Kremlin and to the East. Escalating rumbles of discontent had been emanating from communist China from the very start of the de-Stalinization effort. For starters, Khrushchev had chosen Soviet economic development over massive aid and assistance to Comrade Mao's Red China, which naturally did not please the Chinese. Moreover, Moscow's official denunciation of Stalinism and call for peaceful coexistence with the decadent West was most alarming to the recently enthroned Chinese communist leadership, who were presently presiding over a thoroughly Stalinist system, and had no intention of committing similar acts of sacrilege. In many ways, "Maoism may be viewed as a reaction to Khrushchevism."[46] And the conflict between Maoism and

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[45]For the unedited text of the Soviet note to the United States, see Department of State Bulletin, vol. 40, January 19, 1959, pp. 81-89.

[46]Merle Fainsod in M.M. Drachkovitch, op. cit. (1965), p. 134.

Khrushchevism also both reflected and further fueled existing divisions among the Soviet leadership.[47]

One of the few interesting revelations in Gromyko's recently published memoirs is his description of a secret visit to Beijing he made in August 1958, in the midst of the crisis in the Formosa straits. The very fact of the clandestine visit is evidence of a high level of Soviet concern over the widening Sino-Soviet rift and the implications of Chinese aggression for the maintenance of peaceful US-Soviet relations. Gromyko reports that during his stay, Mao sought Soviet collaboration in the event of an American attack on China. Mao outlined his strategy to a "flabbergasted" Gromyko: If the United States attacked China with nuclear weapons, the Chinese army would retreat from the border regions, drawing American forces into the interior of the country, "so as to grip US forces in a pincer." The Soviets, meanwhile, should hold back until the Americans are right in China's central provinces; the Soviet Union, at this point, should "give them everything you've

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[47]Frol Kozlov and Mikhail Suslov seem to have been the leaders of the opposition to Khrushchev in 1958, advocating a cooling of relations with the United States and a warmer relationship with Peking. See Robert M. Slusser, "The Berlin Crises of 1958-9 and 1961," in Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, eds., Force Without War: US Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1978), p. 366.

got."[48] Upon his return to Moscow, Gromyko no doubt reported to the Soviet leadership on Mao's willingness to contemplate an American nuclear attack on China, and the ongoing debate over post-Stalin diplomatic policy surely must have heated up. In light of these developments, the return of a more hostile Soviet posture toward the West in late 1958 becomes less puzzling, particularly since the struggle between Maoism and Khrushchevism was a symbolic cousin of the conflict in the Politburo between the friends and foes of further de-Stalinization within the Soviet Union.

In similar fashion, the meandering course of Soviet diplomacy in the months surrounding Khrushchev's visit to the United States becomes more comprehensible in light of these twin factors.

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[48]See Andrei Gromyko, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1990), pp. 251-2. In his memoirs, Khrushchev somewhat condescendingly recommends Gromyko as "a better source for reconstructing the details of when and where certain conversations with foreign leaders took place; he's a younger man, and its his business to keep track of what people said and in what circumstances they said it." Nikita S. Khrushchev, op. cit. (1974), p. 6. Unfortunately, with the exception of the story recounted above, the selective recollections in Gromyko's memoirs reveal little, omit much, and are a terribly tedious read.

The Economist aptly referred to Khrushchev's descent upon America as "a coast to coast riot."[49] It is true that the visit held more than its share of absurd and awkward moments, but all in all, it was largely a propaganda bonanza for Khrushchev, who was able to convince an astonished America that communists could be "just like us," while simultaneously demonstrating to the folks back home that under his leadership, the United States had at long last accepted the Soviet Union as its equal on the world stage.[50] Aware that the Chinese leadership might have a different impression of his diplomacy's significance, particularly after his proposal at the United Nations for complete nuclear disarmament earlier that same fall, Khrushchev

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[49]Cited in Hans J. Morgenthau, "Khrushchev's New Cold War Strategy," Commentary, vol. 28, November 1959, pp. 391-8. Morgenthau found the American celebration of Khrushchev's US visit and his appeal for an end to the Cold War alarming. The Cold War being the product of the as yet unresolved conflict between Soviet expansionism and American resistance to it, in Morgenthau's view, Khrushchev's overtures amounted to little more than an invitation for the United States to stop resisting the expansion of the Soviet Union. His conclusion, characteristically incisive: "We can believe Khrushchev when he tells us that, for the time being, he brings us peace, not a sword. But sword or no sword, he has made what he means by peace perfectly clear; it is the peace of the burial ground."

[50]For Khrushchev's own recollection of his visit to the United States, see the second volume of his memoirs, op. cit. (1974), pp. 368-416. His account reveals a considerable amount of pride in having received the invitation, as well as a small measure of guarded apprehension about his ability to advance Soviet interests while plunging into the capitalist unknown. See, especially, p. 374 on the former sentiment and pp. 371-3 on the latter.

departed for Beijing for 10th anniversary festivities the day after his return to Moscow from the United States.

The reception for Khrushchev in Beijing was far from warm, but the sources of Chinese resentment ran deeper than mere dissatisfaction with the Soviet first secretary's accelerating campaign for detente with the West. The Chinese have subsequently claimed that the Soviet Union had backed out of a previously negotiated military agreement with the PRC - probably, we can surmise, providing the Chinese with some sort of nuclear technology - right before Khrushchev's journey to Camp David.[51] It is easy, in light of the results of Gromyko's secret 1958 visit, discussed above, to understand why the Soviet Union might have been apprehensive about supplying Mao with nuclear weapons. Additionally, Khrushchev reveals in the third "glasnost" volume of his memoirs that the Chinese had captured an American missile in the course of the Taiwan Straits Crisis, and then, for some time, had refused to deliver the weapon into the hands of Soviet experts, despite Khrushchev's repeated requests.[52] In light of these new revelations, Khrushchev's call, at the Twenty-First Party Congress in January 1959, for a nuclear-free zone in the Far East and

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[51]See Donald E. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict: 1956-61 (New York: Atheneum Press, 1967), pp. xxviii-xix; William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1964), p. 351.

[52]See Nikita S. Khrushchev, op. cit. (1990), pp. 150-2.

Pacific Ocean was most likely more than a crude propagandistic ploy.

With the Sino-Soviet dispute on the verge of spectacular public eruption, Khrushchev moved boldly ahead with his twin pursuits of domestic reform and detente with the West. In January 1960, First Secretary Khrushchev unfurled his plan to cut the Soviet armed forces by 1.2 million men over the next 18 months.[53] The Soviet strategic missile forces - the prowess of which Khrushchev had been incessantly boasting, despite his simultaneous effort to win the trust of the West - would now play the primary role in Soviet defense policy, a fundamental change in Soviet strategic doctrine.[54]

In the transition period, what nuclear strength the Soviet Union lacked in practice, Khrushchev through exaggeration would eagerly provide, "to give the enemy pause."[55] Most likely, however, the theatrics of the "missile gap" were not staged exclusively for the United States. Reminding comrade Mao in inflated fashion of the

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[53]Khrushchev's announcement was the continuation or reactivation of a general policy line he had earlier initiated. From 1955-58, Soviet conventional forces were reduced by just over 2 million men. See Mark Frankland, Khrushchev (New York: Stein and Day, 1967), p. 166. For the text of the announcement, see Pravda, January 15, 1960.

[54]David Holloway, "Foreign and Defence Policy," in Archie Brown and Michael Kaser, eds., The Soviet Union Since the Fall of Khrushchev (New York: The Free Press, 1975), p. 49.

[55]Nikita S. Khrushchev, op. cit. (1990), p. 188.

practical strategic balance within the communist world surely did not undermine Soviet security, nor did exaggerations of Soviet nuclear strength damage Khrushchev's persistent claims to his opponents in the Presidium that the Soviet Union could afford to allocate a larger share of investment to agriculture and light industry.[56]

Yet the drive for peace and friendship with the West had ground to a halt by the close of 1960. The U-2 incident, subsequent scuttling of the Paris summit, and the Soviet intervention in the Belgian Congo were certainly contributors to the cooling of US-Soviet relations, but they cannot alone account for either the seeming sea change in Khrushchev's approach to East-West issues or the precipitous further downturn in the US-Soviet relationship in 1961, a dangerous year encompassing the erection of the Berlin Wall, a US-Soviet tank face-off and the Soviet Union's resumption of atmospheric nuclear testing. What additional factors

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[56]Theory and implicit arguments for butter over guns aside, the Soviet consumer did not reap the benefits of the troop reductions. Total military expenditures in 1960 remained steady, although allocation patterns within that total figure changed. George W. Breslauer, Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Politics (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), p. 69. For additional data on 1955-60 Soviet military expenditures, see Lincoln Bloomfield, Walter Clemens, and Franklyn Griffiths, Khrushchev and the Arms Race (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966), pp. 51-8. The reader interested in further details on the strategic use of the missile gap in Soviet foreign policy should consult Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966).

might explain the feverish, careening character of Soviet diplomatic policy in this period?

The return of the confrontational stance in the Soviet Union's diplomatic dealings with the United States, its principal ideological adversary, should be seen as the external manifestation of a leader and his reform vision under fire, rather than a change of heart, so to speak, on the part of Khrushchev. Even after the immediate fallout from the U-2 incident, Khrushchev appears to have held fast to his belief in detente with the West and "consumerism" at home, defending the troop reductions and calling for their eventual expansion.[57]

Unlike the status of his beliefs, however, Khrushchev's prestige and personal power were compromised by the U-2 affair. Three days after Francis Gary Powers' plane was brought down over Soviet territory, a previously unannounced meeting of the Central Committee Plenum was convened, and for Khrushchev supporters, the outcome was not favorable. Two of Khrushchev's advocates, Kirichenko and Belyaev, were ousted from the Presidium. The Central Committee Secretariat, a bastion of Khrushchev patronage since the leadership crisis of 1957, was in the end cut by half - from ten to five members, leaving the First Secretary with a tenuous 3-2 majority - and purged of Khrushchev's most dependable appointees. Kozlov and Suslov, two of

[57]See, for example, Pravda, May 6, 1960 and May 8, 1960.

Khrushchev's more daring critics, were the principal beneficiaries, relatively speaking, of these changes. The net effect of the personnel shakeup of mid-1960 was to diminish Khrushchev's ability to implement policies entirely of his choosing.[58]

Seemingly undaunted, Khrushchev forged ahead with his plans for domestic change, ringing in 1961 with a call for a fundamental transformation of Soviet agriculture, to the benefit of the Soviet consumer. Yet the U-2 incident was a turning point in Khrushchev's leadership with respect to foreign affairs[59], for it gnawed at the fragile link he had attempted to forge between rapprochement with the West and

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[58]For further details on the turnover in personnel in the wake of the U-2 incident, see Carl A. Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 1957-64 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966), pp. 91-8; Wolfgang Leonhard, The Kremlin Since Stalin (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975), p. 361; and Robert M. Slusser, "America, China, and the Hydra-Headed Opposition: The Dynamics of Soviet Foreign Policy," in Peter H. Juviler and Henry W. Morton, eds., Soviet Policy-Making: Studies of Communism in Transition (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 203.

[59]In his retirement, Khrushchev is reported to have spoken of the downing of the U-2 and its aftermath as tipping the balance, irreparably, in favor of his opponents: "From the time Gary Powers was shot down in a U-2 over the Soviet Union, I was no longer in full control...those who felt America had imperialist intentions and that military strength was the most important thing had the evidence they needed, and when the U-2 incident occurred, I no longer had the ability to overcome this feeling." See Dr. A. McGehee Harvey, "A 1969 Conversation with Khrushchev: The Beginning of his Fall from Power," Life, December 18, 1970, p. 48B. (McGehee was a Western internist, the Director of the Department of Medicine at the Johns Hopkins Hospital, who traveled to the Soviet Union in 1969 for medical consultation with a member of the Khrushchev family. During his stay, he spent a day with the former premier at his dacha outside Moscow.)

internal reform of the Stalinist system. With the dispute with China now acrimoniously unfolding in full public view, the stakes in the fight over the shape of post-Stalin change within the Soviet Union had been auspiciously raised; any move on the international front was now even more profoundly wrought with significance for the domestic situation. His position after the 1960 shakeup weaker, Khrushchev could now only aim to choose his compromises with skill, not to persuade his compatriots to buy the whole new doctrinal package. It was easier for a man whose first glimpse of the West did not come until after he had passed his sixtieth birthday to revert, on occasion, to hostile actions against the capitalist West, particularly given Khrushchev's enduring belief that it was largely responsible for most of the world's problems in the first place, than to abandon the search for a viable domestic alternative to Stalinism, one that would enable the Party to lead the first socialist country to and then preside over a new era of peace and prosperity. Thus, peaceful coexistence was sporadically sacrificed to the promise of further domestic reform.

At the same time, Khrushchev seems to have been painfully aware of the long-run tradeoff implicit in this sort of concession. Though admittedly filtered through the lens of selective recollection, Khrushchev's description in his memoirs of how he felt after the disappointing Vienna Summit, nevertheless, is indicative - and prescient:

> "I felt doubly sorry because what had happened did not create favorable conditions for improving relations. On the contrary, it aggravated the Cold War. This worried me. If we were thrown back into the Cold War, we would be the ones who would have to pay for it. The Americans would start spending more money on weapons, forcing us to do the same thing, and a new accelerated arms race would impoverish our budget, reduce our economic potential, and lower the standard of living of our people. We knew the pattern only too well from experience."[60]

Ironically, Eisenhower was simultaneously convinced that Khrushchev's major goal in his policies toward Berlin was to provoke the United States into excessive arms expenditures.[61]

To summarize, the erratic course of Soviet diplomacy from 1957-61 was much more than the sum total of Khrushchev's capricious personality. Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence, a foundation for a post-Stalinist orientation in Soviet diplomatic policy, was throughout a hostage to the demands of the internal power struggle. When opposition to Khrushchev was on the wane, peaceful coexistence was ascendant. When his opponents went on the offensive, however, the new look in Soviet foreign policy toward the capitalist West was usually the first casualty. Through this dynamic, the struggle for change in the Soviet Union's external posture was inescapably bound up with the quest for domestic de-Stalinization.

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[60]Nikita S. Khrushchev, op. cit. (1974), pp. 499-500.

See Dwight D. Eisenhower, <u>The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-61</u> (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965), p. 336, footnote 6.

International Economic Policy, 1957-61

The doctrine of peaceful coexistence was not simply a blueprint or justification for Soviet diplomatic policy during the period of domestic de-Stalinization; it served similar purposes in the Soviet Union's economic interactions with the outside world as well. Since communism was now to triumph by peaceful means, through the sheer attractive force of its technological and productive prowess, rather than by military might or capitalism's spontaneous combustion, the quest for economic sustenance from the West no longer needed to be a largely covert procedure, as it had been in the early Stalin years. Instead, greater economic links with the capitalist lands could be pursued directly, as they were now explicitly endorsed and legitimized by Marxist-Leninist ideology.

Khrushchev's new approach - what Hans Morgenthau referred to as the strategy of "communizing the world through the prestige of the Soviet Union"[62] - faced a major obstacle in the form of what might be termed the Stalinist legacy in the institutions of foreign trade. That is to say, institutionally, Khrushchev was ill-equipped to attain the majority of the external economic trade goals and agreements to which he aspired. The pursuit of economic prosperity under Khrushchev was - and indeed still is, even

[62]Hans J. Morgenthau, "Khrushchev's New Cold War Strategy," Commentary, vol. 28, no. 11, November 1959, p. 382.

in the Soviet Union today - shackled and shaped by the institutional legacy of an earlier era.

All Soviet foreign trade in the Stalinist system was centrally planned, organized under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Trade[63], GOSPLAN (the institution for economic planning) and a variety of subsidiary trade organizations. The Soviet Union's trade monopoly functioned abroad through a network of resident trade missions, whose status and authority were defined by individual bilateral agreements with the host country. Soviet foreign trade delegations were strictly intermediary organizations, independent from the export-producing or import-absorbing Soviet entities. Foreign trade transpired only if officially mandated and guided from on high.[64]

The Stalinist system intentionally isolated the domestic economy from the world economy, prices for a given good in one realm bearing no relationship to the prices for the same in the other. An inconvertible ruble and closed borders were essential components of a carefully constructed closed economic system, one which concentrated all information and decisionmaking power in Stalin's hand and

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[63]Hereafter, the Ministry of Foreign Trade is sometimes abbreviated as "MFT".

[64]Paul R. Gregory and Robert C. Stuart, Soviet Economic Structure and Performance (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), pp. 272-76; Jan F. Triska and David D. Finley, Soviet Foreign Policy (London: The MacMillan Company, 1968), pp. 40-2.

simultaneously served the higher interests of the dictator's security apparatus.

The final years of Stalin's reign saw a marked decline in East-West trade, in part due to Stalin's desire to keep the actual magnitude of the sheer devastation wrought by Hitler's armies and the ravages of his own paranoia a closely guarded secret, as well as to the onset of the Cold War. Stalin's death led to a renewed interest in the expansion of commercial relations with the West. A group of pioneering British businessmen returned from an early exploratory mission to post-Stalin Russia to report that the Soviet trade agencies were currently interested in procuring as much modern production equipment as possible from the West. Western businessmen were subsequently encouraged to submit their offers of appealing import items to the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and Soviet trade representatives began to turn up in Europe, angling for the renegotiation of existing bilateral trade agreements.[65]

The agenda for Soviet international economic policy, then, was clearly redefined by Stalin's demise, but the foreign trade policy apparatus concurrently underwent little, if any, significant change. Similarly, Khrushchev's subsequent economic reforms do not seem to have been extended to the institutions of foreign economic policy.

[65]US Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, A Background Study on East-West Trade, 89th Cong., 1st sess., 1965, pp. 5-6. (Hereafter, "A Background Study on East-West Trade.")

The goals of the Soviet Union's international economic policy may have been substantially altered, but the Stalinist institutional order, sketched above, was left largely intact, placing severe constraints on the prospects for attaining these redefined objectives.

Nevertheless, though Soviet institutions ultimately were ill-equipped to serve his trade agenda, Khrushchev's rediscovered interest in economic cooperation with the West did fundamentally alter the expressed desires and explicit style of Soviet foreign trade policy, so much so that American East-West trade experts were summoned by Congress in 1960 to discuss the "Soviet trade offensive," and how the United States should respond to this new foreign economic policy.[66]

The overall volume of Soviet trade, in general, was steadily on the rise over the course of the Khrushchev years. Soviet foreign trade turnover (exports + imports) quadrupled in the time from Stalin's death to Khrushchev's fall. The composite index figures (1913 = 100) for the Khrushchev years are presented in the table below:

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[66]US Congress, Senate, Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, Foreign Commerce Study: Trade with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 86th Cong., 2nd sess., 1960. (Hereafter, "Foreign Commerce Study.") The reader should also note that American experts at the time were still blindly insisting on the existence of a Sino-Soviet bloc as the feud between the two communist rivals openly raged (Red Flag published "Long Live Leninism" on April 16, 1960).

Foreign Trade Turnover of the USSR (1913 = 100)[67]

Year	Trade Turnover Composite Index
1953	253.1
1954	287.0
1955	291.5
1956	324.5
1957	365.9
1958	408.0
1959	507.6
1960	532.7
1961	565.3
1962	646.4
1963	686.0
1964	712.8

Though a portion of this increase must be viewed as regaining ground lost in Stalin's declining years[68], the bulk of it is directly attributable to a newly found interest in expanding the Soviet Union's economic ties with both the communist and non-communist worlds. Different priorities, however, ruled the day in each of the Soviet Union's new relationships; the quest for stronger ties to the economies of the capitalist West was fueled by different

[67]The source for these figures is Michael Kaser, "A Volume Index of Soviet Foreign Trade," Soviet Studies, April 1969, pp. 523-6.

[68]Statement of Joseph Berliner in Foreign Commerce Study, p. 129.

objectives than either the drive to expand Soviet economic influence in the developing world or the concurrent move to solidify and institutionalize economic relations with the fraternal countries. Here, we will restrict our attention to the first two categories, examining each of these constellations in turn.[69]

The aims of Soviet foreign trade policy toward the West were a direct outgrowth of Khrushchev's agenda for domestic economic reform. Like Stalin, Khrushchev sought to harness Western industrial achievement to serve the purposes of his domestic campaign of the moment. However, in contrast to Stalin, who had been primarily interested in importing goods from the West to fuel industrialization at the direct expense of the Soviet consumer, Khrushchev argued that the strength of the Soviet Union was not only determined by the amount of metal it produced, but by "the amount of products a man receives and eats."[70]

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[69]A thorough investigation of the third set of relationships - i.e., the USSR's intrabloc economic dealings - is beyond the scope of our analysis.

[70]Speech to the January 1961 plenum, published in Pravda, January 21 and 22, 1961.

For Khrushchev, the road to prosperity led through the transformation and revitalization of Soviet agriculture.[71] He quickly turned to the capitalist west for assistance in the arduous process of agricultural reform; the import of choice for this end was machinery and equipment to fortify the Soviet chemical industry, enabling it to produce the latest varieties of fertilizers and herbicides. The Soviet First Secretary defended this import strategy by emphasizing that it provided the Soviet Union with "the opportunity of quicker fulfillment of its program...without wasting time on drawing up the plans and mastering the production of new types of equipment."[72] Having boasted that the Soviet Union would "bury" the United States by 1980, Khrushchev had no time for patience with backward indigenous industries.

Khrushchev was at least partially successful in soliciting the help of the West in his programs for agricultural reform. Trade with the countries of the industrial West increased substantially during the

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[71]For a lucid and thorough treatment and analysis of Khrushchev's ebullient and ultimately disastrous program for agricultural reform, see Roy A. and Zhores A. Medvedev, Khrushchev: The Years in Power (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1978). For some figures chronicling the increase in gross investment in agriculture under Khrushchev, see J.F. Karcz, " Soviet Agricultural Policy: 1953-62," in J.F. Karcz, The Economics of Communist Agriculture (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1979), p. 154.

[72]Pravda, December 10, 1963.

Khrushchev years.[73] More specifically, from 1958-62, the Soviet Union imported a large amount of chemical equipment, critical to Khrushchev's ambitions for Soviet agriculture, two-thirds of which came from the West.[74] But simply because some capitalist enterprises were willing to do business with communists, did not also mean they were willing to do it on Soviet terms. Despite the promise of peaceful coexistence, Western firms remained reluctant to grant long-term credits to the Soviet Union, which, in turn, placed severe limits on the potential for expanded East-West economic interaction.

In comparison with the positions of its European allies, the United States was especially resolute in its resistance to Soviet appeals for more trade on more

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[73]See US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Annual Economic Indicators of the USSR, February 1964, pp. 111-112. See, also, the word of caution about the reliability of these figures in footnote 79 below.

[74]A Background Study on East-West Trade, p. 22.

favorable terms.[75] Indeed, throughout the 1950s, the Americans were never really convinced that trade on any terms with the Soviet Union was in their interest. The Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act, enshrined as law by the Truman Administration in 1953 and more commonly known as the Battle Act, had early on established a hardline position on trade with the Soviet bloc, asserting that national security was jeopardized by the export of any potential war material (broadly defined) to the Soviet Union and its satellites. Throughout the Khrushchev years, the Battle Act endured as the basic legal framework for American export control policies toward the Soviet Union.[76]

Bumping up against the limits of the Battle Act, Khrushchev in 1958 made a personal plea to President Eisenhower to ease trade restrictions and permit a massive

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[75]There was a considerable degree of disagreement between the United States and Europe over the issue of export controls. In general, the European countries were far more liberal in their view of the appropriateness of trade with the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin than was the United States. Though trade flows rose temporarily after Khrushchev's US visit, the amount of trade between the United States and the Soviet Union was but a small fraction of total trade between East and West. Finland and the United Kingdom were pioneers in trading with the post-Stalin Soviet Union, and West Germany, France, and Italy quickly became similarly involved. For a breakdown of total Soviet trade figures with the free world by country over time, see U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Annual Economic Indicators of the USSR, February 1964, p. 114, and Foreign Commerce Study, p. 45.

[76]Philip J. Funigiello, American-Soviet Trade in the Cold War (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1988), pp. 68-75. Most-favored-nation status had been withdrawn from the USSR earlier, in 1951.

expansion of American exports of non-strategic items to the Soviet Union, insisting that the Soviet Union could finance a portion of the desired transaction with exports of raw materials, but that still more American goods could be purchased, of course, if only American long-term credits were made available. Khrushchev's letter to Eisenhower was probably not the most strategic of moves, as the petition for long-term credits only served to refocus attention on the issue of existing Soviet World War II debts. In the end, the Eisenhower administration made the settlement of Soviet lend-lease debt a further precondition for the easing of trade restrictions.[77] Though the Kennedy administration would make an early attempt to amend the Battle Act, the return of overt hostility to the US-Soviet relationship quickly paralyzed this effort.

Thus, Khrushchev's persistent and increasingly insistent requests that the Soviet Union be treated like the ally it had once been and be granted long-term credits from the West so that it might be able to afford reform fell on largely deaf ears. Consequently, as had been the case during Stalin's revolution from above, vital imports had to be funded either with cash or through short-term credit arrangements. What Khrushchev viewed as a quick fix from the West, therefore, came at considerable cost. CIA estimates in early 1964 indicated that Soviet gold reserves

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[77]Ibid., pp. 112-17.

had been substantially depleted, in part, no doubt, to underwrite Khrushchev's international adventures in agriculture.[78] Whether a quick fix might actually have lifted Soviet agriculture out of problems that were largely of its own making is another matter entirely. The point to be made here is that Khrushchev's vision of agricultural perestroika seems to have been endowed with some rather unrealistic expectations that Western sympathy for his reform agenda would ultimately prevail.

Shifting our attention from North to South, to the second constellation of economic relationships under our examination, the drive to expand Soviet economic influence in the Third World was fueled by a quite different set of objectives than was the quest for Western credits. Putting aside for the moment the question of motives, an explosion of economic interaction with the newly independent nations of the developing world was a prominent feature of Soviet foreign trade policy under Khrushchev. Whereas from 1955-62, the total trade turnover of the USSR increased by 108%, trade turnover with the less developed countries

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[78]Cited in A Background Study on East-West Trade, p. 22.

simultaneously increased by 266%.[79] For the most part, in the Khrushchev period, the Soviet Union exported machinery and arms and imported raw materials, such as cocoa beans, wool, hides, skins, and raw cotton.

What the trade turnover figures partially camouflage, however, is the enormous amount of Soviet economic aid that flowed into the developing world during the Khrushchev years. Soviet economic assistance was primarily administered through the provision of Soviet goods and services on credit to targeted third world countries. Thus, while the trade turnover figures for this period, cited above, would seem to suggest that an economically vital Soviet Union was selling its finished products, attractive by world standards, to a grateful developing world, in reality, the lion's share of Soviet international economic policy toward the newly independent nations was a seductive offer of aid rather than trade, a package of propositions an impoverished fledgling nation could hardly refuse. By 1960, Soviet aid to the Third World as a percentage of GNP nearly

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[79]Figures derived from summary table prepared by Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, Annual Economic Indicators of the USSR, February 1964, p. 104. In turn, the Joint Economic Committee based its figures on data gleaned from Vneshniaia Torgovlia SSSR (Moscow: Ministerstvu Vneshnei Torgovli SSSR, 1963), and earlier volumes. Since the ultimate source of data is a product of Soviet accounting procedures, an appropriate dose of skepticism with respect to the precision of these estimates is advised. Nevertheless, the trends are still striking. For comparative purposes, the rate of increase in trade turnover with the industrial West for the same period was 143%.

equalled American aid commitments to the less developed nations.[80]

Though the Soviet aid program cast its net widely, with millions of rubles of credits being granted in the late 1950s to developing countries on no less than three continents, the principal recipients of Soviet attention in the sunrise years of Moscow's expanding third world influence were India and Egypt.[81] The Soviet Union financed the building of steel mills and oil refineries in India, and underwrote the erection of the Aswan dam in Egypt. Egypt was also the first recipient (in 1955) of large-scale Soviet military assistance - a menacing assortment of Soviet jet fighters and bombers, medium and heavy tanks, artillery, submarines, torpedo boats, two destroyers, and plenty of

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[80]Elizabeth K. Valkenier, "The USSR and the Third World: Economic Dilemmas," in Robin F. Laird and Erik P. Hoffmann, Soviet Foreign Policy in a Changing World (Hawthorne, NY: Aldine de Gruyter, 1986), p. 732.

[81]According to one Soviet source, from 1955-59, Soviet credits to the third world were distributed in the following manner (in millions of roubles): Egypt - 1,100; India - 1,000; Iraq - 550; Afghanistan - 480; Indonesia - 427; Argentina and Ethiopia - 400; Ceylon -120. See V. Rymalov, "Soviet Assistance to Underdeveloped Countries," International Affairs, no. 9, September 1959, pp. 24-5.

ammunition - all of which was "officially" supplied by Czechoslovakia, but negotiated by the USSR.[82]

In its move into the Third World, the Soviet Union was looking for more than markets for its obsolete weaponry. Whereas Soviet foreign trade policy toward the West had had its eyes fixed on tactical short-term gains, with the domestic reform program shaping its specific objectives, Khrushchev's economic strategy with respect to the developing world was a long-term blueprint for the future, a primarily political rather than a strictly economic investment of Soviet resources. The doctrine of peaceful coexistence, while permitting and encouraging East-West cooperation in the present epoch, also looked forward to a future where the enemies it advocated befriending for the present might one day be laid to their final rest, not necessarily in violent fashion, but preferably by peaceful conversion to the true faith, inspired by the force of the Soviet Union's example. The war of ideology was to rage all the more fiercely in the circumstance of superpower cooperation. Under such parameters, what better way to lay the foundation for capitalism's impending demise than to remake the previously colonized in the Soviet Union's own

[82]Bruce D. Porter, The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars, 1945-80 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 17. In a barter arrangement, Egypt traded cotton and rice for the weaponry. For a more detailed discussion of Soviet foreign aid programs in India and Egypt, see Marshall I. Goldman, Soviet Foreign Aid (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1967), pp. 85-114 and 60-84, respectively.

promising image, to convert the West's past colonial holdings into bastions of Soviet influence? Rhetoric about helping the needy nations aside, one of the fundamental goals of Soviet foreign aid to the developing world was to deliver gifts that would eventually be repaid in kind. Khrushchev himself so much as confesses this in his memoirs; assisting the poorer nations was seen as an investment that would serve the future of the Soviet Union, both politically and economically.[83]

Peaceful coexistence as international economic policy, then, moved simultaneously on two fronts. While preaching economic cooperation with the West, it transformed the Third World into the principal playing field for the ongoing and suddenly peaceful competition between capitalism and socialism. Sadly, the playing field all too quickly became a new battleground.

Surveying where we have traveled in this section, the foreign trade policy of peaceful coexistence presents something of a paradox. The domestic politics of de-Stalinization never broke the strong bond between domestic and international economic policy that Stalin had forged; decentralizing reforms did not enter the realm of foreign trade policy-making. Foreign trade continued to be planned and administered from on high. As had been the case during Stalin's revolution from above, the quest for an expansion

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[83]See Nikita S. Khrushchev, op. cit. (1971), p. 562.

of trade with the West was a central feature of Khrushchev's international economic policy. Foreign trade policies were employed as an instrument for the attainment of internal goals, the immediate imperatives of domestic need directly shaping the content and course of Khrushchev's economic dealings with the West.

In the midst of the unsettling uncertainty that the search for a viable alternative to Stalinism prompted, regime legitimacy was bolstered by the apparent appeal of the Soviet model in the developing countries, though the outflow of funds surely undermined the concurrent pursuit of some measure of prosperity at home after endless suffering and sacrifice. In addition, in the early Comecon years, economic relations with the fraternal countries were also not yet a winning proposition.[84] For the Soviet consumer, though his daily life in the Khrushchev years did steadily improve - how could it not with the memory of the destruction of war and Stalinism still so vivid? - the promise of delayed gratification was ultimately yet again deferred. In this sense, too, the foreign trade of de-Stalinization was orchestrated in thoroughly Stalinist fashion.

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[84]In the new third volume of his memoirs, Khrushchev complains that the fraternal countries looked upon the Soviet Union as "one big feeding trough." See Nikita S. Khrushchev, op. cit. (1990), p. 112.

Transnational Policy, 1957-61

On April 17, 1956, with an official announcement from Mikoyan, the Cominform (Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties) was allowed to die an undistinguished death. In a gesture to appease the West, Stalin had dissolved the Comintern in 1943, and had then somewhat awkwardly reconstituted the organization under a new name in 1947.[85] Though its reappearance on the world stage after a short four year absence could not help but provoke an already suspicious West, the impotence of the resurrected organization, which was unable to contain the open feud between Stalin and Tito, was - with the benefit of hindsight - immediately apparent. After the revelations of the Twentieth Party Congress, Khrushchev could mercifully lay the entire notion to rest.

The close of the age of formally organized socialist internationalism, however, did not produce the institutional vacuum that it might have, for Stalin had left the Soviet system with new institutions that might more effectively carry on the old world mission in changed circumstances. In 1943, the year the Comintern was disbanded, Stalin had created a new department of the Central Committee, the International Department, and assigned it the task of handling relations with foreign communist parties.

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[85]Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York: Vintage Press, 1971), pp. 545-6.

For the remainder of Stalin's dictatorship, the International Department was in a perpetual process of reorganization, reflecting the uncertain status of the very concept of communist internationalism in an age where communist and capitalist had willingly fought side by side. Shortly after the founding of the Cominform, in 1948, the five year old International Department was closed down and reconstituted as the Foreign Relations Department (Otdel Vneshnikh Snosheniy). The Foreign Relations Department survived for a mere two years before its obligations were transferred to two new organizations, the Foreign Policy Commission (Vneshnepoliticheskaia Kommissiia) and the Department for Cadres of Diplomatic and Foreign Trade Organs (Otdel Kadrov Diplomaticheskikh i Vneshnetorgovykh Organov). Finally, six years later, in 1955 - just before the official disbanding of the ineffectual Cominform, the institutional merry-go-round came full circle; the Foreign Policy Commission and the Department for Cadres were combined and rechristened as the International Department.[86] Unfortunately, little information is available on the purposes of each of these reorganizations, but their very existence, in rapid succession, bears testimony to the existential dilemmas wrought first by the war-time alliance

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[86] Robert W. Kitrinos, "The CPSU Central Committee's International Department," in Robin F. Laird and Erik P. Hoffmann, eds., Soviet Foreign Policy in a Changing World (Hawthorne, NY: Aldine de Gruyter, 1986), p. 181.

and then by Stalin's death and the subsequent divisions in the faltering international communist movement.

All of the institutional metamorphoses chronicled above were accompanied by a corresponding reshuffling of personnel, but one man did emerge as a constant presence throughout. Boris Ponomarev came to the International Department after an illustrious career as Soviet representative to the Comintern's Executive Committee from 1936-43 and a stint as first deputy head of the short-lived Cominform. He was appointed, in the midst of the Malenkov-Khrushchev power struggle, head of the born-again International Department in 1955. In the waves of de-Stalinization that shortly followed, Ponomarev, though an original Stalin appointee, not only retained his power but accumulated new honors; he was made a member of the Central Committee in 1956 and years later, in 1972, a candidate member of the Politburo.[87] Ponomarev's longevity as head of the International Department is significant, for it suggests that de-Stalinizing the internationalist policy apparatus was not exactly a top priority of the Khrushchev reforms.

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[87]Elizabeth Teague, "The Foreign Departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU," Supplement to the Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, October 27, 1980, pp. 9-11, and Leonard Schapiro, "The International Department of the CPSU: Key to Soviet Policy," International Journal, Winter 1976/7, pp. 42-3.

Indeed, de-Stalinization seems to have largely passed over the International Department.[88]

The demise of the formal transnational institutions of communist internationalism, then, only marked a redefinition, rather than an abandonment of the Soviet Union's internationalist agenda. But the international movement in its post-Cominform incarnation would have less stringent membership requirements than had been the case previously, and its rallying cry would no longer be Marxism-Leninism as defined by Moscow, but a more amorphous anti-colonialism. Thus, the Soviet Union under Khrushchev eventually sought to present itself as the champion of anti-colonialism, rather than of doctrinaire socialist solidarity, much to the discontent of the Chinese leadership, who had similar nascent aspirations. What this meant, in practical terms, was that Moscow could and did support nationalists over communists in the Third World when the local communist party had little indigenous support. One might say that the internationalism of peaceful coexistence was internationalist in form, but quite frequently, nationalist in content.

Peaceful coexistence, therefore, when it came to the Soviet Union's policy toward national liberation movements

[88]Veljko Micunovic, Yugoslavia's ambassador to the Soviet Union in the Khrushchev years, in his memoirs reports that Boris Ponomarev still had a large portrait of Stalin hanging on his office wall "in a prominent place" two years after Khrushchev's secret speech. See Veljko Micunovic, Moscow Diary (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1980), pp. 385-6.

in the developing world, had a decidedly warlike side. It championed the status quo, but only in those areas of the world where existing political arrangements were indisputably entrenched. Wherever the forces of anti-Western sentiment potentially threatened to overturn the old order, the Soviet Union enthusiastically endorsed the prospect of revolutionary change, even when in so doing, the risk of escalating conflict loomed large. "Our foreign policy," Khrushchev proudly clarifies in his memoirs, "is rooted in our conviction that the way pointed out to us by Lenin is the way of the future not only for the Soviet Union, but for all countries and all peoples of the world."[89]

In a revealing 1961 speech that was probably originally meant for communist ears only but inadvertently provoked substantial fallout in the West, Khrushchev further elucidated the more dialectical elements of his coexistence policy in the following manner: The USSR does indeed seek to avoid nuclear war, and to this end opposes "local" wars that might escalate, explained Khrushchev, but the Soviet Union also concurrently views wars of national liberation as "sacred" and worthy of the Soviet Union's "wholehearted and unreserved" support.[90] Thus, even in the nuclear era, for

[89]Nikita S. Khrushchev, op. cit. (1971), p. 560.

[90]Khrushchev's speech was given to a joint meeting of the Higher Party School, the Academy of Social Sciences and the Marx-Engels Institute, and was published in Kommunist, no. 1, 1961, pp. 3-37.

Khrushchev, some wars were still noble wars, despite the risk of total destruction.

With the doctrine that was meant to guide foreign policy itself embracing these contradictory elements, it is not surprising that the internationalist arm of Soviet external policy often found itself working at cross purposes with that of the Soviet Union's more conventional state-to-state diplomacy. As it had been under Stalin, so it was under Khrushchev; one set of rules seems to have applied to the Soviet Union's relations with other governments and another to Moscow's dealings with non-state actors. In the Khrushchev era, the institutional division of policy labour, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs administering diplomatic policy and the International Department overseeing relations with national liberation movements, could only reinforce schizophrenic tendencies already present in peaceful coexistence's extant principles.

Where Stalin and Khrushchev differed, however, was on the geographical emphasis of their respective transnational policies. Whereas Comintern policy had concentrated on guiding non-ruling communist parties in Europe, Khrushchev's internationalist strategy directed the crusade Southward rather than Westward. In his memoirs, Khrushchev describes the stark disappointment of the immediate post-war years, when the Soviet leadership was forced to accept that a completely communist Europe - an outcome, Khrushchev tells

us, that Stalin had expected - was not in the making.[91] Under Khrushchev, a new set of hopes and expectations surrounding the future of the newly independent nations seems to have replaced the dream of a Soviet Europe.

The Third World of the 1960s was fertile ground for the promises of Marxism-Leninism. After all, the Soviet Union with communist principles as its guide had managed to join the ranks of the industrialized countries in an impressively short period of time. The price that was paid for this accelerated development is now well-known, but at the time, it was far from obvious to those newly independent nations who had similar dreams of rapid advancement. The Soviet alternative was an attractive one, especially since choosing that road could bring much needed economic and military support to a struggling underdeveloped country, as well as provide aspiring third world political leaders with an anti-colonialist superpower advocate.

The armed struggle, of course, required arms, which Moscow was generally more than happy to supply. Prior to 1955, arms transfers to the developing world from the Soviet Union and the fraternal countries were minimal; after 1955, Soviet-sponsored arms exports to the non-aligned countries rose dramatically.[92] Egypt, Syria and Yemen were the first

[91]See Nikita S. Khrushchev, op. cit. (1990), pp. 99-100.

[92]Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Arms Trade With the Third World (New York: Humanities Press, 1971), pp. 188-9.

beneficiaries of Soviet support, but their ranks were soon joined by Afghanistan, Iraq, Indonesia, India, and Laos, among others. As a consequence, Soviet weapons quickly became a factor in several regional conflicts: the turmoil in Indonesia from 1958-65, the Congo crisis and civil war in the early 1960s, and the Laotian civil war of 1960-61.

The results of these interventions, however, from the Soviet perspective, were decidedly mixed. On the overwhelmingly negative side of the balance sheet, the Soviet Union sent the largest amount of assistance to back Sukarno in a series of conflicts in Indonesia, but its weapons never played a major role, seeing a minimum of actual combat action. Similarly, the Soviet foray into the Congo in the early 1960s was ultimately a failure, and, in addition, had considerable diplomatic fallout. On the positive side for Moscow, the political outcome of Soviet meddlings in Laos in 1960-61 did reap substantial short-term gains, with minimal material commitment, but for the most part, expectations and effort exceeded concrete achievements in the Soviet Union's early attempts to exert its influence in the developing world.[93]

Thus, though the preliminary Soviet ventures in third world intervention were somewhat disappointing, the explosive Soviet third world adventurism of the later Brezhnev years can trace its origins to the Khrushchev era.

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[93]Bruce Porter, op. cit. (1984), pp. 19-21.

Moreover, Khrushchev's very ascent to power seems to have played an instrumental role in the shaping of the Soviet Union's policies toward the non-aligned nations.

Ironically, Khrushchev, the principal spokesman for peaceful coexistence with the West, was also an advocate of third world activism, while Molotov, usually portrayed as a powerful symbol of the Stalinist legacy in Soviet foreign policy, when it came to the Soviet Union's role in unstable areas of the world was a proponent of caution, warning of the perils of adventurism (either abroad or within) for Soviet vital interests. The outcome of the 1957 leadership crisis, therefore, had significant implications for the Soviet Union's policy toward the array of emerging national liberation movements in the developing world. Khrushchev, in a 1958 conversation with Nasser, is said to have described his foreign policy conflict with Molotov in the following terms:

> "'He [Molotov] thought we should go back to traditional policies - first, that is, we should draw a line in Europe beyond which we should allow no retreat. Second, we should refuse to discuss anything affecting the countries on our side of that line. Third, we should stop what he called "adventurism," in which he included out interest in your part of the world, Mr. President...I told Molotov that to adopt a purely defensive position in Europe would be a mistake...offence is the best form of defence. I said we needed a new, active diplomacy, because the impossibility of a nuclear war meant that the struggle between us and the capitalists was taking on new forms. I told them: "I'm not an adventurer, but we must aid national liberation movements..."'"[94]

It was, then, as the Soviets would say, no accident that the fall of Molotov and the rise of Gromyko coincided with the unveiling of a more assertive course in Soviet third world policy, for the new course that subsequently emerged in this realm of the Soviet Union's external affairs was a component of Khrushchev's larger strategy of peaceful coexistence, rather than a manifestation of opposition to that agenda.

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[94]Mohamed Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar: The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Middle East (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), pp. 91-2. Heikal was a senior advisor to both Nasser and Sadat. I am inclined to trust his account, for the portrait of Khrushchev it paints is consistent with the personality and idiosyncrasies that emerge from the pages of Khrushchev's memoirs. For further details on Khrushchev's quarrel with Molotov over the appropriate breadth of the Warsaw pact (Khrushchev favoring a more inclusive organization), see Nikita S. Khrushchev, op. cit. (1990), pp. 69-70. Molotov was also opposed to anything resembling active pursuit of the West's favor. For further accusations on this general point, see Khrushchev's speech of July 6, 1957, excerpts of which may be found in English translation in The Current Digest of The Soviet Press, vol. IX, no. 24, p. 6, and the "Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the Anti-Party Group," reprinted in Robert Conquest, Power and Policy in the USSR (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 458-63.

In addition to producing another change in leading personalities at the Foreign Ministry, the outcome of the 1957 Anti-Party Group crisis also facilitated significant changes in the institutions of transnational policymaking. Sometime in 1957, the International Department section for dealing with ruling communist parties was elevated to the status of an autonomous department of the Central Committee, the Department for Liaison with the Workers' and Communist Parties, under whose auspices relations with the fraternal countries would henceforth primarily be conducted.[95] The first head of the Department for Liaison with the Workers' and Communist Parties was the former ambassador to Hungary, future helmsman of the KGB and, later, General Secretary of the Party itself, Yuri Andropov.[96]

What remained of the old International Department would now be responsible for the Soviet Union's relations with non-ruling foreign communist parties and national liberation movements only and would retain the name, International Department. This restructuring of the Central Committee's foreign departments laid the institutional groundwork for the move to a more activist third world policy. And with the Soviet Union's nuclear capability now

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[95]Robert W. Kitrinos, "The CPSU Central Committee's International Department," in Robin F. Laird and Erik P. Hoffmann, eds., op. cit. (1986), p. 182.

[96]See Jerry F. Hough, "Soviet Policymaking Toward Foreign Communists," Studies in Comparative Communism, vol. XV, no. 3, Autumn 1982, p. 172.

fully developed, the superpower contest would indeed quickly take on new forms, just as Khrushchev had anticipated.

Thus, preliminary appearances to the contrary, Khrushchev's version of peaceful coexistence continued to cling to the old Bolshevik illusion that the Soviet Union might dialectically play the roles of both status quo and revolutionary power simultaneously. Yet the global political landscape was radically different than in it had been in Stalin's time. Communism was in power in other countries, and the largest member of the new communist bloc was openly challenging the Soviet Union's former position as the indisputable vanguard of the world socialist movement. The movement itself was no longer unified enough to maintain even the facade of international communist solidarity. To regain the initiative in the evolving struggle over who was to lead the forces of progress into a brave, new era, Moscow not only had to repackage the old universalist message of socialism, but also, in the absence of formal internationalist communist institutions, sell its revised creed to the world via new channels.

Under Khrushchev, the Soviet Union rediscovered "bourgeois" international organizations as valuable forums for transnational propaganda operations. The reader will recall that Stalin's diplomats, after a period of cautious flirtation, embraced the League of Nations under the shadow of the Nazi threat, relegating the Comintern to the status of a confused cheerleader. The diplomacy of peaceful

coexistence, in contrast, was not saddled with the constraint of a Comintern equivalent. Khrushchev could involve the Soviet Union in UN matters without ideological hand-waving, for the reformist doctrine of peaceful coexistence explicitly endorsed Soviet cooperation with the status quo powers.

Soviet policy toward non-communist international organizations passed through three distinct phases in the post-war years. From 1945-53, the Soviet Union, much as it had done before the war, participated in the international institutions of the West's devising largely to forestall the formation of anti-Soviet coalitions. Stalin's death quietly ushered in a new era in Soviet internationalist policy, one in which Moscow initiated and rapidly expanded its aid commitments to UN agencies funding Third World development. This second phase in the evolution of Soviet attitudes was one in which Moscow aimed at winning the respect and support of the non-aligned nations, the United Nations being the principal forum for that campaign. Finally, from roughly 1960 onwards, in the eyes of Soviet transnational policy, the United Nations was increasingly less of an arena for persuasion and more of an instrument that might be directly utilized to advance larger Soviet interests.[97] Thus, over the course of Khrushchev's tenure in power, previously

[97]Alvin Z. Rubinstein, The Soviets in International Organizations: Changing Policy Toward Developing Countries, 1953-63 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 349-55.

suspect international organizations grew to be a central component of Soviet internationalist strategy.

That Khrushchev grew to take the UN very seriously is evident in the fact that he deemed it important enough to spend three weeks away from Moscow in New York under UN auspices in 1960. The UN's headquarters were conveniently situated for Khrushchev's purposes, for an appearance at the UN did not require an invitation from the Americans, yet its base in New York guaranteed an American audience for the Soviet leader's assorted propaganda efforts.[98] Khrushchev's proposals and actions during the 1960 visit were curiously counterproductive; his recommendation that the office of the General Secretary be shared by three representatives - one each from the communist, capitalist and non-aligned worlds - did not even appeal to the "neutral" nations it was allegedly meant to empower. Additionally, his less than ceremonial behavior during the proceedings, culminating in an episode of shoe-banging during a speech by Macmillan, undermined his efforts to strengthen the prestige of the

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[98]Khrushchev welcomed this label for his activities, as his 1961 speech to the Fifth World Congress of Trade Unions reveals: "It may be said that Khrushchev is again handing out propaganda. If you think so, you are not mistaken. Yes, I was, am, and always shall be a propagandist." Quoted from Nikita S. Khrushchev, Communism - Peace and Happiness for the Peoples (Moscow: 1963), vol. II, p. 365.

institution and the Soviet Union's evolving status within it.[99]

Khrushchev's behavior cannot be satisfactorily explained through reference to the more volatile dimensions of the First Secretary's personality alone. To account fully for Khrushchev's contradictory actions, we must refer back to the contradictions inherent in the very doctrine of peaceful coexistence itself. Peaceful coexistence, the handmaiden of Khrushchev's agenda for domestic renewal, preached East-West detente to the North, and to the South revolution against an order the West had primarily forged. Consequently, the United Nations, a body in which the aspirations of the North and South routinely collided, was precisely the arena in which a policy at ultimate cross-purposes was most likely to stumble over its own contradictions, undermining its broader aim - that of maintaining a fragile peace so that some semblance of political order within the post-Stalin Soviet Union might be reforged.

In the end, however, for all their immediate differences, Khrushchev and the UN's architects did, at a certain level, see eye to eye, as Khrushchev acknowledged in retirement:

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[99]Khrushchev and the Soviet delegation were fined $10,000 for the breach of procedure that the Soviet leader's shoe-banging represented. See Roy Medvedev, op. cit. (1982), p. 154.

> "On the whole, the UN has helped us avoid a major war. To me, the organization is like a cold cleansing shower: once people go through it, they tend to be a bit more tolerant and a bit more realistic about the prevailing conditions in international affairs. The UN has a way of restraining some people in their zeal so that a third world war is less likely to break out."[100]

In some ways, Khrushchev may have understood his own foibles better than his critics were ever willing to acknowledge.

Conclusion

Peaceful coexistence, the first blueprint for a post-Stalin foreign policy, was a child of the Twentieth Party Congress, the first congress of de-Stalinization. Its subsequent theoretical elaboration functioned as both a world view and a legitimating mechanism for the foreign policy of de-Stalinization. In embracing peaceful coexistence, Khrushchev abandoned the "inevitability of war" doctrine that had informed the foreign policies of both Lenin and Stalin. Whereas Lenin and Stalin's theory of imperialism had precluded anything but the shortest term tactical cooperation with the capitalist west, the new Soviet theory of international relations explicitly endorsed more lasting forms of cooperation with the Soviet Union's ideological adversaries.

The search for an alternative to Stalinism within the Soviet Union, we have seen above, had implications for both the personnel and for the institutions of the Soviet foreign

[100]Nikita S. Khrushchev, op. cit. (1974), p. 485.

policy making apparatus. From the perspective of personalities, Khrushchev's ascent to power spawned a series of changes in the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In contrast, Stalin's men continued to preside over the International Department and the Ministry of Foreign Trade throughout Khrushchev's tenure in power. Institutionally, de-Stalinization spelled the long overdue death of the Communist International and the rise of a new institution, the International Department of the Central Committee, which was to deal exclusively with movement matters in those countries not yet fortunate enough to have installed communists in power.

Under Khrushchev, much like during Stalin's revolution from above, the imperative of internal change was most directly reflected in Soviet international economic policy. The domestic campaign of the moment set the agenda for international trade, at both abstract and specific levels. Arguably, the Stalinist legacy weighed most heavily upon Soviet foreign trade. Though the definition of most valuable import had changed since Stalin's time, with imports to aid agriculture taking precedence over the needs of heavy industry, the mechanism by which trade was conducted and interests were formulated remained a prisoner

of rigid central planning.[101] This would, unfortunately for the Soviet consumer, change little in the decades that followed.

As we found in our investigation of Soviet international behavior under Stalin, we find that the diplomatic and transnational arms of Soviet foreign policy under Khrushchev were also often working at cross-purposes. While Soviet diplomatic and trade policy endeavored to build a more stable and profitable relationship with the West, the representatives of the International Department were simultaneously at work fueling the flames of anti-Western sentiment in the developing world and United Nations, often in ways that undermined the agendas of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade.

Under Khrushchev, differing rates of de-Stalinization within the institutions of the Soviet foreign policymaking apparatus, as well the emerging institutional division of labour itself, could only serve to reinforce what was a longstanding double-standard interpretation of detente with the capitalist West, one first established by Lenin himself. Remaining firmly within this tradition, Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence meant only that the Soviet leadership

[101]In an interesting interview on Soviet television, Nikita Adzhubei, Khrushchev's grandson, reports that Khrushchev before the end of his tenure in power, realized that his economic policies had been fatally flawed, that the concept of a dash forward to communism and his related campaign approach to the Soviet Union's economic woes had been a major mistake. Vremya [Moscow Television], August 2, 1989. Transcript in FBIS-SOV, August 4, 1989, pp. 86-7.

and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had reached an understanding of sorts with the capitalist states. What the International Department - or earlier, the Comintern - was doing simultaneously was seen to be irrelevant to the maintenance of East-West rapprochement. This understanding of the meaning of detente, so different from that of the West, would return yet again, with most unfortunate consequences, in the Brezhnev era.

The parallels between the foreign policies of revolution from above and de-Stalinization can only be drawn so far, however, before differences begin to overwhelm similarities. First, unlike Stalin, Khrushchev was armed with a fully elaborated theory, that of peaceful coexistence, which conveniently provided the formal ideological justification for the economic and political pragmatism of the moment. With its celebration of dialectical development, peaceful coexistence could simultaneously provide the justification for expanding cooperation with the West and for Soviet support of anti-Western wars of national liberation in the South. According to the tenets of peaceful coexistence, the former would facilitate the pursuit of full communism within the Soviet Union, the latter would accelerate the ongoing march toward a world in which all nations were socialist and shared similar ends.

Stalin, on the other hand, had deployed only the crudest of ideological explanations for his foreign policy

choices. When his interests too obviously ran counter to Marxism-Leninism's dictates, rather than instruct his subordinates to carefully cloak his self-serving policies in soothing ideological rationalizations, Stalin instead simply annihilated all entities that might view his actions as ideologically suspect.

Second, Khrushchev's and Stalin's style and strategy of leadership with respect to external affairs differed dramatically. Khrushchev had a stubborn desire to see and judge things for himself, to understand the world through direct confrontation with it. Hence, Khrushchev was the first Soviet leader to travel abroad extensively, and these experiences, for better or worse, colored his perceptions. In contrast, Stalin had little interest in actually experiencing those countries and cultures that Marxism-Leninism had condemned; his isolation from the external world allowed him to present as fact to both himself and his frightened subordinates a global landscape entirely of his own making, one whose contours were unfailingly conducive to the maintenance of Stalin's personal power.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Khrushchev and Stalin's radically different domestic agendas shaped the process of foreign policy formulation and implementation in very different ways. Under Stalin, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union became the foreign policy of one man. Thus, Stalin's foreign policy henchmen held their positions solely as individuals graced by Stalin's favor and ready to

do his bidding, rather than as men in charge of particular functional or issue areas.

In contrast, de-Stalinization returned control of the nation's foreign policy to the Party, and in so doing, restored oligarchical deliberation to the foreign policy process. Consequently, unlike Stalin's policy, Khrushchev's foreign policy was never entirely his own. Foreign policy positions during the Khrushchev years instead became bargaining chips in the internal power struggle over the scope and pace of domestic change.

All of this is not meant to suggest that Khrushchev did not hold distinctive views on Soviet external policy, or that the First Secretary's policy preferences did not play a prominent role. From what we know about Khrushchev, his vision of Soviet foreign policy, while somewhat schizophrenic, was fairly well defined: detente and economic cooperation with the West, the promotion of anti-Western revolution in the developing world. It is instead to emphasize that Khrushchev's preferences did not always translate directly into foreign policy outcomes, as had been the case under Stalin. Put another way, while a portion of the careening character of Khrushchev era foreign policy may be attributable to the Party leader's volatile personality or to the contradictory elements within the Khrushchevian notion of peaceful coexistence itself, many of the more puzzling aspects of Soviet international behavior in this

period can be traced to the raging internal struggle between the friends and foes of change.

In the years this chapter examines, we have argued that the instances where a more hostile diplomatic posture toward the West was temporarily revived - the deviations, if you will, from the general policy of peaceful coexistence - were, for the most part, concessions made by Khrushchev when the opposition to his policies threatened to overwhelm his grip on power. Similarly, the march on the developing world that Khrushchev deemed desirable could not proceed while Molotov and his followers still wielded influence over Soviet internationalist policy. On both fronts, the erratic course of Soviet foreign policy from 1957-61 is inexplicable without reference to the ongoing intra-Party battle over the scope and pace of domestic de-Stalinization.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE EMPIRE UNMASKED: GORBACHEV AND THE FOREIGN POLICY OF PERESTROIKA

"We probably deceive ourselves in thinking that we lived in the 20th century. Maybe history just performed an experiment on us, freezing our brains, thoughts and feelings, compelling us to wander about the world asleep, committing a mass of atrocities, murdering one another, doing no end of atrocious things."

-- Soviet philosopher Aleksandr Tsipko, 1990[1]

"But at that time I really did believe! And - psychologically - for me it is the memory of boundless faith that today generates the feeling of having been deceived."

-- Former Politburo member Aleksandr Yakovlev, 1990[2]

His words heavy with accusations of betrayal, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze publicly resigned his position on December 20, 1990, stunning both his compatriots and the world. Warning of encroaching dictatorship, Shevardnadze's resignation was tendered in an effort, as he himself described it, to galvanize Soviet democrats to mobilize against the swelling forces of reaction before it grew too late.

An unwavering belief in the urgent importance of democratizing the foreign policymaking process in the Soviet Union had been central to the vision of reform that

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[1]Aleksandr Tsipko, "Neobkhodimo potriasenie mysl'iu," Moskovskie novosti, 1 July 1990. I am grateful to Robert C. Tucker and his Presidential address to the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, (Washington, October 19, 1990) for bringing this essay to my attention.

[2]Interview in Komsomolskaia Pravda, 5 June 1990. FBIS-SOV, 25 June 1990, p. 46.

Gorbachev and Shevardnadze had once shared. Both Gorbachev and the former foreign minister had repeatedly traced the most egregious errors in past Soviet policy to the closed and secretive process of policy formulation itself, which had always previously been the province of the few. Glasnost was a latecomer to the realm of the Soviet Union's external affairs, and Shevardnadze's unfailing efforts were instrumental in breaching this last frontier.

Put simply, under Shevardnadze's leadership and with Gorbachev's sponsorship, although not without a fierce struggle, the manner in which Soviet foreign policy was formulated and conducted underwent radical change, resulting in unprecedented outcomes. It is these new practices and processes, which were designed to outlive Shevardnadze's tenure in power, that the return of dictatorship seriously threatens. In this sense, if not in any other, Shevardnadze's concern should also be our own.

Gorbachev must now conduct his foreign policy in an increasingly volatile internal and external environment - indeed, the very definition of what constitutes foreign policy and what falls under the jurisdiction of domestic policy in the disintegrating union is itself in a state of flux - without the direct endorsement of either Shevardnadze or much of his original coalition for reform. Brief though their alliance was, in a short five year period, Gorbachev and his former supporters transformed the Soviet Union and, in turn, its foreign policy. Since the changes in Soviet

external policy and policymaking were, as we shall see, rooted in Gorbachev's domestic agenda, it is to an analysis of the Gorbachev revolution that we first turn.

The Revolutions from Above and Below

It is difficult to overstate the extent to which Gorbachev rocked the very foundations of political legitimacy in the once proud first communist state. His reforms unleashed a snowballing collection of contending forces that now threaten to overwhelm the deteriorating authority of their onetime master. As Peter Reddaway has summarized, "the world's last major empire is no longer fraying at the edges. Its very heart is starting to convulse in what looks like the early stages of a prolonged and probably far from peaceful death."[3]

But this is not the place for rumination on the Soviet Union's uncertain future, tempting though it is to indulge in such. Our purposes in this chapter require an inquiry into where Gorbachev's Soviet Union has been rather than where it is probably going. How might we characterize the sweeping changes in the Soviet domestic landscape brought about by the Gorbachev reforms, and why are these reforms different from the agendas for change that we have examined in earlier chapters? Most importantly, in what ways did the movement for radical reform within the Soviet Union

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[3]Peter Reddaway, "Empire on the Brink," The New York Review of Books, vol. 38, no. 3, January 31, 1991, p. 7.

influence the processes and outcomes of Soviet foreign policy in the first five years, roughly speaking, of Gorbachev's tenure in power? Here we shall briefly address the former cluster of questions in order subsequently to respond better to the latter, which is to be our principal occupation in upcoming sections.

While it was clear that an advocate of reform was assuming power in March of 1985, Gorbachev's radical intentions, initially, were far from readily apparent - perhaps even to himself as well as to the outside observer. In February 1986, in an interview with L'Humanite, the leading newspaper of the French Communist Party, Gorbachev emphatically denied that the course upon which the Soviet Union was embarking under his leadership was as important as the one ushered in by the October Revolution.[4] Four years into perestroika, however, with economic conditions continuing to get worse rather than better, he no longer balked at the comparison, telling reporters after a session of the Congress of People's Deputies that his reforms were "a major turn, which is equal to the October Revolution."[5] He was more specific still in an interview with Time several

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[4]In the same interview, however, Gorbachev described the CPSU's "programme of political action" as a "programme of truly revolutionary character and scale." The interview was conducted on February 4, 1986 and was conducted by Roland Leroy, the political director of L'Humanite. I am grateful to Michael Doyle for bringing this interview to my attention.

[5]FBIS-SOV, 24 May 1990, p. 59.

days later: "To put it briefly, what we're talking about is a shift in direction comparable in magnitude to the October revolution, because we will be replacing one economic and political model with another."[6]

Gorbachev's program for pursuing this new economic and political order involved both institutional and cultural change. Painting with broad strokes, perestroika can be characterized as a crusade to transform the institutions of the old Stalinist system, while glasnost aimed directly at changing the processes of political life, at facilitating the birth of a new political culture.[7] Put another way, glasnost, if you will, was to provide the general milieu in which the new institutions that perestroika mandated could be both established and then, once founded, sustained.

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[6] Time, June 4, 1990, p. 27. Gorbachev repeated this comparison in a speech to the Federal Council after his return from the Washington Summit. See Pravda, 13 June 1990.

[7] Khrushchev, on occasion, had used the term "perestroika" to describe some of his reforms, but did not elevate the concept to the status of a plank in the Party platform. See, for example, Nikita S. Khrushchev, "O perestroike partiinogo rukovodstvo promushlennost'iu i sel'skim khoziastvom: v Prezidium TsK KPSS," in Stroitel'stvo kommunizma v SSSR i razvitie sel'skogo khoziastvo (Moscow: 1963).

Thus, glasnost was seen to be both a prerequisite for and vital component of perestroika.[8]

Yet these slogans, even in combination, fail to describe the ultimate goal of the Gorbachev reforms. To achieve the desired results of reform at the macro level - i.e., enduring change in the macro categories of "institutions" and "culture" - at the micro level, individuals, both at the elite and mass levels, must change the way they think about political life. Aleksandr Yakovlev, the architect of glasnost, in an important speech to the Prague Party School a year before its unexpected demise, described this task of fostering spontaneous participation in his nation's political life after decades of coerced participation as "the most complicated revolution of all, the revolution of the mind."[9] In the midst of the astonishing events of November 1989, Gorbachev elaborated further: "in order to change society, we must change ourselves. Our perestroika is primarily a revolution of the

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[8]An official political dictionary (Kratkii politicheskii slovar'), published in Moscow in 1988, defined glasnost as "one of the most important democratic principles guaranteeing the openness of the work of the organs of government, and access so that society can inform itself of their activities. Glasnost is the most developed form of control by the masses of the population over the organs of government in the struggle against bureaucracy." Quoted in Michael Kraus, "Soviet Reforms, 1985-1988: An Overview," Global Economic Policy, vol. 1, no. 1, Spring 1989, p. 18.

[9]Rude Pravo, 16 November 1988, p. 5. FBIS-SOV, 1 December 1988, p. 82.

mind."[10] The paradoxical effect of totalitarianism's effort to eliminate private interest on behalf of the collective," as Richard Pipes has pointed out, "was to destroy the public spirit of its citizens."[11] At the micro level, then, the success of perestroika and glasnost depended on the resuscitation of public spirit so that subjects might become citizens.

In pursuing this "revolution of the mind," Gorbachev encountered formidable resistance from those forces who stand to lose all should his agenda prevail. In his long interview with Time in May 1990, the General Secretary depicted the difficulties of changing the way the Soviet people think about politics in the following terms:

> "We are only now beginning to feel that perestroika is a revolution. That is why some people are beginning to panic...Changing our mentality has turned out to be the greatest problem for perestroika."[12]

The swollen state and Party apparatus, who were the relative beneficiaries of the centrally planned system, were understandably reluctant to relinquish their present

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[10]Mikhail S. Gorbachev, speech at the all-Union Student Forum, published in Pravda, 16 November 1989. FBIS-SOV, 16 November 1989, p. 71.

[11]Richard Pipes, "Gorbachev's Russia: Breakdown or Crackdown?", Commentary, March 1990, p. 18. Yakovlev, in an interview with Moscow News, more or less echoed Pipes' perception, lamenting the extent to which the CPSU leadership has "crippled people's consciousness." See Aleksandr Yakovlev, "This is my last congress," Moscow News, no. 28, 1990, p. 5.

[12]Time, June 4, 1990, p. 34.

privileges for an uncertain future. In waging war against these forces in his pursuit of radical reform, Gorbachev deployed a variety of weapons, some that have been previously utilized in past efforts to revitalize the system, others being innovations unique to the Gorbachev era. As Jack Snyder has argued,

> "Gorbachev is not trying to build his constituency by collecting a winning coalition from pieces that are already on the board, as Brezhnev did. This would be a losing game for Gorbachev, as most existing organized interests stand to lose from the changes. Instead, like Stalin, Gorbachev is trying to empower new constituencies, working through new institutions and transforming old ones."[13]

Like Khrushchev and Stalin before him, then, Gorbachev generously employed the purge mechanism to break bureaucratic resistance to his reform ideas, as well as opposition to the consolidation of his personal power. The peculiar nature of the Gorbachev succession, with Gorbachev being the third person in three years to wear the mantle of General Secretary of the CPSU, meant that Gorbachev was uniquely positioned to use the personnel weapon to his advantage. "Since possession of a political network [had]

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[13]Jack Snyder, "The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?", International Security, vol 12, no. 3, Winter 1987/8, p. 114. Snyder's reading of the Gorbachev agenda is insightful, though the comparison of Gorbachev to Stalin only holds at the most basic level - i.e. both pursued revolutions from above. The image of Stalin as the "builder" or "empowerer" of "constituencies" would seem to obscure more than it reveals, for a "constituency" cannot be "built" at gunpoint. The essence of totalitarian rule is the absence of constituencies.

ceased to be necessary to contend for the top position,"[14] Gorbachev could emerge victorious, and then proceed to pursue his agenda without having continually to contemplate what the effect of his maneuvers on his patrons might be, or to tolerate blatant incompetence, however loyal.

Unlike his predecessors, however, Gorbachev also endeavored to break bureaucratic resistance to change by forging a newly autonomous state apparatus as a counterweight to the Party. Whereas Khrushchev sought to reform the Party exclusively from within, Gorbachev attempted simultaneously to do the same from without, as well as from within. Hence, the Gorbachev innovation was to establish a new power base outside the Party's jurisdiction, one whose authority was grounded in the extra-Party institutions that were established under Gorbachev's leadership, and to attempt reform of the entire system from that vantage point[15], while at the same time retaining supreme authority within the increasingly emasculated Party apparatus.

In contrast to Khrushchev, therefore, who attempted to restore power to the Party after years of the Stalin dictatorship, Gorbachev, in his effort to deliver the country from its current crisis, worked to neutralize the

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[14]Seweryn Bialer, "New Thinking and Soviet Foreign Policy," Survival, July-August 1988, p. 294.

[15]In this effort, Gorbachev was later outflanked by the populist leader of the Russian republic, Boris Yeltsin.

monolithic power of the Party. It is as though he believed it possible to re-legitimize communist power through the sheer force of his own reform accomplishments.

Consequently, in his drive for a reformation of the Soviet system, Gorbachev attempted to manipulate what might be thought of as two principal levers of real and potential power. At his one hand stood the old lever of command, at the other, the new lever of democratic authority. In late 1989, the Soviet commentator, Vitaly Tretyakov, described Gorbachev's strategy in action thus: "The democratic lever is already moving of its own accord. The command lever is to be eased to the extent that the democratic lever gains strength...This can only be achieved by keeping an eye on the democratic lever, and regulating society's moves with the command lever - until the latter is no longer needed at all."[16]

Put simply, at least until very recently, Gorbachev was mandating a revolution from above, while simultaneously encouraging what amounted to a revolution from below. He himself described his program in these terms:

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[16]Vitaly Tretyakov, "Gorbachev's Enigma," Moscow News, no. 48, 1989, p. 10.

> "It is a distinctive feature and strength of perestroika that it is simultaneously a revolution 'from above' and 'from below'. This is one of the most reliable guarantees of its success and irreversibility. We will persistently seek to ensure that the masses, the 'people below,' attain all their democratic rights and learn to use them in a habitual, competent and responsible manner."[17]

Leaving aside the question of whether it is even possible to found something approaching democracy using these methods, it is obvious that this is a difficult - and dangerous, from the perspective of Gorbachev's personal authority - strategy to pursue. A lesser man would have lost control of the game long ago.

Gorbachev's dual strategy of revolution from above and from below led to the rise of new forces, as was no doubt his intention, in Soviet political life. Indeed, this very phenomenon was a necessary condition for the disruption of the cycle of reform and retrenchment that had governed the Soviet Union's past development. Yet encouraging new actors also meant that the probability of a chain of unintended consequences overwhelming their initiator rose proportionately with the success of the reform from below strategy. The explosion of ethnic tensions and republic demands for sovereignty under Gorbachev are but one manifestation of this phenomenon. It is revealing that in

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[17]Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), updated edition, p. 43. For further elaboration of this argument, see ibid., pp. 41-5.

his best-seller manifesto, Gorbachev devoted but four short pages to nationalities issues.[18]

Diplomatic Policy, 1986-90

Although its future is uncertain, the Gorbachev revolutions from above and below, at least according to the Soviet leadership, had considerable consequences for foreign policy processes and outcomes. In an interview with Time magazine, Shevardnadze made this point even more emphatically, declaring that "without perestroika, there would have been no changes in international relations."[19] Elaborating on this theme, Aleksandr Yakovlev characterized Soviet foreign policy as "the result and continuation of domestic policy. You cannot isolate one from the other. The sources of our foreign policy lie in our perestroika."[20] All the while, Gorbachev consistently stressed the two-way nature of the relationship between the Soviet Union's domestic and international affairs, repeatedly maintaining that not only is perestroika "the key to comprehending the foreign policy of the Soviet Union,"[21] but also that "the success of restructuring is impossible without a foreign

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[18]Pages 104-7 of ibid.

[19]Time, May 15, 1989, p. 33.

[20]Phone interview with Aleksandr Yakovlev by Robert English of Princeton University. Edited transcript in Krasnaiia Zvezda, 15 May 1990, p. 2.

[21]M.S. Gorbachev, op. cit. (1988), p. 118.

policy based on new political thinking."[22] What are we to make of such pronouncements?[23]

In the past, Soviet leaders have often stressed the importance of calibrating Soviet foreign policy to match the domestic imperative of the moment. This is particularly true of leadership for radical domestic reform, as we have seen in previous chapters. Yet the notion that the domestic agenda somehow in turn shapes the international agenda is a new element in Soviet rhetoric. To understand better the complexities of the radical changes in Soviet diplomatic policy under Gorbachev, requires that we start where the Soviets did: with the centerpiece of the latest ideological innovation in Soviet international relations theory, novoe politicheskoe myshlenie, or new political thinking.

Briefly, new political thinking as political doctrine was fundamentally new in four principal ways. First, it painted a picture of a world in which states have become

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[22]Mikhail S. Gorbachev, speech to the Central Committee Plenum, 18 February 1988, published in Pravda, 19 February 1988.

[23]Before tackling this question, a note on the chosen structure of this section is perhaps in order. In the analysis that follows, rather than chronologically touring the unprecedented arms control agreements, the series of ever successful US-Soviet summits, and the moving details of the emancipation of Eastern Europe, I instead will focus attention on the processes that facilitated the outcomes, assuming that the outcomes themselves are still fresh in the reader's memory. That the scope of change in the Soviet Union's external posture and style have been revolutionary under Gorbachev is, it would seem, in little need of documentation. Whether that still fragile change can endure, the question that in many ways animates this study, is, of course, another question entirely.

increasingly interdependent, both in an economic and ecological sense. Interdependence gives rise to global problems, which are more than the sum total of the nuclear threat, problems that the world must collectively address. According to Gorbachev, "the interdependence of the present-day world is such that all peoples are similar to climbers roped together on the mountainside; they either can climb together to the summit or fall together into the abyss."[24] International cooperation is, consequently, a prerequisite for humanity's self-preservation.

Second, new political thinking was imbued with a renewed sense of urgency with respect to the nuclear threat. While Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence stressed the transformative effect of nuclear weapons on international politics, there was also always an implicit understanding that though the threat of destruction was imminent, the fate of socialism itself never hung in the balance; regardless of the evil intentions of the capitalist powers, socialism would, in the end, emerge victorious. Gorbachev's version of peaceful coexistence painted a radically different picture, that of an entire world collectively tottering on the brink of extinction, socialism included.

Third, the fact of interdependence and the threat of nuclear destruction have, according to the central tenets of new thinking, fundamentally altered the nature of

[24]M.S. Gorbachev, in a speech delivered in Prague, 10 April 1987, published in Pravda, 11 April 1987, p. 2.

international security. In these new circumstances, a strategic posture based on a zero sum game view of the world is neither moral nor prudent. Traditional notions of deterrence are hence both anachronistic and mortally dangerous. Each nation of the world must realize that its own security is threatened when its posture is found menacing by another state. "Security is indivisible; it is either equal security for all or none at all."[25]

Finally, while the notion of class struggle may still be useful for understanding domestic political dynamics, according to new thinking, it was no longer relevant for the analysis of international relations, nor the formulation of Soviet foreign policy. The reader will recall that Khrushchev's brand of peaceful coexistence viewed cooperation with the West as a "specific form of class struggle," something akin to an indefinite tactical maneuver that always presupposed the ultimate victory of socialism over capitalism. In contrast, new political thinking abandoned the concepts of class struggle and the correlation of forces, two long-standing analytical features in Soviet interpretations of the world's future, and instead embraced the notion of universal human values that are prior to class

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[25]M.S. Gorbachev, op. cit. (1988), p. 128. On the same point, see, also, Gorbachev's speech to the Kiev workers, published in Krasnaiia Zvezda, 24 February 1989, and reprinted in an appendix to Sylvia Woodby, Gorbachev and the Decline of Ideology in Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), document 10, pp. 115-17, especially p. 115.

interests. Aleksandr Yakovlev has described this reorientation in the following terms:

> "I do not think that there is a more clearly expressed class interest than the survival of mankind. This applies to the workers' class, the peasants, and the intelligentsia. Therefore we are saying that the idea that could unite all people has been found, namely, the idea of the survival of mankind."[26]

For the student of Soviet politics, the idea that Soviet foreign policy should aim to promote universal rather than class values was perhaps the most radical component of new political thinking.

The basic doctrine of new political thinking was first enunciated by Gorbachev at the 27th Party Congress in February 1986. There was only sporadic further elaboration of the concept over the course of the next year and a half or so, but by late 1987/early 1988, there had been a veritable explosion of discussion on the topic, particularly in the wake of the publication of Gorbachev's book in the West.[27] This would seem to suggest that Gorbachev was the initiator of a rethinking of peaceful coexistence. While it is true that the new creed was another example of leader-led ideological innovation, new political thinking's origins can

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[26]Interview with Aleksandr Yakovlev in Trud (Sofia), 28 June 1989, pp. 1, 4. FBIS-SOV, 3 July 1989, p. 1. On this point of the priority of universal human values, see also M.S. Gorbachev, op. cit. (1988), pp. 131-4.

[27]Paul Marantz, "Gorbachev's 'New Thinking' about East-West Relations: Causes and Consequences," in Carl G. Jacobsen, ed., Soviet Foreign Policy: New Dynamics, New Themes (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), pp. 22-3.

be traced to Eurocommunist ideas of the 1970s, which in the Brezhnev years quietly made their way, albeit in covert form, into the pages of obscure scientific journals, such as Voprosi filosofii and Voprosi ekonomiki.[28] According to Soviet defector Evgenii Novikov, a former senior official of the International Department under Gorbachev, the success of new political thinking lies in its ability to translate "the interests of the Soviet Union into terminology compatible with Western thinking."[29]

But while new political thinking was an instance of ideological innovation, it was an innovation qualitatively different from the twists and turns of Soviet ideological development that preceded it. In downplaying historical determinism and the dialectical class struggle in its predictions of interstate interaction in an increasingly interdependent world, the new ideology acknowledged the possibility that Soviet international behavior influences the actions of non-socialist states. The notion that Soviet conduct could play any sort of role other than the handmaiden of historical inevitability, that Soviet policy was capable of provoking responses from its friends and adversaries that were not, for all practical purposes,

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[28]For further development of this argument, see Henry Hamman, "Soviet Defector on Origins of New Thinking," Report on the USSR, October 20, 1989, pp. 14-16. Ivan Frolov, one of Gorbachev's personal advisors and the current editor of Pravda, was former chief editor of Voprosi Filosofii.

[29]Ibid., p. 15.

predetermined, broke radically with past Soviet conceptions of the sources of state conduct. Vadim Medvedev, Chair of the Central Committee Ideology Commission, elaborates:

> "The concept of ideology itself is changing. Whereas before - there is no point in denying it - its task was to influence awareness in a direction advantageous to the ruling elite, today ideology and truth are far closer to each other than ever before in the history of socialism. Truth is not at the service of ideology; it is ideology at the service of the truth."[30]

That Gorbachev facilitated a revolution in the official Soviet view of the external world and its place and role in it should now be obvious. It would seem that this radical ideological turn might have significant implications for Soviet foreign policy in general and Soviet diplomatic policy in particular. Aleksandr Yakovlev has claimed that the "quintessence" of new political thinking is to "reach a state where words and deeds coincide."[31] Given that we are now familiar with the new words, let us turn to the question of deeds. We begin with an assessment of the domestic manifestations of perestroika and new thinking at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The pace and scope of changes in the personnel and internal organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs over the course of the first five years of the Gorbachev

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[30]Interview with Vadim Medvedev in Pravda, 29 June 1990, p. 2. Hereafter, the Central Committee is sometimes abbreviated in the text as "CC".

[31]Interview with Aleksandr Yakovlev, Trud (Sofia), 28 June 1989, pp. 1 and 4. FBIS-SOV, 3 July 1989, p. 1.

reforms were dramatic. Gromyko's departure from the helm of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in July 1985 was certainly an important precondition for these developments. Gromyko had served as Soviet Foreign Minister under Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko, and Gorbachev, surviving each succession with his position intact, his 28 year tenure in power spanning some of the darkest episodes in the history of Soviet foreign policy. His transfer to the - at that time - largely ceremonial post of president cleared the way for new beginnings at the Foreign Ministry.

If Gromyko's removal was the precondition for change, Shevardnadze's appointment was the catalyst. Shortly after his appointment, and undoubtedly at the bequest of Gorbachev, Shevardnadze was supervising sweeping changes in the Ministry's personnel both abroad and in Moscow. By the summer of 1987, Gorbachev had replaced Soviet ambassadors in 74 of the 124 countries with which the Soviet Union had full diplomatic relations, including 9 of the 16 NATO countries.[32] In Moscow, by the summer of 1988, at the level

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[32]Mark Kramer, "The New Role of the CPSU International Department in Soviet Foreign Relations and Arms Control Policy," in The International Department of the CC CPSU Under Dobrynin (Washington: US Department of State - Foreign Service Institute, 1989) [Hereafter, ID of the CC CPSU], p. 47. The changes in personnel, Kramer reports, were apparently dramatic enough to prompt high level MFA officials to lament "the virtual exhaustion of the supply of reserve diplomats." See Valentin Nikiforov, "O kadrovykh politikakh," Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn', no. 9, September 1988, p. 53. Nikiforov is a deputy foreign minister. Hereafter, in the text as well, the International Department is sometimes abbreviated as the "ID".

of first deputy and deputy foreign minister levels, there had been nearly a complete turnover of positions. Many of the new appointees were Americanists or Europeanists.[33] One such new deputy minister was Shevardnadze's future replacement, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, who assumed the position of Head of the America Section in the wake of this unprecedented purge of the foreign ministry apparatus.

The reform of the MFA consisted of more than a sea of new faces in important positions in Moscow and beyond. Concurrently, the organizational structure of the institution also underwent significant change. In June 1986, a new section for arms control was established in the Foreign Ministry, as well as in the International Department of the Central Committee.[34] While some MFA analysts had worked on arms control topics before the rise of Gorbachev, they had not done so in any sort of coordinated fashion; this was, in contrast, precisely the mandate of the new section.[35] The reform was significant, as the military, being the traditional guardians of the secret data on Soviet arms and weapons programs, had always been the principal

[33]George Breslauer, "All Gorbachev's Men," The National Interest, Summer 1988, p. 96; Francis Fukuyama, Gorbachev and the New Soviet Agenda in the Third World (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1989), p. 27.

[34]Further elaboration on the implications of this development within the International Department can be found below, in the section on Soviet transnational policy.

[35]Mark Kramer, "The New Role of the CPSU International Department in Soviet Foreign Relations and Arms Control Policy," in The ID of the CC CPSU, p. 48.

supplier of technical arms control research for Party perusal, with the Foreign Ministry, on request, providing supplementary political analysis.[36] The two new sections suggested a new found interest, on the part of the Soviet leadership, in civilian input in the formulation of arms control policy.

More radical still was the unprecedented establishment, in the early fall of 1989, of a Division on Union Republics, an MFA department of republic or center-periphery relations.[37] On the occasion of the announcement of its creation, deputy minister Valentin Nikiforov explained that this innovation in the Ministry was meant to strengthen the sovereignty of the union republics, and that all Soviet foreign policy decisions heretofore "should be prepared in close democratic dialogue with the republics. Such a dialogue will help to avoid the mistakes of the past."[38] The new department sponsored formal consultations in Moscow with representatives of the foreign ministries of union republics in April 1990. According to TASS, the participants in this first meeting "stressed the need to

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[36]Igor S. Glagolev, "The Soviet Decision-making Process in Arms-Control Negotiations," Orbis, vol. 21, no. 4, Winter 1978, pp. 769-72. Glagolev, a Soviet defector, was Chief of the Disarmament Section of IMEMO from 1961-1964.

[37]V. Markov, "Perestroika in Action: Union Republics in USSR Foreign Policy," Sovetskaia Latvia, 13 October 1989, p. 3. FBIS-SOV, 25 October 1989, p. 76.

[38]Quoted in ibid., p. 76.

raise the contribution of the foreign ministries of the union republics in drafting and implementing the [sic] Soviet foreign policy," and "exchanged opinions on how to take efficiently into account the national interests of union republics."[39]

Additionally, a special subunit at the Foreign Ministry was established to coordinate policy with the newly formed International Affairs Committee of the Supreme Soviet, and was, according to Shevardnadze, in full operation in 1989.[40] In conjunction with this reform, the MFA also set up its own Center for the Study of Public Opinion.[41]

The sum total of this perestroika of the Foreign Ministry reflected a larger ongoing effort, at least until recently in progress, to democratize the foreign policymaking process as a whole. Former foreign minister Shevardnadze was a champion and the principal spokesman of this cause. In a very important and oft-cited speech at the Foreign Ministry in July 1988, he elaborated on his vision of democratic reform in no uncertain terms. In it, he

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[39]TASS (in English), 17 April 1990. FBIS-SOV, 25 April 1990, p. 66.

[40]See Eduard Shevardnadze, speech to the Supreme Soviet, published in both Pravda and Izvestiia, 24 October 1989.

[41]Interview with Eduard Shevardnadze in Izvestiia, 22 March 1989, p. 5. In this exchange, Shevardnadze also proposed the initiation of open testimony by public officials in the Supreme Soviet on foreign policy.

emphasized the supreme importance of establishing an effective "constitutionally-empowered mechanism" for the collective discussion of foreign policy issues,[42] as well as a strict delineation of duties and responsibilities in the foreign policymaking apparatus. Both of these tasks, he argued, were prerequisites of an effective and responsible foreign policy.[43] Shortly after delivering this path-breaking speech, Shevardnadze revived the tradition, which had died along with the NEP, of annual Foreign Minister reports on international affairs to the Supreme Soviet.[44]

New procedures and institutions, however, would be of little relevance to foreign policy without an accompanying change in elite political culture - i.e. in the general milieu in which reforms are promulgated; the two variants of domestic changes must be mutually reinforcing if reform is to be institutionalized and endure. Shevardnadze seems to have quickly grasped this point. For example, in his weighty July 1988 MFA speech, he referred to the difficulties he had surmounted in implementing glasnost and criticism at the Foreign Ministry, where his subordinates,

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[42]Eduard Shevardnadze, Speech at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 July 1988, published in Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del, no. 15, 15 August 1988, p. 27.

[43]See ibid., pp. 29-30.

[44]Shevardnadze's first "State of the Union" address to the Supreme Soviet on Soviet foreign policy, 1985-89, was published in both Pravda and Izvestiia, 24 October 1989. This is the speech cited in footnote 40.

at first, had been reluctant to break with past practice and express dissenting opinions. Yet, in a short while, with the appropriate encouragement, Shevardnadze reported, contending opinions were flowing, particularly from the young and middle level employees. This was an especially good development, according to Shevardnadze, for it guarantees the future of perestroika at the Foreign Ministry.[45]

Shortly after Shevardnadze's July 1988 MFA speech, Gorbachev took things still further and publicly assigned the blame for past foreign policy blunders to the lack of glasnost and the absence of democracy in the foreign policy decision making process:

> "In learning lessons from the past, it is impossible not to admit that the command-administrative methods did not bypass the sphere of foreign policy. Sometimes even decisions of the utmost importance were made by a narrow circle of people, without a collective and comprehensive discussion and analysis, and sometimes without due consultation with our friends. This led to an inadequate response to international events and to the policies of other states, and even to erroneous decisions."[46]

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[45]Eduard Shevardnadze, Speech at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 July 1988, published in Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del, no. 15, 15 August 1988, p. 28. Though this speech was given at a closed gathering of the elite, Shevardnadze also has spoken of his interest in encouraging contending views at the MFA on national television. See, for example, the interview on Vremya, 25 November 1989. FBIS-SOV, 27 November 1989, p. 86. The timing of this appearance was probably no coincidence.

[46]M.S. Gorbachev, Report of the CC to the 19th All-Union Party Conference, published in Pravda, 29 June 1988.

Criticism of past foreign policy decisions and the "secretive" or "command-administrative" manner in which they were taken, therefore, quickly snowballed into something resembling an agenda for reform to address the recently exposed deficiencies. In his report to the Congress of People's Deputies of May 1989, Gorbachev reiterated his criticism of past procedures and policy and laid the foundation for the next stage of glasnost in practice:

> In the past...arbitrary actions were carried out that caused serious harm to the country and had a negative impact on its international prestige. This was the consequence of the same command-based system and the secretive decision-making that was characteristic of it. One of the important tasks of the perestroika of our political system is to exclude such systems and methods. In the future, all significant foreign policy decisions should be adopted only after they have been thoroughly discussed in the Supreme Soviet and its commissions, while the most major ones...should also be submitted for consideration to the Congress of People's Deputies."[47]

Gorbachev's prescription here is striking, for it suggests a complete inversion of the inherent logic of prior decision making procedures in Soviet foreign policy. That is, whereas in the past, the most important decisions were always the most secretively made, the logic of glasnost and perestroika insisted instead that it was precisely these crucial decisions that were most in need of careful democratic deliberation.

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[47]M.S. Gorbachev, Report to the Congress of People's Deputies, published in Izvestiia, 31 May 1989.

At the height of the Gorbachev reforms, the Shevardnadze-Gorbachev alliance pursued not only the transformation of the traditional institutions of diplomatic policy, but also actively promoted the incorporation of new voices in the larger foreign policy process. Dissenting voices from without as well as from within the Party-State apparatus seem, for the most part, not only to have been tolerated, but encouraged. Moreover, under Gorbachev, for the first time, the socialist equivalent of foreign policy academics served on the Politburo, the traditional summit of Party power, as well as in the nascent democratic structures that perestroika has produced.[48] Gorbachev also recruited a number of his most prominent personal advisors from the ranks of the Academy.[49]

In addition to the emergence of what had, for a while, begun to approximate an elite opinion industry, the voice of mass opinion on foreign policy matters was also officially

[48]For example, Yevgeny Primakov, the former director of IMEMO, was appointed a candidate member of the Politburo in September 1989, having been elected four months prior to the position of Chairman of the USSR Council of the Union, the new second chamber of the Soviet parliament. Aleksandr Yakovlev, exiled as Ambassador to Canada under Brezhnev and also Director of IMEMO under Andropov, became a full member of the Politburo in June of 1987. Though the Gorbachev reforms steadily eroded the Politburo's power, this career path from research institute to Politburo membership was still, I believe, unprecedented.

[49]For example, Leonid Albalkin, Tatyana Zaslavskaya, Yevgeny Ambartsumov, Nikolai Shmelov, and Abel Aganbegyan. Most of these intellectuals have since defected from the Gorbachev camp. See David Remnick, "Former Supporters Lead Opposition to Gorbachev," Washington Post, March 28, 1991, p. A25.

encouraged. Shevardnadze has cited the involvement of all the people in the formulation of foreign policy as an "urgent necessity." The liberation of the mass media from the grip of the Party censors was a critical prerequisite for pursuing this end. As Vadim Medvedev has delineated, "as soon as rigid ideological diktat and authoritarian-edict methods of running the mass media were eradicated, an entirely new moral and psychological atmosphere began to emerge."[50] In a bizarre twist, even KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov had encouraged the mass media to report more on foreign policy.[51] Obviously, these were all fragile developments. The point here is that the original agenda for reform included measures to enhance both the quality and the quantity of participation in the foreign policy process, and was an unprecedented departure from past practice.

All of the above is certainly not meant to suggest that the radical reforms of foreign policymaking processes did not encounter substantial resistance. Throughout, as one taboo after another fell, grumbling about the pace and scope of change intensified. After Shevardnadze's extraordinary July 1988 speech had spelled out in no

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[50]Interview in Pravda, 29 June 1990, p. 2.

[51]See Kryuchkov's speech on the anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, published in Pravda, 5 November 1989. While ensuring the mass media that all restrictions on foreign policy coverage had been removed, however, Kryuchkov at the same time attacked liberal journalists for "falsifying the truth" about the Soviet past.

uncertain terms the ultimate aspirations of the reforming forces, an indignant Yegor Ligachev, Politburo point man for the conservative forces, could no longer contain himself. Speaking in Gorky a week after Shevardnadze, Ligachev upheld that linchpin of old thinking, the notion of peaceful coexistence as a specific form of class struggle, asserting that "we proceed from the class nature of international relations. Any other way of posing the question only introduces confusion into the consciousness of the Soviet people and our friends abroad."[52] With this shot, the battle that had previously been waged only behind closed doors now stood in full public view. Yakovlev quickly joined the public fray a week later with two speeches championing "common human interests," a not so covert swipe at the recent Ligachev pronouncement.[53]

The historic events of September 1988 revealed the winner in this particular battle, though the war over the future course of Soviet foreign policy, to be sure, was far from over. At Gorbachev's behest, a special emergency

[52]Moscow Television Service, 5 August 1988. Transcript in FBIS-SOV, 8 August 1988, pp. 42-43. Perhaps interestingly, the Pravda text of the Ligachev speech was heavily edited, though the portion quoted here may be found in its version. See Pravda, 6 August 1988. Ligachev is serious; his recently published memoirs lament the loss of Eastern Europe, and openly call for the abandonment of new thinking and a return to the principle of class struggle in Soviet foreign policy. There was open friction between Shevardnadze and Ligachev at the CC Plenum in February 1990. See the transcript of the proceedings in Pravda, 8 February 1990, p. 3.

[53]See Pravda, 11 and 13 August 1988, p. 2 (for both).

meeting of the Central Committee on 30 September 1988 engineered a dramatic reorganization of the CC apparatus and sweeping changes in Party personnel. The net result was a relative demotion for Ligachev, who was assigned the horrific agriculture portfolio and stripped of his responsibilities as Secretary for Ideology. Vadim Medvedev, who skipped the candidate stage to become a full member of the Politburo, replaced Ligachev as head of the newly created Ideology Commission[54], devoted a good portion of his inaugural speech to a rebuttal of Ligachev's class struggle approach to Soviet foreign policy.[55] The architect of glasnost, Aleksandr Yakovlev, was appointed to head the CC Commission on International Policy, a new entity whose powers transcended the authority of the old International Department.[56] Finally, the special CC session was followed a day later by an emergency meeting of the Supreme Soviet, which unanimously elected General Secretary Gorbachev Chair

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[54]The reorganization of the Central Committee Secretariat created six new Commissions to replace the twenty-two former CC departments.

[55]See Pravda, 5 October 1988.

[56]More will be said below on the emasculation of the International Department. For the composition of the newly created International Policy Commission, see Vernon Aspaturian, "The Role of the International Department in the Soviet Foreign Policy Process," in The ID of the CC CPSU, pp. 33-4.

of the Supreme Soviet (President).[57] A little more than two months later, in his fateful UN speech, Gorbachev dramatically reaffirmed the new course in Soviet foreign policy.[58]

These factors, coupled with yet another critical Politburo reshuffle in September 1989[59], combined in the months that followed to make the proponents of new thinking ascendant at the most critical of moments. In this fortuitous way, the escalating war of ideas and of egos coalesced to set the stage for the spectacular emancipation of millions.

International Economic Policy, 1986-90

The agenda for Soviet foreign trade policy under Gorbachev was shaped by a fundamental reevaluation of the origins of the Soviet Union's economic woes. Whereas Stalin, and for that matter, even Khrushchev, had both ultimately blamed the West's hostile policies for the Soviet Union's economic shortcomings, Gorbachev renounced this

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[57]To trace the trajectory of the development of the presidency under Gorbachev is beyond the scope of our analysis; what is important for our purposes is that Gorbachev retained the position of president throughout the ongoing metamorphosis of the office itself. Over time, as the reader is no doubt aware, the presidency has been strengthened to the point where many warn of impending dictatorship.

[58]The speech was published both in Pravda and Izvestiia, 8 December 1988, pp. 1-2.

[59]For details, see Michael Dobbs, "Politburo Reshuffle Bolsters Gorbachev," Boston Globe, p. 1.

tired explanation and instead pointed directly at the atavistic command-style Stalinist economic system as the primary source of the USSR's economic woes. Not only did the command economy retard economic development, the Soviet President argued, but in an increasingly interdependent world, it also constitutes a threat to national security. Gorbachev perhaps best summarized this reassessment when he told a Central Committee gathering in May 1986 that "We [the Soviet Union] are encircled not by invincible armies but by superior economies."[60]

From the perspective of international economic policy, then, Gorbachev's plan for jumpstarting the Soviet economy had two broad objectives. First, the Stalinist system had to be dismantled and the Soviet Union integrated into the world economy. Second, Soviet foreign policy, instead of undermining the quest for prosperity, had to be recast in a form in which it might actively promote the nation's economic betterment. For Gorbachev, the tasks of foreign policy and of economic policy, both domestic and international, were therefore, more than ever, of necessity interrelated; in light of this, Soviet foreign policy should "create the best possible foreign conditions for accelerating the socioeconomic development of Soviet

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[60]Quoted in Dusko Doder and Louise Branson, Gorbachev: Heretic in the Kremlin (New York: Viking Press), p. 207.

society."[61] Shevardnadze has elucidated this point in the following fashion:

> The time has come, so to speak, to economize our foreign policy, if such an expression is permissible, since until it is linked wholly with the economy, it will be unable to help in the restructuring of our domestic economy and of society as a whole...In its day to day operations, comrades, the whole diplomatic apparatus cannot for a minute lose sight of the national-economic interests of the country and should constantly remember that the most important function of our foreign policy is to create the optimal conditions for the economic and social development of our country."[62]

New political thinking, therefore, was both a product of and a prescription for the Soviet Union's economic crisis. To be sure, the notion that foreign economic policy should serve the domestic imperative of the moment was nothing new for the minions of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Both Khrushchev and Stalin, as we saw in previous chapters, pursued an import strategy that followed directly from domestic needs. But it was the scope and nature of the Gorbachev agenda for changing old foreign trade practices that broke radically with the past.

The example of import policies under Gorbachev is instructive. Gorbachev, like Khrushchev and Stalin before him, targeted certain goods as being particularly desirable

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[61]See M.S. Gorbachev, speech delivered at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in May 1986, published in Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del, no. 1, 1987, pp. 4-6.

[62]See E. A. Shevardnadze, speech on 4 July 1987, in Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del, no. 3, 10 September 1987, pp. 3-6. FBIS-SOV, 30 October 1987, pp. 50-2.

for import. The definition of the desirable has shifted over the course of Gorbachev's tenure in power - first the usual heavy industry items were in favor, then, as the economic situation worsened, consumer goods became the predominant concern for Soviet planners. The major shift in Soviet import strategy became apparent in mid-1988, when for the first time consumer goods were deemed a top priority item.[63] In conjunction with this change in priorities, the Soviet Union negotiated a DM three billion line of credit with an association of West German banks, which was earmarked for the purchase of consumer goods for import.[64]

Yet rather than simply ordering trade in the targeted items from above, Gorbachev instead decentralized foreign trade in relevant sectors. By way of example, in a summer 1987 speech, Gorbachev passionately designated machine tool building as a top priority in Soviet economic development, "the holy of all holies." Organizations and enterprises in the manufacturing, engineering and machine tools sectors

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[63]On the shift in import strategy, see the governmental decrees in Izvestiia, 21, 23 and 24 August 1988.

[64]Carl H. McMillan, "Strategy or Tactics: Recent Initiatives in Soviet Foreign Economic Policy," in Reiner Weichhardt, ed., Soviet Economic Reforms: Implementation Under Way [Les reformes economiques en URSS: la mise en oeuvre] (Brussels: NATO, 1989), p. 149.

were subsequently among the first to be granted the legal right to conduct their own foreign trade.[65]

Put another way, where Khrushchev and Stalin would have planned, Gorbachev selectively decentralized. But the fact that the Soviet leadership still thought in terms of targeting important items for import in the first place, rather than relinquishing their control and allowing market forces to determine what the critical goods and services were, reflects the fundamental contradictions inherent in the very notion of injecting market forces into a centrally planned economy, and, more generally, in the idea of liberalization from above.

Undaunted by this obstacle, Gorbachev's perestroika of Soviet foreign economic policy was launched with a change in leadership at the Ministry of Foreign Trade. In October 1985, Nikolai Patolichev, a Khrushchev appointee who had quietly served as foreign trade minister for twenty seven years and who was as much a fixture at the MFT as Gromyko had been at the MFA, was replaced by Boris Aristov. Aristov had, since 1978, been the Soviet Union's ambassador to Poland. A career Party man, with no formal ties to the existing trade bureaucracy, he was hence ideally suited for

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[65]Hertha W. Heiss, "US-Soviet Trade Trends," in Gorbachev's Economic Plans: study papers submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1987), vol. 2, p. 466; Daniel Thorniley, "Reforming the Soviet Foreign Trade Structure and Adapting to Change," in Reiner Weichhardt, ed., op. cit. (1989), p. 162, 172-3.

the task of implementing radical change at the MFT. In two years, half of the Brezhnev era deputy foreign trade ministers had been replaced.[66]

The sweeping personnel changes at the Ministry of Foreign Trade were reinforced and accompanied by a correspondingly radical series of institutional reforms, which restructured both the MFT itself as well as the process by which foreign trade policy had traditionally been formulated. In August 1986, a new State Foreign Economic Commission[67] was established to formulate and coordinate foreign trade reform strategy; it also served as something of a counterweight to the MFT's monopoly on the management of international economic relations. Shortly thereafter in January 1988, with Gorbachev's domestic economic reforms in full swing, both the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations were first abolished and then reorganized under a new name as the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, which retained broad regulatory powers over foreign economic interaction. The new Ministry was presumably to work under the supervision of the earlier creation of the Gorbachev reforms, the State

[66]Zhores Medvedev, Gorbachev (New York: W.W. Norton, 1986), p. 231; Joan F. McIntyre, "Soviet Efforts to Revamp the Foreign Trade Sector," in Gorbachev's Economic Plans: study papers submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1987), vol. 2, p. 497.

[67]The State Foreign Economic Commission is sometimes translated as the State Commission on Foreign Economic Relations.

Foreign Economic Commission.[68] Concurrently, the USSR Bank for Foreign Trade regrouped as the USSR Bank for Foreign Economic Relations.[69] Thus, somewhat ironically, once the Ministry of Foreign Trade had been purged of old thinkers, subsequent institutional reforms eroded its prior monolithic control of the administration of foreign trade.

The dizzying purge and reorganization of these long-standing institutions of Soviet foreign economic policy were but the external manifestations of an overarching plan for transforming what Shevardnadze has called "the foreign economic mechanism." In his first address to the Supreme Soviet in October 1989, Shevardnadze lamented the still inefficient foreign economic mechanism, insisting that the MFA was in need of further perestroika in this area, and must work harder to promote the goals of Soviet foreign economic policy.[70] And how was Soviet diplomacy to promote such? According to Gorbachev, Soviet foreign policy had work to "clear the way for broader economic cooperation with

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[68]The longstanding State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations should not be confused with the State Foreign Economic Commission, which was, as discussed above, a 1986 creation of the Gorbachev reforms. The old State Committee had traditionally dealt with economic and technical assistance to foreign countries.

[69]For this paragraph, see M.M. Boguslavsky and P.S. Smirnov, The Reorganization of Soviet Foreign Trade (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1989), p. ix; and Ivan D. Ivanov, "Restructuring the Mechanism of Foreign Economic Relations in the USSR," Soviet Economy, vol. 3, no. 3, July-September 1987, pp. 197-202. See also Pravda, 17 January 1988.

[70]Speech published in both Pravda and Izvestiia, 24 October 1989.

the outside world and for the country to join in world economic processes." In turn, Soviet foreign economic policy must make a radical break with the past, "enabling the USSR to become a full participant in the international division of labour."[71] To recast the foreign economic mechanism, then, requires the involvement of both diplomatic and international economic policy.

The task sketched out by Shevardnadze and Gorbachev, was and is indisputably a formidable one, for the basic structure and administration of the Soviet Union external economic relations had not been altered since their establishment by Stalin in 1930.[72] Despite the unchanging monolithic nature of the foreign trade policy process, or, using Soviet language, the foreign economic mechanism, the Soviet Union's economic involvement with the external world,

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[71]M.S. Gorbachev, speech to the Kiev workers, published in Krasnaiia Zvezda, 24 February 1989, and reprinted in an appendix to Sylvia Woodby, Gorbachev and the Decline of Ideology in Soviet Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), document 10, p. 117.

[72]M.M. Boguslavsky and P.S. Smirnov, The Reorganization of Soviet Foreign Trade (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1989), p. 12.

as we have seen, steadily increased over time.[73] Unfortunately, fundamental structural deficiencies inherent in the Stalinist foreign economic mechanism were only exacerbated as the volume of trade increased while the basic system remained intact.

In the language of economists, there have been - and still are - two principal weaknesses in the structure of Soviet foreign trade.[74] First, the Soviet Union has been unable to translate industrial achievement into an "appropriate export structure." In layman's language, this means that other countries do not want Soviet goods, with the exception of its weaponry. Second, the Soviet Union has failed to import the world's technological advances; that is, no one wants to sell anything they'd want to have to the USSR. The latter shortcoming was a task for new political thinking and Soviet diplomats, the former for quixotic Soviet economic reformers.

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[73]For figures on the steady expansion of Soviet economic activity, see Ivan D. Ivanov, "Restructuring the Mechanism of Foreign Economic Relations in the USSR," Soviet Economy, vol. 3, no. 3, July-September 1987, pp. 193-4, and Stephen White, Gorbachev in Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 150-1. Ivan D. Ivanov is Deputy Chairman of the State Commission on Foreign Economic Relations, and probably Yakovlev's point man for foreign trade reform, having served as deputy director of IMEMO under Yakovlev from September 1983 to July 1985. Jerry F. Hough, Opening Up the Soviet Economy (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1988), p. 62.

[74]Carl H. McMillan, "Gorbachev's Foreign Economic Policy," in Carl G. Jacobsen, ed., op. cit. (1989), pp. 89-90.

Assessing the impact that the Gorbachev reforms had on Soviet foreign economic policy is a tortuous process, largely because the gap between legislation and reality was and is so enormous; just as has always been the case, the picture we can paint of how the new system was supposed to operate and that of how it actually functioned bear little resemblance ono to the other. For the purposes of clarity, here we will first trace the path of attempted reform of the foreign economic mechanism before turning to a discussion of the overwhelming obstacles that these reforms encountered.

The program adopted by the 27th Party Congress in February 1986, in its emphasis on the urgent need for expanding Soviet foreign trade, laid the groundwork for reform. Following its lead, in August 1986, the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers passed a joint resolution "On Measures to Improve the Management of Foreign Economic Relations," whose stress on reforming administration - the traditional approach to improving foreign trade had basically focused on exhorting central planners to select the optimal goods for export and import - itself was something of an innovation. This resolution created the State Foreign Economic Commission, discussed above, and promulgated a set of reforms designed to promote imports of technology and market expertise, in order to

boost Soviet exports (and hence hard currency reserves) and eventually to reduce the need for Western imports.[75]

In its ultimate aims, this agenda was nothing new, but the means by which these old goals were to be achieved were an innovation in at least two ways. First, the 1986 reforms chipped away at the MFT's monopoly on foreign trade administration by providing authority, as of the beginning of 1987, for 100 industrial ministries, production associations, and enterprises to conduct their own foreign trade. This meant that the Ministry of Foreign Trade had to relinquish its longstanding control over a number of foreign trade organizations (commonly referred to as FTOs).[76] Second, soon after the arrival of the effective date of the August decree (1.1.87), the Soviet leadership, in an unprecedented move, also legalized joint ventures with

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[75]The text of the 1986 resolution, as well as the text of its counterpart "On Measures to Improve the Management of economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation with the Socialist Countries," were published in Pravda, 24 September 1986.

[76]By the end of 1988, the Ministry's FTOs were responsible for only 40% of Soviet imports, down from upwards of 95%. See Daniel Thorniley in "Reforming the Soviet Foreign Trade Structure and Adapting to Change," in Reiner Weichhardt, ed., op. cit. (1989), p. 161.

foreign entities on Soviet soil, with up to 49% foreign ownership.[77]

Simply permitting joint ventures, however, was not enough to attract Western investment. The process by which a desired joint project actually could become an official and legal entity was a cumbersome and complicated one, each step of the journey involving confrontation with a new layer of the state bureaucracy. Moreover, once a joint project had cleared the hurdle of official sanction, the terms of operation were far from appealing. Profits were to be taxed heavily, and there were draconian restrictions on the repatriation of profits net of tax. Additionally, the chairman of the board and general director of each joint venture were required by law to be Soviet citizens, a pool from which few were skilled in the art of capitalist interaction. The joint ventures were also to employ primarily Soviet citizens and were bound by existing Soviet labor law. Needless to say, the Soviet Union's initial

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[77]Hertha Heiss, "US-Soviet Trade Plans," in Gorbachev's Economic Plans: study papers submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1987), vol. 2, pp. 465-6; Ed Hewett, "The New Soviet Approach to Economic Relations with the West - An Overview," Tokyo Club Papers, no. 4, part 1, 1991, pp. 18-19.

opening did not attract a flurry of interested Western partners.[78]

A landmark decree issued in December 1988 took the twin tasks of decentralizing foreign trade and promoting Western investment in the Soviet Union a step further, at least on paper. The December 1988 decree extended foreign trade rights to all Soviet enterprises, cooperatives, and associations, who as of spring 1989 could create their own foreign trade organizations through a comparatively simple licensing procedure. As an additional incentive, successful exporters were now to be granted access to Western consumer goods, reflecting the mid-1988 shift in Soviet import strategy discussed above.[79]

However, the newly liberated Soviet entities, while being encouraged to pursue foreign trade, at the same time were explicitly forbidden to engage in any barter activities; i.e., a Soviet enterprise could buy only what it would directly use in production and sell what it had produced, placing severe limitations on the potential for

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[78]Ed Hewett, ibid., pp. 21-2; Douglas Nigh, Peter Walters, and James A. Kuhlman, "US-USSR Joint Ventures: An Examination of the Early Entrants," The Columbia Journal of World Business, Vol. 25, no. 4, Winter 1990, p. 21. See the latter, pp. 21-7, for further information on the progress of joint venture development in the Soviet Union prior to the recent crackdown.

[79]The text of the 2 December 1988 decree was published in Izvestiia, 11 December 1988.

releasing any genuine market forces.[80] The December proclamation also laid the groundwork for the devaluation of the ruble, currency auctions, a new tariff system, and finally, vaguely sanctioned the concept of special economic zones, in which, presumably, none of the above would apply.[81]

On the joint venture front, the December 1988 decree made major concessions to the already disgruntled pioneers of Western involvement in the Soviet economy. Effective January 1, 1989, it abolished the maximum 49% foreign ownership stipulation; theoretically, foreign partners could now hold up to a 99% share in a given joint venture. The decree also did away with the requirement that a Soviet citizen be at the jointly held enterprise's helm, with a foreigner now being an acceptable director of a Soviet based joint venture. Finally, joint ventures were no longer subject to Soviet labor laws, meaning that they, unlike any other Soviet economic entity, could hire and fire as they

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[80]Marie Lavigne, "Prospects for Soviet Trade Reform," in Susan L. Clark, ed., Gorbachev's Agenda: Changes in Soviet Domestic and Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), p. 132. In the absence of special permission from the new Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the restriction also applied to joint ventures.

[81]Carl H. McMillan, "Gorbachev's Foreign Economic Policy," in Carl G. Jacobsen, ed., op. cit. (1989), p. 154.

saw fit, and pay what they deemed appropriate.[82] In sum, the aspects of the December 1988 decree that dealt with joint ventures revealed a belief, on the part of Soviet economic reformers, that it was possible for joint ventures to flourish as little islands of liberalization in a sea of central planning, that planning and market elements could somehow schizophrenically coexist without exerting any real negative influence on one another.[83]

The specific substance of the December 1988 decree has been examined here at length, because it, in many ways, reflects the contradictions that have been a constant presence in the general agenda for economic reform under Gorbachev. While the reforms that were intended to address the foreign economic mechanism, at one level, indeed produced radical departures from the past - the very idea of a McDonalds or Pizza Hut operating in Moscow in the Brezhnev

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[82]Izvestiia, 11 December 1988. In the fall of 1990, a presidential decree would explicitly authorize the establishment of 100% foreign owned companies on Soviet soil. See Jeffrey M. Hertzfeld, "Joint Ventures: Saving the Soviets from Perestroika," Harvard Business Review, vol. 69, no. 1, p. 85.

[83]The Law on Cooperation in the USSR of July 1988 had contained similar schizophrenic aspirations. It provided for "equal coexistence" of the state and cooperative sectors, while mandating that this intended liberalization was to take place under the "leading role" of state ownership. Hence, cooperatives were permitted to engage in foreign trade, hire contract labor, even issue stocks - all this, however, within the confines of a centrally planned economy. See Peter Havlik, "Soviet Perestroika and Foreign Trade," in Michael Friedlander, ed., Foreign Trade in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 8-9.

years, even at detente's zenith would have been simply unthinkable - at another level, these new practices still had to struggle for survival within an overarching structure that was centrally planned and a perpetuation of past economic processes.[84]

Put another way, the reforms attempted to promote a new market culture, encouraging Soviet citizens to think like capitalists - not as a replacement for the existing ethos of top-down planning, but presumably as a catalyst for the creation of a new socialist economic culture, one which would be neither communist nor capitalist, but would instead retain the best features of both. In this way, beneath a surface appearance of new-found pragmatism in Soviet economic policy always lurked more than a trace of an enduring utopian element. What the reigning schizophrenia in the theoretical underpinnings of Gorbachev's economic reforms meant in practice was that emerging market forces had daily to do battle with a formidable array of atavistic adversaries.

The net result of the attempts at partial reform has been a spiraling economic crisis, one which quickly unravelled the unlikely coalition for change that existed at the onset of the Gorbachev era. Conservative and liberal,

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[84]For a perceptive Soviet analysis of why the foreign economic reforms produced such disappointing results, one which concurs with a number of the points made here, see Vladimir Kuznetsov, "Foreign Economic Reform: Expectations v. Reality," Moscow News, no. 51, 1989, pp. 8-9.

Party and Military alike were able to unite behind the cause of reform while its consequences still only existed in the realm of theory, but several years of worsening conditions sent both that fragile coalition's constituent elements and the Soviet people scrambling to defensive positions. The polarization of the once united elite and the individual struggle for survival of the neglected Soviet citizen combined to render impotent even those small accomplishments of past foreign economic reforms. Economic hardship revived a longstanding tradition of resentment of profiteers. Both the KGB and the Soviet people vented their frustration on the new Soviet businessmen, those few who had successfully exploited the window of opportunity that the reforms had provided.[85] The victims of retrenchment were, in many cases, the very middle men who had been tasked to grease the wheels of the new foreign economic mechanism.

Transnational Policy, 1986-90

Though the whole world witnessed its waning moments in the dramatic events of the fall of 1989, the official death of socialist internationalism took place quietly, with little fanfare. With its June 1990 issue, the Prague-based journal of the international communist movement, World

[85]On the KGB crackdown, see, for example, Esther Fein, "Millionaire's Bad Fortune: Why is K.G.B. Calling?", New York Times, March 5, 1991, p. A3. On mass hostility toward the new entrepreneurs and the very notion of entrepreneurship, see Anthony Jones and William Moskoff, "New Cooperatives in the USSR," Problems of Communism, November-December 1989, pp. 32-5.

Marxist Review (Problems of Peace and Socialism), which in 1988 had claimed publication in 41 languages and distribution in 145 countries, ceased publication. At what was to be the journal's last international conference in April 1988, Anatolii Dobrynin, then head of the Soviet International Department, had warned his comrades that Communists had severely misread the times and must now adjust accordingly. The new-found glasnost in its pages and a change to a new and glossier format that followed, however, were still no match for 1989's events. Shortly thereafter, the last institutional manifestation of communist internationalism was liquidated by its one-time vanguard.[86]

The tenets of new political thinking had perhaps their most radical implications in the realm of Soviet transnational policy. The assertion of the priority of universal human values over the imperatives of the class struggle deprived an already fragmented working class movement of its raison d'etre. As such, the ideological innovations of the Gorbachev era, at least in the realm of theory, should be distinguished from the tactical maneuvers of the past, for they challenged the very core of Marxist-Leninist teleology; when international cooperation replaces class struggle as the guiding principle of international

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[86]See Kevin Devlin, "International Communist Journal Closing Down," Radio Free Europe: Report on Eastern Europe, June 1, 1990, pp. 51-5.

interaction, rather than being perceived as a clandestine manifestation of such, the meaning of Soviet internationalism, in turn, has undergone a related transformation. Thus, instead of the Comintern or non-aligned movement, there was the United Nations; instead of the utopianism of world revolution, there was instead the utopianism of a world ruled by international law.[87] In the words of Eduard Shevardnadze,

> "The interrelationship of events in an interdependent world increasingly compels us to delegate some national prerogatives to an international organization...From states of law to a world of law - such is the logic of the movement."[88]

The distance between a conclusion of this sort and the notion of the Soviet Union as vanguard of world revolution is obviously immense.

In Perestroika, Gorbachev and his team of writers had originally attempted to salvage the notion of communist internationalism through a radical redefinition of the world movement's agenda, insisting that for new thinkers, "communist internationalism" was synonymous with "promoting universal human values."[89] The semantic sleight of hand was

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[87]See, for example, Gorbachev's article in Pravda, 17 September 1987, pp. 1-2.

[88]Eduard A. Shevardnadze, Address to the 43rd UN General Assembly, 27 September 1988, published in Pravda, 28 September 1988, p. 4.

[89]M.S. Gorbachev, op. cit. (1988), p. 174.

a feeble attempt to cloak in comfortable rhetoric what in reality amounted to an ideological revolution.

Little time passed before the past policies of communist internationalism were under open attack. In his July 1988 speech at the MFA, Shevardnadze attributed past errors in Soviet foreign policy to "distorted" principles of internationalism, which had led to an erosion of diplomacy's leading role.[90] Valentin Falin, the current head of the International Department, joined the chorus by denouncing, in no uncertain terms, the domestic example set by the onetime vanguard of the revolutionary movement:

> "The policy of leveling that we have made so far was not the philosophy of Lenin's October Revolution. Leveling by producing equality in poverty is not socialism."[91]

The reassessment of communist internationalism had immediate implications for the staff and structure of the International Department, which had been the main guardian of the faith since the Comintern's demise. The 27th Party Congress in 1986 began by approving the appointment of Anatolii Dobrynin to replace a veritable institution of traditional internationalism, Boris Ponomarev. Ponomarev, the reader will recall, was a Stalin appointee, who had been

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[90]Eduard Shevardnadze, Speech at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 July 1988, published in Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del, no. 15, 15 August 1988, p. 32.

[91]Interview with Valentin Falin, Neue Kronen-Zeitung (Vienna), 30 June 1989, p. 4. FBIS-SOV, 12 July 1990, p. 100.

the head of the International Department since its inception. He had been a committed believer in the importance of an activist third world policy.[92] Vigorous internationalist activity seems to have kept Ponomarev healthy; he was over 80 when he was finally pried from his position.

Having spent the bulk of his Party career abroad, first in New York as UN undersecretary general (1957-60) and then in Washington as Ambassador to the United States (1962-86), Dobrynin was an unconventional choice for Ponomarev's replacement.[93] Americanists typically were not commonplace at the International Department. Yet a concurrent top-level appointment, that of Georgii Korniyenko as first deputy chief of the ID and of Lt. General Viktor Starodubov as head of a new ID sector that was to deal with arms control issues reflected a similar trend. Both men had considerable experience in American affairs and arms control matters, Kornienko having served as a deputy to Dobrynin in Washington, Starodubov having been the principal military advisor to the START negotiations.[94]

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[92]Galia Golan, The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements in the Third World (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1988).

[93]For more complete information on Dobrynin's career path, see Alexander Rahr, "Appendix: Biographies of the Soviet Party Elite," in David Lane, ed., Elites and Political Power in the USSR (Aldershot, England: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1988), p. 88.

[94]Philip Taubman, "Soviet Diplomacy Given a New Look Under Gorbachev," New York Times, August 10, 1986.

A wave of replacements at lower levels of the Department followed on the heels of Dobrynin's appointment. Many of the old guard Party functionaries were swept out of their positions and replaced by experienced diplomatic specialists reassigned from the Foreign Ministry. Over the course of the next two years, sixteen (out of twenty) ID department heads were replaced; as of July 1988, only four department heads were holdovers from the Brezhnev era.[95] In general, the 1986 changes in personnel and those that followed subsequently seemed to suggest a concern that International Department policy be henceforth pursued in the context of the US-Soviet relationship, rather than in autonomous fashion, as had been the case with detente.[96] The addition of an arms control sector in the very department that in the past had, through its supervision of Soviet military aid to the third world, contributed to the proliferation of weaponry would also seem to reflect this new concern.[97]

Dobrynin's stint as Chief of a revitalized International Department was to be short lived. The massive

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[95]Vernon Aspaturian, "The Role of the International Department in the Soviet Foreign Policy Process," in The ID of the CC CPSU, pp. 21 and 35.

[96]Wallace Spaulding, "Shifts in CPSU ID," Problems of Communism, July-August 1986, pp. 80-6.

[97]On the creation and staffing of the new arms control sector and the implications thereof, see Mark Kramer, "The New Role of the CPSU International Department in Soviet Foreign Relations and Arms Control Policy," in The ID of the CC CPSU, pp. 48-9.

Central Committee shakeup of September 1988, which followed on the heels of Shevardnadze's landmark critique in July of past Soviet foreign policy processes, sent Dobrynin into temporary retirement. The Plenum, however, sent Gromyko into permanent retirement; he was relieved of his duties as Politburo member and as President of the Supreme Soviet, paving the way for Gorbachev's assumption of the Presidency.[98] Dobrynin, who would later be reinstated as one of Gorbachev's personal advisors, was replaced by Valentin Falin, a specialist on Germany, who had been Moscow's ambassador to Bonn in the early 1970s and had dealt extensively with the West over the course of his career.[99]

Falin assumed leadership of a department whose precise responsibilities were no longer immediately obvious, as the entire Central Committee apparatus had been concurrently restructured in September 1988. The number of Central Committee departments shrunk from twenty to nine, and in addition, six new Central Committee Commissions were established, including a new institution of foreign policy, the International Policy Commission, which was to be headed by Aleksandr Yakovlev. As if the leadership had some sort of premonition that its presence would soon be, for all practical purposes, superfluous, the Department for Liaison

[98]TASS, 30 September 1988. FBIS-SOV, 30 September 1988, p. 29.

[99]David E. Albright, "The CPSU International Department and the Third World in the Gorbachev Era," in The ID of the CC CPSU, p. 149.

with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, whose jurisdiction had been relations with ruling communist parties, was absorbed by the restructured International Department.[100] The new amalgamation would have less power than the sum of its previous constituent parts, for the revamped International Department would now be subordinate to the newly formed International Policy Commission, although Falin was made a member of Yakovlev's Commission.

The massive reorganization did more than diminish the stature of the International Department; it also effectively neutralized the influence of Ligachev and his like-minded compatriots on Soviet foreign policy. In the reshuffle, Ligachev lost his responsibility for the ideology portfolio, which was now to be the turf of new thinker Vadim Medvedev, and was instead selected to head the new Agrarian Policy Commission, an unattractive assignment, given the disastrous state of Soviet agriculture. From the perspective of the future of Soviet transnational policy, with Yakovlev at the helm of the International Policy Commission and Medvedev leading the Ideology Commission, both being outspoken supporters of new thinking, the September Plenum was a significant defeat for the tenacious advocates of a class-based approach to international affairs. The simultaneous downgrading of the International Department was also a

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[100]The revamped ID also took over the responsibilities of the defunct Cadres Abroad Department. See Mark Kramer, "The New Role of the CPSU International Department in Soviet Foreign Relations and Arms Control Policy," in ibid., p. 44.

victory for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its ongoing turf battle with the International Department.

The September 1988 changes in foreign policy institutions and personnel, therefore, had a considerable impact on the transnational policymaking process. Under Brezhnev, the operations of the International Department and the Foreign Ministry were, for all practical purposes, compartmentalized, with detente being the concern of the latter and revolutionary activism in the third world the preoccupation of the former. Both institutions were supervised in their respective activities by the Politburo, who would routinely withhold information deemed unnecessary for the mere administrators of and collaborators in its policy. Thus, the Foreign Ministry often had little idea of what the International Department was doing and vice versa; the result was an effective "division of labor," with Gromyko's relative disinterest in the third world reinforcing the informational divide.[101] This compartmentalization of information surely made it easier for the sheer force of ideology to prevail over that of fact-based insight in the Brezhnev era foreign policy decision making process.

In contrast to the secretive scenario painted above, the eclectic membership of the Foreign Policy Commission encouraged cooperation and information sharing between

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[101]Arkady Shevchenko, comment in ibid., p. 142.

institutional components of the foreign policy process. Yakovlev's commission, as established, was comprised of twenty three disparate members, including V.A. Kryuchkov (the Head of the KGB), A.G. Kovalev (First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs), V.M. Nikoforov (Deputy Foreign Minister), Marshal A.K. Akhromeyev (former Chief of Staff and now a personal advisor to Gorbachev on military issues), E.M. Primakov (then director of IMEMO), G. A. Arbatov (Director of the USA Institute), the First Secretaries of four Union Republic Party organizations (interestingly, Armenia, Azerbaidzhan, Estonia and Uzbekistan), V.M. Falin (Head of the International Department), E.P. Velikhov (Vice President of the Academy of Sciences), and A.S. Chernyayev (Assistant to Gorbachev on foreign policy issues).[102]

The new International Policy Commission, according to Yakovlev, had an immediate transformative effect on the International Department, promoting unprecedented cooperation between the ID and MFA, as well as between the ID and a variety of new actors in the foreign policy process:

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[102]Vernon Aspaturian, "The Role of the International Department in the Soviet Foreign Policy Process," in ibid., pp. 33-4.

"The present International Department differs radically from its past form. It has been cut down drastically and the so-called visiting [vyyezdnaia] commission within it has been abolished. Within the framework of the new division of responsibility and the changed functions, it was necessary to establish appropriate contacts with the Congress of People's Deputies, the USSR Supreme Soviet and its committees and commissions, and state foreign policy departments. I think we have succeeded in the main. Close and fruitful cooperation exists with the USSR Foreign Ministry. There are of course, differences in the approaches to certain questions, and that is only natural. But the petty bureaucratic "tug-of-war," which only damaged the cause, has disappeared."[103]

Since the administration of the Soviet Union's internationalist agenda had previously been virtually the exclusive domain of the International Department, the changes in its status and in the general foreign policy process had implications for Soviet transnational policy outcomes. Under Gorbachev, these changes found expression both in the Soviet Union's policy toward the third world and in the Soviet approach to non-communist international organizations. By way of illustration, let us briefly examine the effect of the Gorbachev reforms on each of these areas in turn.

In the late Brezhnev years, the Soviet Union overtook the United States as the largest supplier of military goods and services to the third world, reflecting an increased interest in expanding Soviet influence in the developing

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[103]Interview with Aleksandr Yakovlev, published in Pravda, 23 June 1990, p. 5.

world.[104] Collaborating or supervising, depending upon one's interpretation of the Soviet-Cuban relationship, the Soviet Union intervened in a series of regional conflicts, from Angola to Cambodia, exploiting the gun-shy hesitation in Washington generated by the American withdrawal from Vietnam. The Soviet offensive culminated with the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.[105] When he assumed power, therefore, Gorbachev inherited a series of involvements of varying intensity on the Soviet Union's periphery, as well as a full scale war on his southern border.

The 1986 Party Program was an early indication that Soviet third world policy was undergoing serious reevaluation; whereas the third world and the Soviet Union's historic relationship to it were the subject of substantial discussion at the twenty sixth Party Congress in 1981, a loud silence on the subject prevailed at the subsequent Congress in 1986.[106] The silence was to be short-lived; by the fall of 1988, Shevardnadze was warning the Party

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[104]Mark Kramer, "Soviet Arms Transfers and Military Aid," in Kurt M. Campbell and S. Neil MacFarlane, Gorbachev's Third World Dilemmas (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 74 and 102-3.

[105]Bruce Porter, op. cit. (1984), pp. 26-35.

[106]For example, the 1986 Party Program mentioned the developing world only vaguely, and in the context of the US-Soviet relationship. Gorbachev's report to the 27th Party Congress contained only two paragraphs on the third world, compared with 38 paragraphs on the same topic in Brezhnev's 1981 report to the 26th Party Congress. Cited in Richard Sakwa, Gorbachev and his Reforms, 1985-90 (New York: Prentice Hall, 1990), p. 347.

organization at the MFA that the third world was an economic burden and that Soviet assistance to the developing world would have to fall.[107] Soon after figures that revealed the astronomical size of the country's national deficit (34 billion rubles) were released at the first Congress of People's Deputies the following summer, an open debate on the future of Soviet foreign aid programs was raging.[108] Prescriptions varied, but all views shared a growing awareness of the costs of global empire.[109]

While this debate intensified, the Soviet Union completed its phased withdrawal from Afghanistan, the last Soviet troops departing in February of 1989. The pullout initiated an outpouring of soul-searching analysis in the

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[107]See Eduard A. Shevardnadze, speech to the conference of the MFA Party Organization, 1 November 1988 in Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del, no. 22, 1 December 1988, pp. 12-17.

[108]See, for example, Andrei Kortunov in Moskovskie Novosti, no. 49, 1989, p. 6 (who analyzes the Soviet budget and concludes that the Soviet Union gives 25% of all its foreign assistance to Cuba); Boris Sergeyev in Ekonomika i zhizn', no. 12, March 1990, p. 6; Alexei Izyumov and Sergo Mikoyan, in response to Kortunov, in Moscow News, no. 7, 1990, p. 13.

[109]The deficit figures released at the Congress, according to one Soviet analyst's calculations, revealed that the Soviet Union had a 75% debt-service ratio (meaning 75% of Soviet hard currency income was spent on paying off its debt), compared with 44% for Brazil and 25%, on average, for most LDCs. See Boris Sergeyev, "Foreign Debt was a Big Secret," Moscow News, no. 51, 1989, p. 8. A Rand study in 1983 estimated that the costs of empire maintenance had, in 1980, risen from 0.9% - 1.4% in 1971 to 2.3% - 3.0% of Soviet GNP. See Charles Wolf, Jr., K.C. Yeh, E. Brunner, A. Gurwitz and Marilee Lawrence, The Costs of the Soviet Empire, the Rand Corporation, R-3073/1-NA, September 1983, p. 19.

Soviet press on the origins of the misguided decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan in the first place. Only a few individuals were alleged to have been involved in the decision to invade Afghanistan, all of them conveniently dead, but what is most interesting, for our purposes, is the fact that blame for the unfortunate venture was routinely assigned to the secretive and conspiratorial manner in which the decision was taken.[110]

It is important to remember, though it now seems almost implausible, that most Sovietologists had viewed a complete Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan as near impossible, since such an action smacked of roll-back and would effectively undermine the legitimacy of the totalitarian regime. Yet while the Soviet Union's exit from Afghanistan was the most dramatic evidence of an apparent reorientation in Soviet third world policy, the retreat from Afghanistan was also part of a larger pattern of retrenchment. In Cambodia, Angola, and Ethiopia, the foreign forces that had, with Soviet backing, propped up weak communist regimes in these countries were withdrawn.

[110]At the Congress of People's Deputies, Aleksandr Dzasokhov, acting chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee, asserted that only General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov, KGB Chair Yuri Andropov and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko were involved in the decision. TASS, 24 December 1989. FBIS-SOV, 26 December 1989, p. 35. For further information on the spate of glasnost revelations on the decision to invade Afghanistan and the difficulties of making sense of competing claims, see Cynthia Roberts, "Glasnost' in Soviet Foreign Policy: Setting the Record Straight?", Report on the USSR, December 12, 1989, pp. 4-8.

In Angola, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua, negotiations to end the longstanding state of civil war have been undertaken, again with Soviet approval. In a conspicuous reversal of past policy, the Soviet Union was suddenly wildly enthusiastic about the merits of UN Peacekeeping operations.

In similar unprecedented fashion, the Soviet Union under Gorbachev also engaged in an extensive effort to expand its involvement in international organizations. The USSR applied twice - one time in May 1986, unsuccessfully - for observer status in GATT, and in March 1990 finally had its application accepted. A broad agreement on economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and the European community was concluded, rather fortuitously, in November 1989. In addition, the following year, Moscow was admitted as a founding member of the newly created European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The Soviet Union also actively explored the possibility of IMF assistance, and in July 1990, at the Houston (G-7) summit, the leaders of the industrialized world commissioned a study of the Soviet Union's economic woes and the potential impact of various forms of Western assistance, to be conducted under the supervision of the IMF, thereby committing themselves, in principle, to supporting further Soviet reform.[111]

But perhaps most striking was the new-found Soviet interest in the United Nations and its agencies. The USSR's

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[111]Ed Hewett, op. cit. (1991), pp. 15-16.

past involvement with the UN had been characterized by a large discrepancy between Soviet rhetoric and what the Soviet Union actually did in practice. While the Soviet Union throughout the Brezhnev years claimed to be a leading progressive force at the UN, in reality, it simultaneously resisted most measures that would have endowed the UN with greater authority. At the UN, it lamented the plight of the third world, while contributing very little to UN assistance programs for less developed countries. Unlike Britain, France, China, and the United States, who were members in all fifteen of the UN's specialized agencies, in the early 1980s, the Soviet Union still belonged to only nine.[112]

In contrast, under Gorbachev, the nature of the Soviet Union's involvement at the United Nations underwent a significant transformation. First, in the realm of rhetoric, the manner in which the Soviet Union justified its policy changed dramatically. Instead of the imperatives of class struggle ruling the day, it was the demands of interdependence.[113] The November 1989 General Assembly on "Enhancing international peace, security and international cooperation in all its aspects in accordance with the

[112]Thomas G. Weiss and Meryl A. Kessler, "Moscow's UN Policy," Foreign Policy, no. 79, summer 1990, pp. 96-7.

[113]The interested reader can trace the transformation of Soviet UN policy through Shevardnadze's speeches to the General Assembly. See, for example, Shevardnadze's 1987, 1988 and 1989 speeches to the General Assembly, all published in Pravda, 24 September 1987, 28 September 1988, and 27 September 1989, respectively. Gorbachev's landmark 1988 UN speech was reprinted in Pravda, 8 December 1988.

Charter of the United Nations," co-sponsored by the United States and Soviet Union, was of great symbolic importance; it was the first such instance of collaboration between the two superpowers in the history of the UN.[114] Shevardnadze worked to seize the initiative in the environmental movement, the Soviet Union producing a series of creative proposals.[115] The USSR also supported the establishment, under UN auspices of a global register of arms sales and supplies.[116] Most significantly, the Soviet Union actively supported UN peacekeeping activities and endorsed UN operations in Afghanistan, Angola, Namibia, Central America, and on the Iran/Iraq border. The Soviets even moved to reduce their substantial debt to the UN for their share of past peacekeeping operations - which had been a real sore point - from $200 million to $125 million.[117]

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[114]Toby Trister Gati, "The UN Rediscovered: Soviet and American Policy in the United Nations of the 1990s," final draft of manuscript to be published in Robert Jervis and Seweryn Bialer, eds., Soviet-American Relations in the 1990s (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), p. 25.

[115]See Shevardnadze's article on the politics of ecology and the role of Soviet diplomacy in the environmental movement in Literaturnaia Gazeta, 22 November 1989, pp. 9-10.

[116]See Shevardnadze's letter to the UN Secretary General, published in Izvestiia, 16 August 1990, p. 4.

[117]Thomas Weiss and Meryl A. Kessler, op. cit., pp. 97-104. For a relatively early Gorbachev endorsement of UN-sponsored multilateral approaches to regional conflict resolution, see M.S. Gorbachev, "Realities and Guarantees for a Secure World," International Affairs, no. 11, 1987, pp. 3-10.

Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy has summarized the changes in Soviet transnational policy under Gorbachev:

> "Our approach to the United Nations and international organizations as a whole has changed appreciably. Today we proceed from the fact that the United Nations and its system of specialized institutions is not a propaganda machine, as we believed earlier, but a multilateral forum of interaction and cooperation created by the collective efforts of all states."[118]

In so doing, the theory and practice of socialist internationalism has been transformed beyond recognition.

Conclusion

If we are to take Gorbachev at his word, the original coalition for perestroika and new political thinking was forged on the shores of the Black Sea, at the resort of Pitsunda, in early 1985. Strolling by the water's edge with his visitor from Moscow, then first Party secretary of Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze, in a moment of rare communist candor, acknowledged, "Everything is rotten." Politburo member Gorbachev concurred, "We can no longer live like this."[119] Several short months later, Politburo member Gorbachev became General Secretary, and soon thereafter, in July 1985, Shevardnadze was his new foreign minister. And what had started as a shared understanding of the necessity

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[118]Interview with Deputy Foreign Minister V. Petrovskiy, Argumenty i fakty, no. 15, 14-20 April 1990, p. 4. FBIS-SOV, 18 April 1990, p. 5.

[119]Quoted in Suzanne Crow, "The Resignation of Shevardnadze," Report on the USSR, January 11, 1991, p. 6.

of change within the existing system rapidly took on the character of a revolutionary movement.

While past Soviet leaders had launched campaigns for radical change, Gorbachev pursued a familiar agenda in untraditional fashion. Like Khrushchev and Stalin, he mandated change from above; unlike his predecessors, he simultaneously promoted a revolution from below, his reform aspirations requiring a transformation of both elite and mass political culture.

Consequently, whereas Khrushchev had attempted to de-Stalinize the Soviet system while rooting his authority and leadership in the traditional Stalinist mechanics of power, Gorbachev hijacked Khrushchev's agenda, yet instead based his authority on a careful blend of both Stalinist and, for lack of a better word, quasi-democratic legitimating mechanisms. Hence, Gorbachev continued to head the Party, yet needed the endorsement of the Parliament. Establishing his power through massive purges, he seems to have done so in the name of forging a new system in which periodic purges from on high need no longer be the sole source of change.

In similar fashion, new political thinking, the handmaiden of perestroika, contained elements of both old and new. Like peaceful coexistence, the doctrine of new thinking preached the importance of international tranquility for the accomplishment of the domestic task at hand. Unlike its predecessor, however, Gorbachev's reform ideology broke radically with the past by downgrading class

struggle and elevating universal human values to the position of supreme importance, not temporarily so that the forces of world revolution might catch their breath, as had been the case with peaceful coexistence, but instead as something tantamount to a permanent reordering of ultimate ends. Thus, while Gorbachev's new thinking was still very much an ideology, it was one of a different persuasion than those that preceded it. With its emphasis on interdependence and the symbiotic relationship between domestic and international ends, it shifted the focus of foreign policy reform from the pursuit of apocalyptic outcomes to the institutionalization of democratic processes. In so doing, new political thinking was an ideology that clandestinely contained the seeds of its own destruction.

Like the ideology that informed them, the Gorbachev-Shevardnadze reforms of the foreign policymaking apparatus were unlike anything that had preceded them. While Khrushchev replaced only top-level positions in selected institutions of foreign policy, leaving a number of Stalinist holdovers, such as Ponomarev at the ID, in control of key positions, Gorbachev ruthlessly purged all levels of the foreign policy bureaucracy and did so uniformly across institutions. Thus, under Gorbachev, the staffs of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, as well as the International Department, underwent a complete makeover,

with younger new thinkers typically replacing the dinosaurs of the Brezhnev era.

The Gorbachev reforms not only restaffed the existing foreign policy organs with like-minded people, but created brand new institutions while undermining those that had proven themselves to be especially resistant to change. Yakovlev's new International Policy Commission, a product of the September 1988 Central Committee shakeup, which was established to consider the broadest issues of foreign policy, also facilitated unprecedented cooperation between the constituent elements of the policy process. In conjunction with the rise of the International Policy Commission, the International Department, once the administrator of world revolution, underwent an institutional demotion.

New institutions and new personnel were both prerequisites and catalysts for important changes in foreign policy processes. Previously, Soviet foreign policy had been formulated in an extremely centralized fashion. The process before Gorbachev had been highly centralized, with the Politburo and General Secretary at its apex. Valentin Falin, who would later become head of the newly emasculated International Department, in an unusual 1979 interview, summarized decision making in the Brezhnev years:

> "Our decision making system differs from the American in that it is more centralized. In international or national security affairs, the American Secretaries of State and Defense can make a good many decisions on their own. In our case, all foreign policy and national security questions must be discussed and decided in the Politburo."[120]

Under such a system, secrecy and the compartmentalization of information were operating principles.

Under Gorbachev, it was precisely this "command-administrative" system in foreign policy that was singled out as the source of some of the past's more lamentable foreign policy errors.[121] It followed, therefore, according to Gorbachev era reformers, that the remedy for restructuring the foreign policy apparatus ran parallel to the imperatives of domestic de-Stalinization. At a general level, then, the prescription for avoiding the errors of the past in the realm of foreign policy dovetailed with aspects of the agenda for domestic reform. In both cases, democratization and glasnost were the weapons required to liberate policy from the legacy of Stalinism. Thus, under Gorbachev, broader participation in the foreign policy process was not only permitted but was encouraged, and new voices and new views entered the fray. These new forces, until very recently, had begun to chip away at what

[120]Interview conducted by Henry Brandon, The Washington Star, July 15, 1979.

[121]See, for example, the Gorbachev interview with Time, June 4, 1990, p. 29, where the beleaguered President argued that "in foreign policy too we have to get rid of the command-administrative system. There's no other choice. It's the imperative of our time."

Aleksandr Yakovlev has referred to as the "enemy syndrome,"[122] as the definition of the enemy had become a subject for foreign policy analysts rather than a monolithic product of the inexorable logic of Marxism-Leninism.

The idea that the process by which foreign policy is made is intrinsically of significance and should therefore be a target for reform was perhaps the most radical outgrowth of perestroika. What the reformers referred to as the democratization of foreign policy was, in practice, the rise of a nascent process orientation, however fragile, in Soviet thinking about foreign policy. And while the ascendance of process over outcome in Soviet foreign policy threatens to be short-lived, its temporal existence has already facilitated global change that would have otherwise been unthinkable.

Surveying policy outcomes under Gorbachev in the three components of Soviet foreign policy this study examines, we see, for the first time, something resembling coordination of policy. The reader will recall that the compartmentalization of information and the institutional arrangements of the Stalinist foreign policy process had reinforced dualist tendencies in Soviet foreign policy, the

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[122]Interview with Aleksandr Yakovlev, Literaturnaia Gazeta, no. 7, 14 February 1990, p. 10. FBIS-SOV, 21 February 1990, p. 55. Here, Yakovlev criticized the debilitating effect that the "enemy syndrome" had on Soviet foreign policy: "In the last 70 years...we have been constantly struggling - if there has been no real enemy, we have invented one."

diplomatic and economic arms of the Soviet State often pursuing cooperation with the West, while the transnational arm advanced the cause of world revolution.[123] Under Gorbachev, there was both interaction between the institutions primarily responsible for each of the aforementioned areas and a virtual disappearance of the dualist practices of the past. Whereas in the past the Soviet national interest was intimately linked with the prospect of imminent world revolution, under Gorbachev, of necessity, this was no longer the case; interest instead became tied to the success of perestroika.[124]

And therein lies the tragedy of the Gorbachev reforms. While the profound transformation of every aspect of Soviet political life brought freedom to Eastern Europe, perestroika's failure to ease the hardships of the average Soviet citizen's daily existence undermined the prospects for further liberalization in the Soviet Union. Glasnost greased the wheels of political change, but could not, unfortunately, fill the Soviet Union's empty shops. The resultant polarization of Soviet society and the prospect of imminent civil war make the future of the fragile changes in the Soviet foreign policy process all the more uncertain. Aleksandr Yakovlev once maintained that "if perestroika had

[123]On the tradition of institutional dualism in Soviet foreign policy, see Arkady Shevchenko, Breaking With Moscow (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1985), pp. 187-91.

[124]The point is Igor Malashenko's. Avoiding Nuclear War Seminar at Harvard University, 7 December 1988.

changed nothing within the country, there would be no results in the foreign arena."[125] Unfortunately, the future and past of Soviet foreign policy are bound by the same dynamic.

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[125]Interview with Aleksandr Yakovlev, Pravda, 23 June 1990, p. 5.

CHAPTER FIVE

EPILOGUE

> "Socialism will go on developing through all its phases until it achieves its extremes and its absurdities. Then there will escape anew from the great bosom of the rebellious minority a cry of refusal, and the struggle to death will begin anew, as socialism, assuming the place of present-day conservatism, is vanquished in its turn by the revolution to come..."
>
> -- Alexander Herzen, mid-19th century[1]

At the time of this writing (spring of 1991), the unlikely coalition for change, spanning army, party, military, and the intelligentsia, that had once united behind Gorbachev in the early days of his reform efforts has completely unravelled, with the forces unleashed by the attempted revolution from below now rising up in opposition to their original master. The ominous polarization of Soviet state and society was reflected in the series of public demonstrations this February, when within two days of one another, the armed forces rallied for the defeat of the democrats, while the opponents to Gorbachev demonstrated in support of Yeltsin.

Contrary to recent accounts in the Western press, Gorbachev's condemnation of the Yeltsin camp does not represent a reversion to Stalinist libel. Gorbachev's critique is of another persuasion entirely; instead, he faults Yeltsin for his "anti-Constitutionalist call" and "neo-Bolshevik" tactics, hardly traditional Marxist-Leninist

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[1]Quoted in Jean-Francois Revel, "Is Communism Reversible?", Commentary, vol. 87, no. 1, January 1989, p. 24.

terms of abuse.[2] "The so-called democratic forces have officially announced the overthrow of the existing system,"[3] Gorbachev has maintained, and their attempt to seize power "outside the framework of the Constitution" can only result in the disintegration of the Union, civil war, and still greater suffering. We should not be surprised, therefore, according to the disintegrating Union's president, that "these 'democrats' are entering into political alliance with separatist and nationalist groupings. They have a common aim: to weaken, and if they can demolish, the Union."[4]

In response to this charge of subversion, Yeltsin and his supporters, many of whom are former Gorbachev advisors, have put forth their own version of a new Union treaty, in which each of the fifteen republics is granted the right to independently choose its own future. In the absence of coercion, the Yeltsin camp seems to believe that the non-Russian republics might voluntarily choose to link their destiny with a rehabilitated Russia in some form of a post-Soviet commonwealth, in which the Russian, not the Soviet,

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[2]For the development of the former accusation, see Gorbachev's speech to the Minsk Tractor Workers, Pravda, 28 February 1991. For Gorbachev's reference to "neo-Bolshevik" tactics, and his feeble attempt to explain why he, as a Communist, deploys it as a term of abuse, see his address to the Byelorussian Academy of Sciences, Moscow Central Television, 26 February 1991, transcript in FBIS-SOV, 28 February 1991, p. 76.

[3]Speech to the Minsk Tractor Workers, Pravda, 28 February 1991, p. 1.

[4]Address to the Byelorussian Academy of Sciences, op. cit., p. 75.

president would play the dominant role.[5] Should some republics choose otherwise, that is their right, Yeltsin has argued, and the appropriate severance arrangements should be made. For Yeltsin and his supporters, the preservation of the Union is ultimately less important than the struggle for a free and democratic Russia.

That the Union could be reformed as smoothly and painlessly as Yeltsin would hope possible seems unlikely, and this is not only because of the resurgence of nationalism on Russia's periphery. A recent poll conducted by the All-Union Center for Public Opinion Studies showed that 65% of respondents, when asked "what does the Union mean to the average Russian?", replied that the Union meant shortages, lines, and poverty; 28% said it mean arbitrariness and humiliation.[6] If a significant proportion of Russians as well as non-Russians see the Union itself as part of the problem, then an infinite number of additional referendums is not likely to produce fraternal feelings that transcend ethnic lines.

While the few existing bona fide democrats have thrown their support behind Yeltsin, what unites the Yeltsin populist movement, regrettably, is not a belief in the merits of liberal democracy. Despite his criticism of

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[5]Alexander Rahr, "Gorbachev and El'tsin in a Deadlock," Report on the USSR, February 15, 1991, p. 3.

[6]Report on the USSR, March 22, 1991, Weekly Record of Events, p. 27.

Gorbachev's dictatorial methods, Yeltsin has just asked for and received authorization from the Russian Parliament to rule by presidential decree. In reality, the eclectic Yeltsin coalition for change is instead held together by a common conviction that the old system is so rotten to its very core that nothing of lasting good can be built upon what remains of it. Like perestroika once was, it is a movement defined in opposition to the status quo; consequently, its rallying cry is for Gorbachev's resignation.

That the general population seems to have reached a consensus of this sort means that the terms of the original debate have been transformed.[7] Hence, the struggle between Gorbachev and Yeltsin is no longer a battle over the pace of change within the existing system. A consensus that radical change of some sort is necessary follows inexorably from the country's empty shops and increasingly angry population. The Gorbachev-Yeltsin confrontation is instead a war between the proponents of further reform and the clandestine advocates of revolution.

Here the parallels between Roosevelt in the 1930s and Gorbachev in 1991 are instructive. Like Roosevelt, Gorbachev is a reformer, not a revolutionary. "Roosevelt

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[7]A recent poll conducted for US News and World Report found Gorbachev's approval rating to be only 14%, compared to Yeltsin's 70%. Cited in David Remnick, "Gorbachev is Now the Odd Man In with the Party and the Army," Washington Post, April 2, 1991, p. A14.

consciously sought to preserve capitalism in the midst of its greatest economic crisis by introducing state interventionist policies which many then described as socialistic. Gorbachev seeks to save socialism by introducing free market and democratic policies which many identify as capitalistic."[8] Hence, when Gorbachev declares that "before no audience am I embarassed to say that I am a Communist and adhere to the socialist idea. I will go out with this and, as they say, I will go into the next world with it.",[9] his words amount to more than carefully chosen rhetoric; they are, instead, a statement of faith in both the merits of the socialist enterprise and his adherence to the path of radical reform.

In contrast, though Yeltsin's denunciation of the center's policies is not yet explicitly anti-communist in word, it is in spirit. He has recently, in a speech to the Russian parliament, said that the socialist system had left Soviet citizens "bringing up the rear of world civilization."[10] Unlike Gorbachev, what Yeltsin and his supporters today ultimately demand is more than reform of

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[8]Seymour Martin Lipset, "Politics and Society in the USSR: A Traveler's Report," PS: Political Science and Politics, vol. 23, no. 1, March 1990, p. 28.

[9]Address to the Byelorussian Academy of Sciences, op. cit., p. 79.

[10]Speech by Boris Yeltsin at the Third Extraordinary Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies, broadcast live on Moscow Radio Rossii, 29 March 1991. FBIS-SOV, 1 April, 1991, p. 67.

the existing system - which was the intention of the original 500 days plan - but instead, a complete refounding of the regime itself, through the vehicle of a revolution in Russia's past relationship with the other once-Soviet republics.[11]

Though the terms of debate have changed, Gorbachev has stubbornly insisted that perestroika's goals remain the same:

> This is the whole point of perestroika: work through reforms, deep and revolutionary, and not through confrontation, not through a new version of civil war...Let's be done with reds and whites, blacks and blues, and so on. We are one country, one society, and within the framework of political pluralism...we should find the kind of answers that will meet the fundamental interests of the people and that will move the country. That is the task of the political center. These are the aims of perestroika."[12]

Consequently, to say that Gorbachev has shifted his position under fire misses the more important point. The embattled President of the disintegrating Union continues to pursue the centrist strategy with which he began, but with the popular forces he unleashed now aligned against him, he must increasingly rely on surviving communist institutions to maintain his power. Ironically, they are the very entities that have been drained of legitimacy by his own reform efforts. Polls conducted by Soviet sociologist and former Gorbachev supporter, Tatyana Zaslavskaya, show that

[11]Ibid., pp. 71-2.

[12]Address to the Byelorussian Academy of Sciences, op. cit., p. 78.

Gorbachev's remaining support comes from the "oldest, least educated, most conservative" segments of the population, and that over 90% of Soviet citizens under 30 reject any brand of communism or socialism for their nation's future.[13]

It is for this reason that the tragedy of Gorbachev's present predicament is inescapable. The centrist position for change has grown ever more untenable, as Gorbachev's reliance on the old institutions of communist power for support binds him more and more inextricably to the miserable status quo in the eyes of the masses, despite his fateful role in reawakening a sleepwalking nation. Once tied to the advance of socialism without, the Party must now cling for its very life to the only remaining accomplishment of communism in power, the sprawling Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The alternatives - either a Party-led crackdown on the swelling chorus of discontent or Gorbachev's ouster and the inevitable explosion of nationalist claims - under current circumstances, only promise unthinkable violence.

Given the utter bankruptcy of Marxism-Leninism, a crackdown waged in the name of Communism could not be sustained for long before the quest for alternative sources of legitimacy was revived, and another cycle of violence initiated. In this sense, a complete replaying of the

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[13]Cited in David Remnick, "Gorbachev is Now the Odd Man In with the Party and the Army," Washington Post, April 2, 1991, p. A14.

Soviet past is impossible. Nor does the Russian tsarist past hold much sustenance for the aspirations of the fledgling democratic forces. It is only the right wing alternative - some new amalgam of Russian nationalism and militarized politics - that has yet to demonstrate its inability to solve the nation's problems in practice. All the more appealing because it can be seen to have perished at the hands of the allegedly anti-nationalist Bolsheviks, it is this variant of the politics of despair that poses the greatest threat to new political thinking.

After six years of perestroika, dangerously, the Soviet Union still remains a highly militarized society, but one now stripped of its original raison d'etre. For the center of the crumbling empire, the rebirth and harnessing of Russian nationalism by opportunistic elements is one way that post-communist legitimacy could be provided for the forces that are capable of restoring political, economic, and social order. Under this shadow, we can only hope and do what little we can to ensure that post-Soviet Russia's road to the reestablishment of political authority will lead through accomplishments within, rather than conquests without.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION: THE LEGACY OF FAILED REFORM

This project has sought to illuminate the historical relationship between radical domestic change and foreign policy processes and outcomes in the Soviet Union. We began with the working assumption that the old frameworks for the study of Soviet politics - those that stressed continuity over nascent change - were not only incapable of accounting for the Gorbachev reforms, but may well have also distorted our understanding of Soviet foreign policy formulation and implementation, both past and present.

Our comparative investigation of the foreign policies of Stalin, Khrushchev, and Gorbachev has validated that assumption. In the preceding chapters, we saw how each leader's attempt to remake political life inside the Soviet Union shaped Soviet external behavior. Further, our inquiry has shown how the legacy of failed reform has set the stage for the foreign policy of perestroika. In restoring the neglected domestic reform dynamic to the history of Soviet foreign policy, this study, therefore, seeks to make a contribution to a larger process of historical recovery that is ongoing in the Soviet Union today.

The Stalin, Khrushchev, and Gorbachev programs for domestic change obviously differed dramatically in both content and aspirations. Yet leadership for change in all three instances, at the most general level, sought similar ends: the radical transformation of Soviet political culture. Each attempted to manipulate existing institutions and the character of institutional and individual

participation in political life to accomplish this end. In so doing, Stalin's revolution from above forged a pernicious political and economic system that Khrushchev would subsequently endeavor to reform and Gorbachev would irreparably subvert.

The preceding chapters, then, have traced the ways in which these successive attempts at the radical transformation of domestic political life have shaped Soviet foreign policy processes and outcomes. This was accomplished by examining the three primary components of Soviet foreign policy - diplomatic policy, international economic policy, and transnational policy - at the height of each leader's crusade for domestic change. For the purposes of clarity, we shall first present the results of the comparison across policy areas before turning to the larger question of what we discover when we compare the aggregate foreign policies of each leader over time, since the results of the former inform the conclusions of the latter.

While pursuing radically different domestic agendas, the diplomatic policies of Stalin, Khrushchev, and Gorbachev in the periods we examine were singleminded in their pursuit of cooperation with the capitalist west. The early Stalin years produced a series of friendship and non-aggression pacts with a range of ideological adversaries. With peaceful coexistence, Khrushchev elevated the quest for tactical rapprochement with the West to the status of official ideology.

The new political thinking of the Gorbachev years took matters more than a step further, declaring cooperation with an increasingly interdependent world to be a permanent goal of Soviet diplomacy, rather than a temporary respite in the march toward a glorious communist future, as had been the case in the Khrushchev years. While ideological developments under Gorbachev were of utmost significance - this point will be elaborated below - the fact remains that there was little that was new and much that was familiar in the Soviet Union's renewed desire for cooperation with the West. The battle for internal change has always coincided with a concerted simultaneous effort to maintain peace on the Soviet Union's external front.

With internal turmoil as a backdrop, the external economic policies of the Soviet Union have also been uniformly conciliatory. From Stalin to Khrushchev to Gorbachev, Soviet foreign trade policy has moved in tandem with diplomatic policy. That is to say, all three leaders deployed foreign trade strategically in their struggles to revitalize the Soviet system. Each regime singled out a set of goods or services that was perceived to be the catalyst for the attainment of specific domestic ends, and mandated the import of the targeted items from on high.

For Stalin, the road to progress, purchased with the destruction of the Soviet peasantry, was paved with the heavy machinery and equipment that would fuel forced industrialization. Khrushchev coveted Western items that

might advance Soviet agriculture. Similarly, Gorbachev first fell in love with machine tools, before the collapsing Soviet economy forced him to turn his affections to consumer goods. In all three cases, fulfilling the import plan so that domestic goals might be met presupposed cooperation with the capitalist West.

While all three regimes sought to expand trade with the non-socialist world, each singling out different key sectors to be the principal recipients of Western import infusions, Gorbachev pursued familiar ends through unfamiliar means. Instead of solely dictating import quotas to guide economic development from on high, Gorbachev instead decentralized the foreign trade of the sectors meant to benefit from the targeted import items. Put another way, where Stalin and Khrushchev would have issued commands from above, Gorbachev decentralized.

While coveting Western technology, both Khrushchev and Stalin had balked at the idea of permitting direct foreign influence in the Soviet economy. Unlike his predecessors, Gorbachev encouraged foreign investment in the Soviet Union; indeed, the import of Western expertise was an indispensable component of his strategy for remaking the centrally planned economy. Western businessmen and enterprises were solicited, through the vehicle of joint venture projects, to aid the Soviet Union in the decentralization effort. Opening up the Soviet economy so that it might benefit from foreign know-how is an enterprise

that by definition involves the partial relinquishment of central control. The initiator of this sort of economic reform cannot for long be its master.

Thus, unlike the pet projects of past import campaigns, Gorbachev's quest for foreign expertise was a reflection of his simultaneous effort to dismantle the Stalinist system. The unprecedented idea at the heart of Gorbachev's economic reforms was the notion that there were methods of organizing economic life to be learned from the West that Marxism-Leninism was ultimately incapable of teaching. After more than seventy years of insisting that the Soviet system was the way of the future, this was an admission with revolutionary implications. As the first communist state, the legitimacy of the Soviet domestic political order prior to the rise of Gorbachev had always been tied to the Soviet Union's continued external role as vanguard of the forces of socialist progress, who were involved in a struggle to the death with imperialism's excesses. With his radical suggestion that cooperating with and even learning from former capitalist adversaries was the key to Soviet economic renewal, Gorbachev effectively rendered impotent what had for a long time been a critical source of regime legitimacy.

Perhaps understandably, then, it was on the transnational arm of Soviet foreign policy that the Gorbachev revolution had its most profound impact. Under Stalin and Khrushchev, Soviet internationalist policy had

been singlemindedly focused on advancing the cause of world revolution. Directed by the Politburo and administered primarily by first the Comintern and then the International Department, Soviet transnational policy during Stalin's revolution from above and Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign seems to have equated the promotion of Soviet interests with the advance of socialism abroad, at the very same time that Soviet diplomatic and international economic policy saw the interests of the world's first socialist state best served by cooperation with the capitalist economies. Under both Stalin and Khrushchev, then, given that the Soviet internationalist mischief in Europe and the third world aroused the utmost suspicion in the West, the operations of the International Department and those of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade functioned at fundamental cross purposes.

The resulting tension between the respective strands of foreign policy examined here could only serve to exacerbate the West's suspicion of the Soviet Union's ultimate aspirations, thereby undermining the accomplishment of domestic plans. The question that naturally arises is why both Khrushchev and Stalin, while their motives undoubtedly differed, not only tolerated but endorsed this schizophrenic agenda for Soviet external policy.

The general answer, with respect to both the Stalin and Khrushchev eras, is that the legitimacy of the Soviet state was served by the continued pursuit of revolutionary

goals. Demonstrating the Soviet Union's revolutionary credentials became all the more important as relations with the capitalist West improved, since rapprochement with class adversaries was by definition ideologically suspect. With Soviet diplomatic policy pursuing the ends of a status quo power, first the Comintern and then the International Department were assigned the task of bolstering the Soviet Union's ever more suspect revolutionary reputation. And so Stalin dispatched the Comintern to subvert the political systems of the very states he had simultaneously instructed the Foreign ministry to woo. Khrushchev's International Department promoted anti-Western sentiment in the third world, while at the same time, his diplomats sought the favor of the first world. That these agendas in combination, to the non-Marxist eye, were overtly contradictory was never a great concern of either Stalin or Khrushchev; higher truths in truly scientific socialism were always dialectical.

Observing similar patterns in the Brezhnev version of detente, Harry Gelman has traced the schizophrenic foreign policy of the late Brezhnev years to a "decoupling" of third world policy, which was the domain of Boris Ponomarev's International Department, and Soviet American policy, which was principally executed by Gromyko's MFA.[1] The de facto institutional bifurcation to which Gelman refers both

[1]See Harry Gelman, The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984).

reflected and was a product of Moscow's enduring desire to play the roles of status quo and revolutionary power simultaneously.

This investigation has demonstrated that Gelman's point also holds for the foreign policies of the early Stalin and Khrushchev eras, that detente's eventual downfall can be at least partially explained through reference to an institutional division of labor in Soviet foreign policy that predated the Brezhnev years. Put another way, the Soviet version of detente was a product of preexistent patterns in the Soviet foreign policy process.

This longstanding dualist tradition in Soviet external policy, one which seems to have been most pronounced under circumstances of internal disarray, faltered under Gorbachev. The first casualties in the struggle for change were the principal administrators of past policy, many of whom had held their entrenched positions since the Khrushchev years. The launching of perestroika coincided with the removal of Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko and of the head of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, Nikolai Patolichev, who had maintained their positions for twenty eight and twenty seven years, respectively. Soon thereafter, in early 1986, Soviet internationalist policy was liberated, when Ponomarev, a dinosaur from the Stalinist era, who had headed the International Department since its inception, was sent into retirement.

The new leadership subsequently conducted a sweeping purge of the foreign policy bureaucracy, one which, unlike the Khrushchev post-succession shakeup, took place uniformly across existing institutions. The reader will recall that Khrushchev, while purging the top levels of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, had left the leadership, staff, and programs of the Central Committee's International Department intact. In contrast, under Gorbachev, the personnel of the International Department, as well as the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, underwent a complete makeover, with younger new faces replacing aging cold warriors. Moreover, unlike Khrushchev's version of de-Stalinization, Gorbachev's purge permeated all levels of the foreign policy apparatus.

Subsequent institutional reforms dealt further blows to the revolutionary tradition in Soviet foreign policy. The September 1988 Central Committee shakeup resulted in the reorganization and relative demotion of the International Department, the institutional embodiment of the struggle for world revolution being placed under the watchful eye of Yakovlev's new International Policy Commission. Thus, the International Department was first staffed with like-minded people, and then stripped of its former powers in the administration of transnational policy. In so doing, the power of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Gorbachev's new Foreign Minister in the overall foreign policy process increased accordingly.

As was the case with Gorbachev's domestic program, the full de-Stalinization of the Soviet foreign policy process required both a revolution from above and from below. Just as domestic perestroika was doomed to failure without glasnost, the reform of the foreign policy apparatus relied on democratization for survival. Under Khrushchev and Stalin, dissenting opinions on matters of foreign policy were strictly forbidden; all official participants were encouraged to fall in line behind the Party line, which was forged in secret by a handful of individuals. In contrast, under Gorbachev - until very recently - the party line not only permitted dissent but actively encouraged it. As a result, new voices and new views entered the fray, the increase in both the quantity and the quality of participation in the foreign policy process further transforming traditional patterns of institutional interaction. With its eclectic membership, the new International Policy Commission, facilitated cooperation and information sharing between the institutional components of the foreign policy process, where previously secrecy and strictly hierarchical compartmentalization of information had prevailed.

While Khrushchev's de-Stalinization efforts, through ideological innovation and tactical reform of the foreign policy apparatus, had shaped foreign policy ends and outcomes, the basic authoritarian foreign policy process itself, however, had remained largely intact. Additionally,

despite Khrushchev's efforts to purge old Stalinists from top positions and replace them with his patrons, a Stalin appointee, Ponomarev continued to supervise the administration of the Soviet Union's internationalist policy throughout the Khrushchev years and well beyond. If the change from Lenin to Stalin meant that "the foreign policy of a movement became the foreign policy of a single man,"[2] the change from Stalin to Khrushchev entailed the restoration of oligarchical foreign policy decision making; while in one instance the final arbiter was one man who terrorized all and in the other a collection of Politburo members who instead waged real war only on one another, the process itself was still, in either instance, a captive of central planning.

In contrast, the idea that the "command-administrative" process by which foreign policy was made in the past produced decisions that ran counter to Soviet interests was perhaps the most radical outgrowth of perestroika. The reforms that were promulgated from above and promoted from below under Gorbachev combined to open up the Soviet foreign policy process to new ideas and actors. By encouraging and legitimizing the participation of these new voices, perestroika, in turn, laid the fragile foundation for a new elite political culture. Thus, following the resignation of his position, instead of

[2]George F. Kennan, Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1961), p. 258.

quietly exiting from political life, former foreign minister Shevardnadze instead founded a new Foreign Policy Association, a nongovernmental organization which is to function both as the Soviet equivalent of an independent think tank and as an advocate for continued foreign policy reform and the preservation of new political thinking's gains.[3] Without the Gorbachev reformation of foreign policy processes, such a move would have been unthinkable.

New political thinking, the handmaiden of perestroika, both guided and legitimated the attempted revolutions from above and below. Like peaceful coexistence, Gorbachev's ideology of reform extolled the importance of international tranquility for the accomplishment of crucial domestic goals. Unlike its forerunner, however, new political thinking broke radically with the past by downgrading class struggle and elevating universal human values to the position of supreme importance. Where peaceful coexistence had viewed cooperation with the West as a specific form of class struggle, a tactical maneuver to accelerate the advent of world socialism, new thinking instead called for the transcendence of class struggle in interstate relations, class struggle being a misguided and dangerous proposition in an increasingly interdependent world. Preaching cooperation rather than struggle as a permanent imperative of Soviet external policy, new political thinking implicitly

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[3] Izvestiia, 22 February 1991, p. 2.

embodied an unprecedented reordering of traditional revolutionary ends.

In short, Gorbachev's ideology of reform, unlike its predecessors, attempted a fundamental redefinition of socialist internationalism. Instead of the Comintern or non-aligned movement, the forum for discussing socialism's goals became the United Nations. The utopianism of world revolution was replaced with the idealism of a world ruled by international, rather than socialist, law. The new socialist internationalism urged the fraternal countries to build their own future, without fear of interference from their former vanguard. The semantic sleight of hand, however, could not for long disguise what in reality amounted to a renunciation of Marxism-Leninism's most cherished suppositions.

Thus, while new political thinking surely began as an ideology, it was one of a qualitatively different persuasion than the permutations of socialist internationalism that had preceded it. Both new political thinking and glasnost rested on the assumption that cooperation and toleration in both international and domestic politics were goals that were worthy in and of themselves, that the Soviet Union's problems were often as much the results of authoritarian policy processes as of imprudently selected policy ends. With its emphasis on interdependence and the importance of coordinating international and domestic ends, new political thinking shifted the locus of foreign policy reform from the

strategic pursuit of apocalyptic outcomes to the democratization of the foreign policy process.

Yet an ideology that extols processes over ultimate outcomes quickly develops, through a certain inexorable logic, into nothing resembling an ideology at all, that is, at least not one that could be categorized as either Marxist or Leninist in orientation. In this way, both new political thinking and glasnost were ideologies that clandestinely contained the seeds of their own destruction.

The de-ideologization of Soviet foreign policy, as Soviet analysts have referred to it, then, has as much to do with the return of discourse on foreign policy issues to Soviet political life as it does with the renunciation of world revolution as the ultimate objective. Georgii Shakhnazarov, one of Gorbachev's principal foreign policy advisors, has described the formidable legacy that perestroika struggled to overcome:

> "Every ideology creates its own bureaucracy...which strives to prolong its life at any cost, covering its flaws and praising its achievements. The circle of social interests which it serves, as a rule, is wide enough at its inception but gradually declines. Correspondingly, the measure of partiality imbued in the ideology grows, the defects in the perception of the surrounding world turn more or less into complete distortion...This was a society extremely ideologized and half-blind, which had lost the ability to understand its own situation. Perestroika, glasnost and democratization brought it out of this situation."[4]

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[4]Georgii Shakhnazarov, "The Renewal of Ideology or the Ideology of Renewal," New Outlook, vol. I, no. 4, Fall 1990, p. 20.

With respect to the Soviet Union's external policy as well as to internal affairs, Gorbachev's agenda required a revolution of the mind, for which glasnost, in both instances, was to be the catalyst. The spread of glasnost slowly gnawed away at atavistic perceptions of the world and the Soviet Union's place within it, while the war on secrecy and oligarchy simultaneously made it more difficult for the sheer force of ideology to prevail over fact-based insight in the formulation of specific policies. The net result was that little that was once held sacred survived. As political journalist Len Karpinsky has argued, "the disgraces of history are revealed entirely. Ideology is a relic. We live in the world now, for better and worse. There is no going back."[5]

As we have seen, maintaining the illusion of socialism's unfaltering advance beyond the Soviet Union's borders had once functioned as a vital component of regime legitimacy in the face of an increasingly miserable domestic reality. The democratization of the foreign policy process under Gorbachev systematically exposed the myth of the inexorable march of socialist accomplishment beyond the Soviet Union's border, despite appearances at home to the contrary, as cruel and empty rhetoric. With glasnost, the history of Soviet foreign policy, once the story of the power of the socialist idea, was exposed to be instead one

[5]Quoted in David Remnick, "Beyond the Soviet Abyss," Washington Post, March 17, 1991, p. D5.

of brutal military domination and coerced submission purchased at the expense of the Soviet people. The unintended consequence of glasnost, therefore, was the irreparable draining of legitimacy from surviving communist institutions.

Under Gorbachev, the sheer financial burden of maintaining Marxist-Leninist fantasy finally grew too weighty; the renunciation of class struggle as the supreme value in Soviet external policy took place when it did only because the costs of empire had grown so large that the risk of pulling the rug out from under the entire tottering Stalinist edifice had to be taken. Gorbachev's new thinking, then, may well have been genuine but was, at the same time, an act of desperation as well as revelation. In this sense, the remaking of Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet empire was as much a product of the legacy of failed reform as it was of Gorbachev's personal initiative.

There are at least several possible objections to the interpretation of the Gorbachev reforms presented here. First, one could argue that the apparent redefinition of Soviet interests was not rooted in domestic change, but was instead a manifestation of lessons learned by the Soviet

leadership in the Brezhnev years.[6] This study has highlighted the existence of cycles in the Soviet Union's interest in cooperation with its ideological adversaries, which would seem to suggest that if lessons have been learned under Gorbachev, they could just as easily be unlearned. Moreover, as it is quite difficult to identify instances of learning without reference to the changes in behavior that are both caused by and reflect learning, the concept does not take one very far in thinking about the probable future of Soviet foreign policy. Proponents of learning theories are in one way on the right track, however, as their approaches inevitably highlight the important role of ideas in Soviet politics.

That there have been cycles in Soviet external policy raises the second potential objection to the conclusions presented here. If Soviet foreign policy is rooted in domestic factors, and domestic politics in the Soviet Union have exhibited patterns of reform and retrenchment, then why should not Gorbachev himself be viewed as the most recent manifestation of this dynamic, particularly with reaction on the march in the Soviet Union today?

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[6]See, for example, George Breslauer, "Ideology and Learning in Soviet Third World Policy," World Politics, vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 429-448.; Robert Legvold, "War, Weapons, and Soviet Foreign Policy," in Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum, eds., Gorbachev's Russia and American Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Nuclear Learning and US-Soviet Security Regimes," International Organization, vol. 41, no. 3, Summer 1987.

This study has attempted to demonstrate that while Gorbachev, like Khrushchev before him, utilized Stalinist tactics in the pursuit of de-Stalinization, he also broke significantly with the past. Gorbachev's attempt to revitalize mass politics was not an effort to promote new forms of planned participation, as had been the case under Khrushchev, but instead to encourage a spontaneous revolution from below, which was to supplement the familiar revolution from above. The qualitatively different character of the Gorbachev reform effort has irreversibly compromised the legitimacy of the Party's surviving foreign policy institutions, making a reversion to the institutional arrangements of the Brezhnev era no longer a viable option for either Gorbachev or his successors. This is not to say that the Russian foreign policy of the future will no longer be capable of pursuing messianic ends. It is instead to imply that Soviet foreign policy as we have known it is a ghost of the past, not the future.

Generational change is a third competing explanation of Soviet foreign policy change under Gorbachev. According to this perspective, the presence of Stalinists in key foreign policy positions prior to Gorbachev, for all practical purposes, precluded the possibility of genuine change in Soviet perceptions of national interest. By replacing relics of an era past with young, new thinkers, so the argument goes, Gorbachev facilitated a revolution in Soviet foreign policy.

Those who emphasize the role of generational change are right to point out the significance of new faces in old positions under Gorbachev. For example, recent statistical work by Bill Zimmerman and Deborah Yarsike has demonstrated the correlation between age and more militant foreign policy views.[7] Yet, as the investigation herein has demonstrated, the Gorbachev reforms did more than merely purge the foreign policy apparatus of old Stalinists; they also simultaneously transformed the process by which policy had previously been formulated and administered, allowing new views, as well as new actors, to influence the making of Soviet foreign policy. Without this concurrent institutional and cultural change, the fact of generational change could not have expressed itself in such dramatic fashion. Thus, while the presence of generational change is both palpable and important, it cannot in and of itself account for the changes in Soviet external policy under Gorbachev.

A fourth objection to the argument presented here is that it abstracts away the influence of American foreign policy on Soviet international behavior. Without the Reagan Administration's defense buildup and abiding commitment to combatting Soviet influence on the periphery, these challengers would maintain, the Soviet Union would have

[7]William Zimmerman and Deborah Yarsike, "Mass Publics and Major Changes in Soviet Foreign Policy," Paper prepared for the World Congress of Soviet Affairs, Harrogate, England, July 1990, to appear in William Zimmerman, ed., The Changing Soviet Union and the Re-evaluation of Western Security Policy.

marched along in a Brezhnevian holding pattern, despite a mounting economic crisis, for years longer.

This position, somewhat ironically, was perhaps most popular in the Soviet Union. While it too, like the other competing theories discussed above, contains an element of truth, in its fixation on the importance of American actions in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy, it overestimates the extent to which the United States has been capable of shaping Soviet political behavior.

While Soviet perceptions of the origins of American foreign policy have indeed grown more sophisticated over time, the common denominator in Soviet international relations theory prior to the rise of Gorbachev was that the class struggle, reflected in the ongoing battle to the death between the malevolent forces of imperialism and the benevolent forces of socialism, was the fundamental dynamic of international interaction. If American intentions were seen to be unfailingly sinister, whether the Americans were at present pursuing detente or confrontation was of little relevance for the formulation of Soviet strategy. Thus, the Reagan Administration's hard line policy may have stepped up the external pressure for internal change at a critical juncture in Soviet history, but the argument that goes one step further, identifying American foreign policy as the driving force behind the movement for reform in the Soviet Union, in the end, obscures more than it reveals.

Finally, Jack Snyder has maintained that the origins of "historical Soviet expansionism and zero-sum game thinking about international politics have largely been caused by the nature of Soviet domestic institutions. These institutions, their authoritarian methods, and their militant ideology were necessary for the tasks of 'extensive economic development'...After these tasks were accomplished, the Stalinist institutions hung on as atavisms, using the militant ideology and the exaggeration of the foreign threat to justify their self-serving policies."[8] The eradication of atavistic Stalinist institutions, therefore, is the source of any waning in Soviet expansionism.

In many ways, the findings of this project are compatible with Snyder's argument, but they ultimately represent an elaboration rather than a complete validation of his perspective. The persistence of Stalinist institutions does indeed explain the general trajectory of Soviet foreign policy history, but can shed little light on the ebbs and flows of Soviet militarism; that is to say, it cannot account for the variance in Soviet foreign policy either over time or across issue areas.

Snyder does endeavor to explain the foreign policies of Gorbachev's predecessors, exploring, in somewhat ad hoc fashion, the dynamics of domestic coalition building, but in

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[8]Jack Snyder, "The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?", International Security, vol. 12, no. 3, Winter 1987/88, p. 94.

so doing, he clandestinely smuggles back into his account ideas and leadership, both being factors that the parsimonious theory of atavistic institutions discounts. Thus, Soviet expansionist behavior, while propelled by atavistic institutions, is, at the same time, also rooted in "the institutional and intellectual legacy of Stalin's revolution from above."[9]

Obviously, the former assertion is not equivalent to the latter; if the intellectual legacy of Stalinism is important, then the tradition of Soviet militarism is more than the sum total of pernicious institutional and economic arrangements. My point here is not that ideas are somehow more important than institutions in the shaping of Soviet foreign policy processes and outcomes; one must, as Snyder does, evaluate both factors to account for incremental, as well as revolutionary, change. It is simply that the engine driving Snyder's story of Soviet foreign policy consists of much more than atavistic institutional arrangements.

In contrast, my emphasis on leadership for reform and the role of attempted cultural change in Soviet political development explicitly incorporates the factors that Snyder's theory implicitly employs. The result is a less parsimonious explanation, but one which can shed light on both the general course of Soviet foreign policy, as well as

[9]Ibid., p. 108. Despite the overarching theoretical claim to the contrary, similar references to the role of ideas in Soviet foreign policy development abound throughout Snyder's essay.

on the separate trajectories of its principal components - diplomatic, international economic, and transnational policies - which, as we have seen, have not always moved in tandem. Additionally, attention to the legacy of failed reform can also lay the foundation for understanding where the Soviet Union may be going, as well as where it has been.

Appearing on Italian television in March 1991, former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze warned that without perestroika, resistance to German reunification could have been severe enough to start a third world war.[10] If the sea change in Soviet international behavior had its origins in the tentative democratization of foreign policy processes, as this thesis has argued, then the demise of glasnost and tolerance in Soviet domestic politics in turn does not bode well for new thinking. The future of Russian foreign policy is bound up with the outcome of the present crisis of legitimacy in Soviet domestic political arrangements. Whatever the ultimate result, the nature of the potential threat to new thinking no longer remains the same. The internationalist dreams of Marxism-Leninism, so thoroughly discredited, can no longer sustain a reversion to the offensive detente of the Brezhnev years. In this sense, the era of Soviet foreign policy is drawing to a close.

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[10] Report on the USSR, March 22, 1991, Weekly Record of Events, p. 37.

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V. NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS

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Daily Report - Soviet Union (FBIS)
Economist
Harriman Institute Forum
International Herald Tribune
Moscow News
New York Review of Books
New York Times
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Report on the USSR (RFE/RL Research Institute)
Saturday Review
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In French:

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